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The dissertation consists of three distinct chapters that contribute to important, yet 
unresolved topics in Macroeconomics and International Economics. 
 
Macroeconomists have been keenly interested in understanding how financial 
crisis turn into real recessions in emerging markets. By using a unique data set for 1,300 
listed firms from six Latin American countries, the first chapter (co-authored with 
Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Carolina Villegas-Sanchez) provides systematic evidence on 
the key channel behind the contractionary nature of financial crises. Using a differences-
in-differences methodology, we disentangle the role played by banks’ credit crunch and 
firms' balance sheet currency mismatches in firms’ investment behavior in the aftermath 
of steep devaluations. Our results suggest that the key factor hindering investment and 
growth in the aftermath of financial crises is the decline in the supply of credit. 
 
Economists and policymakers have also been interested in the response of 
exchanges rates to central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets. The second 
chapter considers the recent experience of Colombia between 2004 and 2007, and 
examines the effectiveness of central bank intervention in stemming domestic currency 
appreciation under an inflation-targeting regime. The results indicate that the 
combination of peso-weakening interventions and expansionary monetary policy between 
2004 and 2006 seem to have led to a reduction in appreciation pressures. In contrast, 
 
xii 
sterilized intervention was ineffective in stemming domestic currency appreciation during 
2007, as large-scale intervention was working against a backdrop of intense monetary 
tightening.  
 
The third chapter (co-authored with Sebastian Auguste, Kathryn Dominguez and 
Linda Tesar) explores the ways in which cross-border financial markets are used to 
circumvent capital controls. We study the recent experience of investors in Argentina 
who while subject to capital controls, were able to purchase cross-listed shares using 
local currency, convert them into dollar-denominated shares, re-sell them abroad, and 
deposit the dollar proceeds in foreign bank accounts. We find that capital controls drive a 
wedge between the price of local shares and their corresponding cross-listed shares. This 
wedge provides an implicit devaluation forecast and the market’s valuation of capital 








What Hinders Investment in the Aftermath of Financial Crises: 
Insolvent Firms or Illiquid Banks?1 
1.   Introduction 
How do financial crises turn into real recessions? There are two leading views. 
The first view highlights the importance of a troubled banking sector that cuts lending in 
the face of a negative liquidity shock (bank lending channel). As argued by Bernanke 
(1983) if firms cannot smooth out the liquidity shortage from their banks, this can have 
large contractionary real effects. Chang and Velasco (2001) develop a model for a typical 
emerging market crisis, where deteriorating access to liquidity is at the center of the 
problem, hindering investment and growth. During the 2007–2009 global crisis central 
banks around the world spent hundreds of billions of dollars to rescue their banking 
systems in fear of such shortages in lending. 
The second view stresses the relevance of firms’ weak balance sheets and the 
associated decline in their net worth (balance sheet channel).2 Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) show that shocks that affect net worth can amplify fluctuations. Business 
downturns deteriorate firms’ net worth, which increase the cost of borrowing and 
decrease investment even further (the so-called accelerator effect). The deterioration of 
firms’ net worth can be the result of a “maturity mismatch” and/or a “currency mismatch” 
in firms’ balance sheets. Maturity mismatch refers to the practice of financing relatively 
illiquid long-term assets with short-term debt (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 
1996). Currency mismatch results from the practice of denominating assets and liabilities 
                                                 
1 This chapter was co-authored with Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Carolina Villegas-Sanchez. 
2 Note that the literature also refers to this as the collateral channel since a negative (positive) shock to 
firms’ collateral (which is part of the balance sheet) causes firms’ borrowing capacity and net worth to go 
down (up). See Holmstorm and Tirole (1997). 
 
2 
in different currencies and hence exposing the firm to exchange rate fluctuations. 
Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) propose a model in which insolvent firms with 
weak balance sheets cannot borrow and contract production during depreciations.3 Given 
the possibility of such balance sheet effects, central banks have been reluctant to let 
currencies devalue in response to external shocks, as shown by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002). 
In order to be able to link financial crises to real outcomes, we have to know the 
relative importance of these financial constraints. Is it the case that firms cannot borrow 
due to insolvency or is it the case that banks cannot extend credit given the credit crunch? 
Both of these channels may cause firms to decrease investment and hinder growth. Our 
contribution in this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we provide systematic evidence 
on how financial crises turn into recessions by disentangling these two main sources of 
financing constraints, bank illiquidity versus firm insolvency. Second, we provide first-
time evidence on substantial real effects of bank credit supply shocks, namely on firm-
level investment. Although, there is an extensive empirical literature on the bank lending 
channel that tests the link between shocks to bank capital and the decline in credit 
provision for firms, this literature has so far been unsuccessful in providing evidence on 
the effects of such shocks on real outcomes.4 
The main challenge to identification comes from the necessity of separating the 
demand for credit by firms from the supply of credit by banks while conditioning on 
changes in firms’ creditworthiness as a result of shocks to their balance sheet. To do so, 
we utilize the experience of six Latin American countries that went through a range of 
crises during 1990–2005. We rest our identification on the fact that different types of 
crises—currency versus banking—affect the supply and demand of credit differentially. 
During a currency crisis and a twin crisis (which involves both currency and banking 
crises) demand for credit by exporters will be relatively higher given the depreciated 
                                                 
3 See also Krugman (1999) and Eichengreen and Hausman (1999). 
4 Most of this literature has not focused on real activity. An early exception is the work by Peek and 
Rosengren (2000), who investigated using state level data from the U.S., changes in real estate activity in 
states with large presence of Japanese banks after the Japan banking crisis. Two recent exceptions are the 
work by Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2011), and the work by Amiti and Weinstein 
(2011). Both papers focus solely on exports, showing a negative effect of bank supply shocks on exports. 
See section 2 for a detailed review. 
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currency, while supply of credit will be relatively lower under a twin crisis. Hence, we 
assume the demand for credit on the part of exporters goes up under both type of crises 
while the supply of credit goes down relatively more under twin crises. The key is to 
compare the investment undertaken by exporters under currency crises episodes, where 
there is a positive demand shock, with the investment of exporters under a twin crisis. In 
the latter case, the profit opportunity is still there but there is also an economy wide credit 
shortage as a result of the negative supply shock to domestic banks. In these twin crisis 
episodes, prior to the currency crash the banking system collapses, as shown by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). 
We identify from within firm changes and therefore we must control for changes 
in firms’ creditworthiness to disentangle the financing constraints. Since both types of 
crises involve a depreciation of the domestic currency in excess of 25 percent, the 
creditworthiness of exporters with foreign currency denominated debt is at stake under 
both type of crises. Conditioning on the changes in creditworthiness through holdings of 
foreign currency debt, we exploit the degree of foreign ownership of the firm, as a proxy 
for firm-level liquidity. This strategy allows us to investigate the differential response of 
foreign-owned versus domestic exporters to a positive demand shock—conditioning on 
their holdings of foreign currency debt—under currency and twin crises, where only the 
latter involves a big negative supply shock to the local banking sector.5 
We study four episodes of currency crises (Mexico 1995, Argentina 2002, Brazil 
1999 and 2002). Two of these episodes were twin crises since they were combined with a 
banking crisis (Mexico 1994, Argentina 2001). In order to have firm-level measures of 
insolvency and liquidity over time, we have hand-collected a unique panel database with 
annual accounting information for the whole universe of listed non-financial companies 
in six Latin American countries, spanning the period 1990 to 2005. For these 1,300 listed 
firms, we observe time-varying measures of the currency denomination and maturity 
structure of both debt and assets, firm’s export revenue, and foreign ownership stakes. To 
                                                 
5 In a recent paper Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro-Alcalde, and Saurina (2011) propose an alternative strategy to 
identify the effect of negative supply shocks to banks on domestic credit provision based on matched bank-
firm level data. They provide evidence that the bank lending channel is stronger if one accounts for 
unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity. Their estimation strategy using firm-year fixed effects, 
however, prevents studying the effects of shocks to banks on firm-level real outcomes. 
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our knowledge, the data is unique in an emerging market setting as it contains cross-
country, time-varying information on the currency and maturity composition of firms’ 
balance sheets, the breakdown of sales into domestic and export revenues, and a precise 
measure of foreign ownership. 
We define a potentially insolvent firm as one with high leverage and holdings of 
short-term foreign currency denominated debt that are not matched by a dollar 
denominated stream of income like dollar assets and/or export revenue. This is based on 
Allen et al. (2002), who argue that maturity and currency mismatch interact to determine 
firm’s solvency risk. These firms are obviously more likely to experience a decline in net 
worth in the face of a currency crisis. We measure the liquidity shock, first, at the 
country-level, by focusing on twin crisis episodes that are characterized by a general dry 
up of credit in the year prior to the currency crisis for all firms. Second, we use different 
firm-level measures that proxy the relative ease of access to finance, such as bond and 
stock issuance abroad, and also direct foreign investment into the firm. Given that during 
crises times markets shy away from emerging countries the former may not be the best 
measures of access to finance during such times, as argued by Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2010). Instead, we argue that foreign ownership that captures direct and portfolio equity 
investment by foreigners is a better measure of access to finance during financial crises 
and use it throughout the analysis as our preferred firm-level measure of access to 
liquidity. The reason is that foreign-owned firms are likely to have better access to 
international markets during crises in the absence of well functioning domestic banks. 
Foreign affiliates also have the possibility of drawing funds from the parent company 
through internal capital-market lending.6 
The differences-in-differences identification strategy allows us to investigate the 
following hypothesis. If the illiquidity channel is the main source of financial constraints, 
foreign-owned exporters should invest relatively more than domestic exporters during 
twin crises but not during currency crises, conditional on short-term foreign currency 
                                                 
6 Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) argue that multinational affiliates access parent equity when local firms 
are most constrained. Similarly, Antras, Desai, and Foley (2009) present evidence that suggests that even 
during “normal” times, foreign affiliates increase their reliance on capital flows from the parent company in 
the presence of weak financial institutions in the country of operation. 
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denominated debt and leverage. The reason is that only the former is associated with an 
illiquidity problem that does not affect foreign firms (or would affect them relatively less 
than domestic firms). Notice in this case we are holding the balance sheet channel 
constant, by comparing exporters holding short-term dollar debt that only differ in 
ownership status. In other words, given two firms with the same level of short-term dollar 
debt and exports, only the foreign-owned firm would increase investment during twin 
crises. We account for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity via firm fixed effects. Hence 
we solely identify from within firm changes. Use of sector-year fixed effects accounts for 
all macro and industry supply and demand shocks that are common to all exporters in an 
industry. The panel dimension of our data allows us to condition on many country 
specific policy changes and other shocks through the use of country-year effects. For 
example, if the shock is common to all our countries (or to the world) then it will be 
absorbed by our time effects. The country-year effects will also allow us to account for 
the different nature of each crisis, valuation effects and the prior country-level trends. 
Although the direction of causality between banking and currency crises is 
debated in the literature (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example) for our 
purposes this is not relevant given our differences-in-differences methodology that 
identifies from relative changes in firm-level outcomes. In the twin crisis episodes that 
we consider, the banking crises were not the result of firm bankruptcies as in some other 
countries and they predated the currency crises. Nevertheless in order to avoid any 
concerns about anticipating the currency crisis we conduct most of our analysis based on 
predetermined variables that characterized firms according to their economic outcomes 
three years prior to the first crisis in each country. 
A key advantage of our estimation strategy is that it allows quantifying the extra 
investment undertaken by firms with access to liquidity as well as the decline in 
investment as a result of a balance sheet weakness. Our main results are summarized as 
follows. Conditional on exposure to short term dollar debt, foreign-owned exporters 
invest relatively more than domestic exporters only during twin crises, where domestic 
firms access to finance is limited given the troubled banking sector. There is no 
difference in investment between these firms during currency crises. This implies that 
both set of exporters have similar access to liquidity under currency crises. During twin 
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crises, however, domestic exporters suffer from the credit crunch. Conditional on changes 
in short term dollar denominated debt, foreign-owned exporters increase investment by 
15 percentage points relative to domestic exporters. Domestic exporters in turn, decrease 
investment by 11 percentage points relative to foreign exporters. The latter effect 
suggests not only the inability of domestic exporters to take the investment opportunity 
but the additional hampering effect of not being able to roll over the short-term debt. 
Overall our results point to the key role of illiquidity rather than insolvency as the main 
source of financial constraint that hinders investment and growth in the aftermath of 
financial crises. This result is fully consistent with the model of Chang and Velasco 
(2001), where adding foreign direct investment precludes the bank run result of their 
model. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents our data. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 presents robustness analysis and discusses alternative stories 
and threats to identification. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.   Related Literature 
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. First, the literature on the 
bank lending channel focuses on establishing the causal link between a shock to bank 
capital and lower lending to firms. Unfortunately due to data and/or estimation strategy 
limitations, this literature does not study the real effects of lower credit such as the effects 
on firms’ investment. The aim of this literature is to establish a casual relationship from 
the negative supply shocks to banks to declining credit provision to firms. The findings in 
a developing country context show that this is indeed the case.7 
Second, our paper draws from the literature on the organization of the firm and in 
particular, the recent theoretical advances that highlight the interplay by firm 
heterogeneity and incomplete contracts in explaining the degree of vertical integration of 
                                                 
7 See Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), and Schnabl (2010). 
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the firm.8 Specifically, Antras, Desai, and Foley (2009) develop a model in which firms 
wanting to exploit technologies abroad will engage in foreign direct investment, acting as 
multinationals especially in environments with weak investor protection. External funders 
require multinational companies’ participation in the local project to ensure better 
monitoring of the investment. As a result, weak financial institutions increase the reliance 
on capital flows from the parent company. This higher reliance on financing through 
internal capital markets by the foreign affiliate in general plays a critical role during 
financial crises. There is a growing literature that investigates the role of foreign 
ownership and FDI during financial crises. Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) investigate 
the response of sales, assets, and capital expenditure of U.S. multinational affiliates and 
domestic firms in the aftermath of a variety of financial crises from 25 emerging market 
countries and find that foreign affiliates outperform their local counterparts across these 
performance measures. Their interpretation is that local firms are constrained due to their 
limited access to finance. However, as they acknowledge, they are unable to document 
the exact mechanism by which currency depreciations differentially intensify financing 
constraints since they lack data on the currency denomination of the debt. The paper by 
Blalock, Gertler, and Levine (2008) extends the analysis of Desai, Foley, and Forbes 
(2008) by focusing solely on exporting plants and investigate the role of foreign 
ownership for this group of establishments in Indonesia. Their strategy allows 
identification of the local firms who would benefit most from the currency devaluation.9 
They reinforce the conclusion of Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) by showing that 
foreign-owned exporters clearly increase investment relative to domestic exporters. 
Alfaro and Chen (2010) using a world-wide dataset on multinational subsidiaries show 
that, establishments sharing stronger vertical production and financial linkages with the 
parent company increase sales during the recent “Global Financial Crisis.” 
All these results are consistent with the existence of financial constraints but the 
source of the constraint is not clear. It is possible that foreign-owned exporters have 
                                                 
8 See Antras (2003, 2005), and Antras and Helpman (2004). 
9 Note that Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) also investigate the differential impact of the depreciation on 
multinationals that are export-oriented by proxying exports with sales from subsidiaries abroad. They did 
not find a stronger effect though. In their analysis, multinational affiliates do better than local firms, 
regardless of the fact that they are export-oriented. 
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stronger balance sheets through having less dollar denominated debt than their domestic 
counterparts. Alternatively they may have more dollar denominated debt but at the same 
time they may have matching dollar revenue from their exports. Or simply, foreigners 
might be better at managing their balance sheet. In any of these cases foreign exporters 
will have higher net worth and will not be facing solvency issues. This creates a selection 
problem, where certain firms with no solvency issues are in the exporter sample, biasing 
results on export performance. Solving this selection bias caused by omitting the balance-
sheet weakness is at the heart of our paper. 
Thus, our paper is also related to the literature that investigates the effect of 
foreign currency borrowing and the associated weak balance sheets on firms’ investment. 
The work by Aguiar (2005) shows that firms with heavy exposure to short-term foreign 
currency debt before the Mexican crisis decreased investment compared to firms with 
lower dollar debt exposure. He shows an increase in sales for both groups but a decrease 
in investment for the exposed group. Hence, his results support the idea that weak 
balance sheets can hinder investment during a major currency crisis episode. However, in 
a very similar study using a bigger sample of Latin American countries during the period 
1991–1999, Bleakley and Cowan (2008) show the opposite result focusing on total debt: 
firms holding dollar debt invest more during exchange rate depreciations. They are the 
first to argue that firms match the currency composition of their liabilities with that of 
their income streams or assets, avoiding insolvency during a currency depreciation. Our 
findings can bridge these two set of studies and provide an explanation for seemingly 
conflicting results. 
 
3.   Data and Construction of Regression Variables 
The empirical analysis draws on a unique database with accounting information 
for over 1,300 companies in six Latin American countries, spanning the period 1990 to 
2005. The countries covered are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. 
The data was assembled from different sources.10 A distinct feature of this data is that it 
                                                 
10 Details of the data are provided in Appendix and further details in Kamil (2009). 
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contains detailed information on the currency and maturity composition of firms’ balance 
sheets, the breakdown of sales into domestic and export revenues, firms’ foreign-
ownership structure and other measures of access to international markets, such as 
corporate bond issuances abroad. This issuance data is at transaction-level and obtained 
from Dealogic database and includes firms’ bond and syndicated loan issuance. 
Financial statement data was obtained from annual balance sheet reports drawn 
from local stock markets and regulatory agencies in each country. Data on foreign 
currency liabilities and assets (and their maturity structure) was hand-collected from the 
financial explanatory notes of firms’ balance sheets. These are all assets or liabilities 
outstanding which are denominated in—or indexed to—foreign currency, issued 
domestically or abroad. In the case of liabilities, these include bank loans, commercial 
debt, trade credit and foreign securities. Foreign currency assets include cash, 
government securities indexed to the dollar, bank deposits abroad and overseas client 
credits. 
While firms in many cases report both consolidated and unconsolidated financial 
statements, we use unconsolidated figures, to reduce variations arising from changes in 
subsidiaries’ ownership and to avoid double counting. Information on firms’ export 
revenues was obtained from income statement data. When this was not available, we used 
countries’ customs office records or Central Bank’s Balance of Payments trade registries. 
In the latter case, we merged balance sheet information with firms’ export sales using 
their tax code identifier and/or name. 
 
3.1 Investment 
Our left hand side variable is investment in fixed capital. The measure of 
investment used in the empirical analysis is the annual change in the stock of physical 
capital scaled by total assets to control for the firm size. This investment to asset ratio is 
winsorized at the lower and upper 1 percent level at the country level to control for 
outliers before it is used in the regression. The stock of physical capital, in turn, is 
defined as the sum of expenditures on property, plant, equipment, plus technical 
reappraisal (valuation change), minus cumulated depreciation. We attempt to minimize 
any exchange rate and valuation effects by normalizing investment by total assets and 
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including country-year fixed effects, that will absorb common exchange rate fluctuations 
and valuation effects. In addition, we try to minimize the effects of accounting bias in the 
value of capital stock by estimating the models with firm-level fixed effects. 
 
3.2 Dollar Liabilities, Export Revenue, and Tradable Sector 
We measure dollar liabilities as the ratio of total dollar liabilities to total liabilities 
and short term dollar liabilities as the ratio of short term dollar liabilities to total short 
term liabilities. Short-term liabilities refer to outstanding debt that must be payed within 
12 months. This measure includes foreign currency denominated debt issued at short 
maturities as well as long-term issues whose terminal date falls over the next 12 months. 
The sources of foreign currency financing differ across countries. In Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico, and Peru firms can borrow in dollars from domestic banks. In the case of 
Colombia and Brazil, however, most of companies’ foreign currency borrowing is 
obtained abroad (whether bond issuances, bank loans or trade credit).11 This is because, in 
these countries, financial dollarization is severely restricted: on-shore foreign currency 
deposits are banned and private banks cannot lend in dollars. In Colombia, firms cannot 
borrow in foreign currency from any type of bank (commercial or state-owned). 
Therefore, firms located in Colombia can only raise foreign currency by issuing bonds, 
loans and equity abroad or through trade credit with foreign suppliers. In Brazil, firms 
that want to borrow in foreign currency domestically can only do so through the state 
development bank (BNDES) under stringent conditions. In fact, only exporters can 
borrow easily from BNDES by pledging foreign currency revenue as collateral against 
dollar debt. Given the fact that we will focus on exporters throughout our analysis, we do 
not worry about firms in Brazil holding significantly less foreign currency denominated 
debt than firms in the rest of our five Latin American countries. As we show later, 
exporters hold more dollar debt than non-exporters across all our countries. 
Exporter status defined by export to sales ratio where sales is defined as gross 
sales from main operating activities. We also define two exporter dummy variables, one 
that takes the value of one if the firm reported export revenue in a given year and zero 
                                                 
11 We thank Laura Alfaro for pointing this out. 
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otherwise. The second one aims to identify exporters with a high exports to sales ratio, so 
that it takes the value of one if the firms’ export revenue represents more than 10 percent 
of the sales and zero otherwise. This is a substantial improvement over previous studies 
in the literature that typically used aggregate variables to proxy for firms’ access to 
foreign currency revenue (either a binary tradable/non-tradable classification or industry 
export shares). 
To control for selection, we also define exporting firms based on a predetermined 
dummy variable. A firm is classified as exporter if she reported export revenue at any 
time during the three years prior to the first crisis.12 In addition, given the severity of the 
banking crisis in Colombia, exporters in this country are defined based on whether the 
firm reported export revenue in 1995, 1996, or 1997 (three years prior to the banking 
crisis). In Peru and Chile where no substantial banking crisis and/or currency crisis took 
place during our sample period, predetermined exporters are defined based on whether 
firms reported export revenue at any time during the period of analysis. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008) identify a banking crisis in Peru 1999 however, the decline in credit to the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP was only of 3 percentage points between 1999 and 
2000 and 5 percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as oppose to 50 percent decline in 
credit to private sector in the case of Mexico. 
 
3.3 Foreign Ownership 
One of the contributions of our paper is to construct a continuous measure of 
foreign ownership for each firm in our sample. Our indicator of foreign ownership is 
based on precise dates of ownership changes, foreigner’s share in the firm and the 
nationality of the parent and global ultimate parent. The continuous measure will allow us 
to explore the role of majority foreign-owned companies by defining a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if foreigners own more than 50 percent of the firm’s capital 
structure and zero otherwise. To check whether or not the results are driven by firms 
                                                 
12 In the case of Argentina, we refer to years 1998, 1999, and 2000; Brazil 1996, 1997, and 1998; Mexico 
1991, 1992, and 1993. 
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becoming foreign-owned during the crises, we also define a predetermined foreign 
dummy variable as in the case of exporters. 
To identify the ownership structure of each firm in our sample and track their 
changes over time, we proceed in two steps, where we provide details on the construction 
of the foreign ownership variable in the appendix. First, we gathered data on all cross-
border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) of Latin-American firms between 1981 to 2005 
using the SDC Platinum database from Thompson (for the period 1981 to 2001) and 
Zephyr from Bureau Van Dijk (from 1997 to 2005). We then identified all transactions 
where the target involved a firm in our sample. Examining M&As from the 1980s 
onwards ensures that we capture any change in ownership relationship that predates the 
firm’s first appearance in our sample, that is 1990. For each deal, we obtained the date on 
which the transaction became effective and characteristics of the target and acquiring 
firms, in particular, the nationality of the target and acquiring firm, and that of the 
ultimate parent. The database also includes transaction-specific information on percent of 
shares acquired and the percent of shares owned before and after the transaction was 
completed. In total, we consider 4,406 completed deals that resulted in a change in 
majority control in a target firm in our sample as well as acquisitions of minority stakes 
(some of which involve multiple acquisitions of the same target). Of the firms in our 
sample, 28 percent were involved in at least one M&A during the period. For each firm 
involved in an M&A, we constructed a continuous, time-varying measure of foreign 
ownership based on the percentage fraction of shares held by foreign and domestic 
investors in each year. 
As a result, the foreign ownership measure can take any value between 0 and 100 
and represents the percentage of capital owned by foreign investors at a given point in 
time. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of average foreign ownership over time in our 
sample, in a balanced panel. Many Latin American countries underwent massive 
privatization processes during the 1990s. Therefore, as expected, foreign ownership has 
steadily grown over time. Most of our sampled firms are domestic and hence the 
distribution of foreign ownership has a high concentration of firms around zero, where 70 
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percent of the firms are domestic, as shown in Figure 1.2.13 Figure 1.3 shows that among 
those firms with positive foreign ownership, 40 percent of the observations are between 
85 percent and 100 percent foreign-owned. Hence foreign investors prefer to have a 
controlling stake in general. These distributions look similar by country. 
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3.4 The Crises Episodes 
Table 1.1 shows the currency crisis and banking crisis episodes for our sample of 
countries together with percent changes in macro aggregates before, during and after the 
crisis episodes. Following Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) we identify a currency crisis 
in a given year if the real exchange rate increased by more than 25 percent with respect to 
the previous year. We identify four currency crisis episodes in our sample: Mexico 
(1995), Brazil (1999), Brazil (2002), and Argentina (2002).14 
Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) we identify the following banking crises: 
Argentina (1995) and (2001), Brazil (1995), Mexico (1994), and Colombia (1998). 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) base their classification of banking crises on two types of 
                                                 
14 All four episodes implied a considerable depreciation of the real exchange rate, the two episodes in 
Brazil amounted to a 34 percent depreciation while Mexico witnessed a 47 percent depreciation and 
Argentina 96 percent. Notice Mexico abandoned the peg in December 1994 and consequently the end-of 
year exchange rate only depreciated between December 1994 and December 1995. As expected we do not 
observe significant differences in the investment rates of foreign-owned exporters relative to domestic 
exporters during 1994 when the exchange rate had not yet depreciated, since no new investment 
opportunity had arisen. 
 
15 
events. First, they focus on bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the 
public sector of one or more financial institutions. Second, in the absence of bank runs, 
according to their classification, a banking crisis involves the closure, merging, takeover, 
or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of 
institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions. 
The banking crises in our analysis, Argentina (2001) and Mexico (1994) were 
precipitated by different events. In Argentina, in March 2001, a bank run started due to 
lack of public confidence in government policy actions. There was strong opposition 
from the public to the new fiscal austerity package sent to the Congress and the 
amendment to the convertibility law (change in parity from being pegged to the dollar, to 
being pegged to a basket composed of the U.S. dollar and Euro) as described in Laeven 
and Valencia (2008). As a result of the bank run, partial withdrawal restrictions were 
imposed (corralito) and fixed-term deposits (CDs) were reprogrammed to stop outflows 
from banks (corralon). In Mexico the 1994 banking crisis had different origins. Until 
1991 banks were nationalized. With the privatization process in 1991-1992, investors 
with scarce previous experience in banking wanting to quickly recover their investment 
extended large amounts of loans without a proper credit risk analysis. This behavior, 
together with the stagnation of real estate prices and the increase in U.S. real interest rates 
eroded banks’ balance sheets. In 1994, 9 out of 34 banks were intervened and 11 banks 
participated in the loan/purchase recapitalization program of 34 commercial banks. The 9 
banks accounted for 19 percent of the financial system assets. 
Table 1.1 shows that, in terms of macroeconomic preconditions in these countries 
at the time of the crisis, with the exception of Argentina, the other countries were 
showing similar growth rates of GDP, investment and trade balance. All these percent 
changes are averages over two years. During and post crisis experiences differ from 
country to country, showing the importance of including country-year effects. A common 
feature of recovery in all countries is the increase in investment and exports leading to a 




Table 1.1. Macroeconomic Outcomes of Twin and Currency Crises 
  Argentina  Mexico Brazil Brazil 
Outcome  Period 2002 1995 1999 2002 
GDP per capita growth prior crisis -3.7% 1.3% 0.2% 1.3% 
 crisis -2.5% -2.4% 0.8% 0.5% 
 post crisis 7.8% 4.2% 1.3% 3.1% 
GFKF to GDP prior crisis -12.0% 2.7% 4.0% 2.7% 
 crisis -6.5% -9.5% -1.8% -5.0% 
 post crisis 25.0% 14.4% 2.7% 6.1% 
Trade Balance to GDP prior crisis 1.0% 3.9% 3.1% 11.9% 
 crisis 29.4% 24.0% 15.7% 2.6% 
 post crisis 6.1% 1.1% 11.9% -0.8% 
Notes: Using data on CPI, the real exchange rates were obtained as the deflated end of period exchange 
rates. A currency crisis is defined as a 25 percent increase in the real exchange rate relative to the previous 
year. We identify four depreciation episodes in our sample: Argentina (2002), Mexico (1995), Brazil 
(1999), and Brazil (2002). Mexico abandoned the peg in December 1994, Brazil in January 1999 and 
finally, Argentina in January 2002. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) we identify the following 
banking crises that predated a currency crisis: Argentina (2001) and Mexico (1994). Therefore, there are 
two twin crises episodes (simultaneous currency and banking crisis) in our sample: Argentina (2002) and 
Mexico (1995). Consequently the crises years are Argentina 2002 and 2003; Mexico 1995 and 1996; Brazil 
1999 and 2000; Brazil 2002 and 2003. We report percentage changes over a two year period. GDP stands 
for Gross Domestic Product. GFKF to GDP stands for the ratio of Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP. 
Trade Balance to GDP stands for the ratio of Exports minus Import to GDP. 
 
3.5 Sample Selection 
All firms in the sample are publicly-traded companies. Following previous 
research, we excluded financial firms. Focusing solely on publicly listed firms was 
dictated by data availability, and has the disadvantage that the patterns observed for 
publicly traded firms might not be representative of the corporate sector as a whole. Yet, 
it has the advantage that financial statistics being more accurate and comprehensive. 
Moreover, relative to other available databases the coverage of small and medium-sized 
publicly traded firms is better since we have the whole universe of listed firms. The 
database covers all firms that are listed—or have been listed—in the six countries’ stock 
exchanges, rather than just the most liquid or with the biggest market capitalization, as 
has been common in other data sets used widely in cross-country studies such as 
Worldscope. 
Most of our variables are expressed as ratios; where this is not the case, we deflate 
the nominal magnitudes with 2000 values using December-to-December changes in the 
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consumer price index and converting them to U.S. dollars using December 2000 market 
exchange rates. Since we identify of off time variation we exclude all firms with non-
consecutive yearly observations (i.e., which appear disappear and reappear in the 
sample), which constitute 10 percent of the sampled firms. The size of the sample 
changes as new firms enter and exit the sample. Only less than 10 percent of the firms 
delisted and hence we believe the survivorship bias is negligible.15 
This cleaning procedure outlined in the appendix leave us with complete 
information for an unbalanced panel of 6,175 firm-year observations, which consist of 
931 firms with an average of around 7 years each. Finally, data on additional controls 
included later on in the estimation leaves us with a sample of 5,063 observations or 864 
firms. 
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Although our sample is restricted to listed companies there is nevertheless great 
heterogeneity across firms regarding whether a firm exports or not, their foreign debt 
holdings and the degree of foreign ownership. Table 1.2 reports the percentage of 
observations by type of firm, averaged over our sample period. Foreign is a dummy that 
takes the value of one if the company is majority owned (more than 50 percent) by a 
foreign investor and zero otherwise. In Argentina 53 percent of the sampled firms are 
foreign-owned while in Colombia only 16 percent would be considered foreign-owned. 
Another important variable in our analysis is export status. Around 56 percent of the 
observations report some export revenue and half of those observations report a ratio of 
export revenue to sales greater than 10 percent. Regarding dollar assets and liabilities, 81 
percent of the sample reports some positive debt holding denominated in foreign currency 
while only 59 percent of the sample reports positive dollar assets. Again these figures 
vary by country. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, we have a greater number of 
observations with positive values of dollar debt. 
                                                 
15 In order to explore sample bias due to delisting/bankruptcy we look at the original sample that included 
all firms that were listed at some point in any of these Latin American countries. In Mexico 1995 and 
Brazil 1999 none of the firms delisted due to a change in ownership. In Argentina 2002 and Brazil 2002 
only one of the delisting firms actually changed ownership status the first year of the crisis. 
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Table 1.2. Percentage of Observations by Country 
 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Total 
Foreign 0.53 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.32 0.25 
Exporter 0.57 0.48 0.40 0.53 0.68 0.84 0.56 
HighExporter 0.29 0.34 0.18 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.30 
DumTotalDollarDebt 0.98 0.86 0.66 0.60 0.90 1.00 0.81 
DumShortDollarDebt 0.94 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.89 1.00 0.76 
DumDollarAssets 0.88 0.21 0.57 0.44 0.95 0.99 0.59 
Number of Observations 539 1292 1552 639 1634 519 6175 
Notes: Observations refer to the sample of firms left after the cleaning procedure. The number of 
observations does not coincide with the final number of observations in the estimation due to missing data. 
Foreign is a dummy that takes a value of one if foreigners own more than 50% of the company’s capital. 
Exporter is a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm reports export revenue and zero otherwise. 
HighExporter is a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm reports export revenue greater than 10% of 
sales. DumTotalDollarDebt is a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm reports positive total dollar 
denominated liabilities. DumShortDollarDebt is a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm reports 
positive short-term dollar denominated liabilities. DumDollarAssets is a dummy that takes a value of one if 
the firm reports positive total dollar denominated assets. 
 
 
There is also extensive variation in the main variables used in the analysis. Table 
1.3 reports summary statistics for these variables. On average firms hold 26 percent of 
their short-term debt denominated in foreign currency while exporters hold on average 
higher values of their debt denominated in foreign currency (35 percent). 20 percent of 
total liabilities correspond to short-term bank debt and exporters seem to exhibit only a 
slightly higher dependence on short-term bank debt at 22 percent. Finally, bonds and 
equity issuance abroad is limited at 2 percent and loan issuance abroad is only 5 percent. 




Table 1.3. Summary Statistics 
Total Sample Exporter Sample  
Mean sd Obs Mean sd Obs 
Investment 0.001 0.07 5063 0.001 0.10 2988 
TotalAssets 18.72 2.00 5063 19.00 1.79 2988 
ShortDollarDebt 0.26 0.28 5063 0.35 0.29 2988 
ExportShare 0.11 0.21 5063 0.17 0.24 2988 
HighExporter 0.28 0.45 5063 0.42 0.49 2988 
Foreign 0.15 0.36 5063 0.17 0.38 2988 
ShortBankDebt 0.20 0.19 5063 0.22 0.20 2988 
BondAbroad 0.02 0.14 5063 0.02 0.16 2988 
LoanAbroad 0.05 0.21 5063 0.06 0.24 2988 
EquityAbroad 0.02 0.15 5063 0.02 0.15 2988 
 
Notes: Statistics refer to the final sample of firms used in the estimation. The exporter sample is based on a 
predetermined export dummy that is equal to one if the firm reported export revenue during the three years 
prior to the first crisis and zero otherwise. Investment is physical stock of capital at time t minus physical 
stock of capital at time t–1 normalized by total assets. TotalAssets is the log of lagged total assets. Foreign 
is the percentage of capital owned by foreign investors (lagged). ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term 
dollar denominated liabilities to short-term debt (lagged). ExportShare is the ratio of export revenue to total 
sales (lagged). HighExporter is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ratio of exports to sales is higher 
than 10% (based on lagged ExportShare). ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short-term bank debt to total 
liabilities (lagged). BondAbroad dummy that takes a value of one if the firm has issued bonds abroad 
(lagged). LoanAbroad dummy is similarly defined if the firm has issued syndicated loans abroad (lagged). 
EquityAbroad dummy is equal to one if the firm has issued equity abroad (lagged). 
 
There is also great heterogeneity in dollar debt holdings across different types of 
firms. This is the crucial variation that we exploit in the paper. Table 1.4 shows that on 
average exporters hold more dollar debt than non-exporting firms. Moreover, foreign-
owned and domestic exporters hold similar average ratios of short-term debt denominated 
in foreign currency. However, there is great variation across countries. While in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, foreign-owned exporters hold a higher share of their 
short-term debt denominated in dollars than domestic exporters, in Mexico and Peru 




Table 1.4. Dollar Debt by Firm Type: Summary Statistics 
Exporter Non-Exporter 
 
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations
Argentina 0.52 0.58 106 0.44 0.41 58 
Brazil 0.28 0.24 331 0.13 0.02 458 
Chile 0.28 0.21 936 0.07 0.00 608 
Colombia 0.10 0.04 328 0.07 0.00 293 
Mexico 0.44 0.43 974 0.24 0.15 644 
Peru 0.53 0.54 313 0.52 0.55 14 
Total 0.35 0.31 2988 0.15 0.02 2075 
 Foreign Domestic 
 Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observations
Argentina 0.56 0.60 74 0.43 0.42 90 
Brazil 0.17 0.08 105 0.19 0.11 684 
Chile 0.17 0.04 362 0.21 0.07 1182 
Colombia 0.09 0.08 37 0.09 0.01 584 
Mexico 0.31 0.32 130 0.36 0.32 1488 
Peru 0.48 0.46 109 0.56 0.57 218 
Total 0.26 0.17 817 0.26 0.16 4246 
Foreign Exporter Domestic Exporter  
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observation
Argentina 0.58 0.61 47 0.47 0.52 59 
Brazil 0.30 0.34 42 0.28 0.23 289 
Chile 0.21 0.11 224 0.30 0.23 712 
Colombia 0.09 0.08 37 0.10 0.03 291 
Mexico 0.33 0.33 119 0.45 0.45 855 
Peru 0.47 0.44 105 0.56 0.57 208 
Total 0.31 0.27 574 0.35 0.31 2414 
Foreign High Exporter Domestic High Exporter  
Mean Median Observations Mean Median Observation
Argentina 0.61 0.69 25 0.47 0.51 27 
Brazil 0.35 0.41 19 0.29 0.25 238 
Chile 0.21 0.11 62 0.40 0.37 352 
Colombia 0.13 0.15 8 0.16 0.07 107 
Mexico 0.33 0.31 42 0.55 0.58 445 
Peru 0.53 0.54 46 0.65 0.70 108 
Total 0.37 0.35 202 0.43 0.43 1277 
Notes: Mean, median and number of observations for the variable ShortDollarDebt are reported. 
ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to short-term debt. Exporter is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm reports any export revenue at any time during the three 
years prior to the first crisis and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm 
is more than 50% owned at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis and 0 otherwise. 
HighExporter is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm reports export revenue higher than 




4.   Identification Strategy 
Our objective is twofold: We want to identify whether financial crises translate 
into lower firm-level investment, and, if so, through which channel this happens. The 
main challenge to identification is to separate the demand for credit by firms from the 
supply of credit by banks, holding firm creditworthiness constant. Exploiting firm-level 
variation during different type of crises that moves demand and supply for credit in 
opposite direction is key for our identification. A currency crisis is a positive demand 
shock for exporters and a banking crisis is a negative supply shock. 
Currency crises can also impact firms’ creditworthiness by inflating the value of 
dollar denominated debt holdings. In order to account for the balance sheet channel we 
incorporate into the analysis the dollar debt holdings of these exporting firms. Exporting 
firms without dollar debt holdings would not experience a decrease in net worth due to a 
depreciated currency. The decline in net worth experienced by exporting firms holding 
dollar debt would ultimately depend on their ability to match dollar denominated income 
(exports) and dollar debt holdings. As a result, we focus on the sample of exporting firms 
that are the ones expected to increase investment and at the same time have the 
opportunity to avoid a mismatch on their balance sheet. Table 1.4 shows that the median 
exporting firm holds on average 31 percent of short-term debt denominated in foreign 
currency while the median non-exporting firm holds less than 1 percent of the short-term 
debt denominated in dollars (notice the high variation across countries). 
Regarding the liquidity channel, we exploit both country and firm-level 
heterogeneity. We observe more than one depreciation episode and some of these 
episodes are combined with banking crises. Hence, all the currency crises episodes share 
the depreciation of the currency and consequently, a potential balance sheet weakness. 
However, in some of the depreciation episodes there is in addition, an economy-wide 
liquidity shock resulting from the troubled domestic banking sector (these are the so-
called twin crises episodes). As argued by Kaminsky (2006) not all currency crises are 
the same. Twin and currency crises are different treatment events. They are both 
characterized by the depreciation of the currency but in addition, twin crises involve a 
general dry up of available funds. During twin crises, even firms that do not experience a 
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deterioration of their net worth might have difficulties in accessing external financial 
resources and therefore invest less. 
We exploit firm-level heterogeneity in liquidity under different crisis episodes 
utilizing data on the ownership structure of the firm. As discussed before, several recent 
papers have shown that foreign-owned companies outperform domestic companies 
during financial crises. This evidence is consistent with an access to finance explanation 
where foreign-owned firms outperform the domestic counterparts during a crisis given 
their connections to international financial markets and/or deeper internal capital markets. 
An alternative explanation for the higher investment of foreign owned firms is that these 
firms may not suffer from weak balance sheets since they are insulated from exchange 
rate fluctuations. Our identification strategy will allow us to disentangle these two 
sources of liquidity constraints, insolvency versus illiquidity. We compare investment of 
foreign owned exporting firms with dollar debt holdings to that of domestic exporting 
firms who also have dollar debt holdings. This will allow us to identify the exact 
mechanism for the financial constraint. Conditional on the assumption that during a 
currency crisis the financial sector does not face liquidity constraints, we should observe 
no significant differences between foreign-owned and domestic exporting firms holding 
their creditworthiness constant. During a twin crisis, on the other hand, foreign-owned 
exporting firms should invest relatively more than domestic exporting firms since 
domestic firms that are heavily reliant on the domestic banking system will witness a 
sharp decline in the availability of credit. Our data on bank dependence (i.e., the ratio of 
short-term bank debt to total liabilities) confirm that on average the ratio of short-term 
bank debt to total liabilities for exporting firms is 16 percent while that of high exporters 
is 25 percent. This is in line with the channel outlined in Amiti and Weinstein (2011) 
where exporting firms rely heavily on short-term debt for operation. Within the sample of 
high exporters there are no major significant differences across domestic and foreign-
owned companies regarding their reliance on short-term bank debt (both types of firms 
show a bank dependence ratio of around 24 percent).16 Despite the similar reliance of 
domestic and foreign-owned companies on bank credit, which confirms the suitability of 
                                                 
16 Notice that we are not able to determine whether the bank debt is from domestic or international banks 
that might be more or less exposed to the national country shock 
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comparing these firms, foreign-owned exporting firms would still have access to 
international financial markets either directly or through the parent company. 
A critical assumption for our study is that banks are illiquid only during twin 
crises and not during currency crises. Notice that our results do not rest on the very strict 
form of this assumption. We only need banks to be relatively more illiquid during twin 
crises compared to currency crises. Since the seminal work of Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999), there has been an extensive literature highlighting the role of a troubled banking 
sector that turns a currency crisis into a twin crisis. This is especially relevant for 
emerging markets where stock and bond markets are less developed and banks are the 
main source of credit. Therefore, bank illiquidity means a halt in domestic credit 
provision. Banks can also be insolvent if they have a balance-sheet mismatch of their 
own. For our purposes of focusing on the real effects of the crisis, where the investment 
decision is taken by the firm, the key factor is whether or not banks can provide liquidity 
to firms, regardless of whether they are themselves illiquid or insolvent. The extensive 
literature on the bank lending channel also provides evidence on the causal link between 
a negative shock to banks and the credit provision to firms in a developing country 
context, as reviewed in section 2. The critical issue here is that all the banking crises 
predate the currency crises and were not originated by firm bankruptcy, which was the 
case as discussed in section 3.4. If banks become insolvent under a currency crisis and 
halt domestic credit provision as much as in the case of a twin crisis, then our firm-level 
access to finance measure—foreign ownership—should not have differential explanatory 
power among the types of crisis, i.e., domestic firms should do worse than foreign-owned 
firms under both types of crisis. 
Figure 1.4 demonstrates the case in point and shows that in our sample, countries 
that experienced a twin crisis witnessed a significant decline in domestic credit provision, 
whereas this did not happen in countries that went thorough currency crisis episodes. The 
top left panel shows domestic credit to the private sector (as a percent of GDP) in Chile, a 
country that had no crises during our sample period. The top right panel shows the case 
of Colombia, who had a banking crisis in 1998. The 15 percentage point decline in 
domestic credit is clearly visible. The bottom left panel shows the case of Mexico where 
the banking crisis of 1994 is followed by the currency crisis in 1995. Again domestic 
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credit as percent of GDP dropped sharply, corresponding to a 50 percent decline in credit 
provision to the private sector. Finally, the bottom right panel represents Brazil who did 
not suffer from a collapse in bank lending during the currency crises of 1999 and 2002.17 
 





















































For our identification strategy, summarized above, we need to run a triple 
difference-in-difference specification that we estimate for the sample of exporting firms: 
 
                                                 
17 Notice the beginning of the 90s was a very turbulent period in Brazil. Inflation was rampant with a peak 
of 82.4 percent in March 1990. A new government designed a stabilization program, Plano Real, aimed to 
reduced fiscal deficit and introduced a new currency. During the 1980s, banks acted as intermediaries of 
the public sector debt and benefited from high inflation and indexation. To avoid reducing their profits once 
inflation was brought down, banks initially expanded credit (mostly through consumer and commercial 
loans). Although the new currency brought down inflation, it could not prevent the banking crisis in 1995. 
The sharp decline in domestic credit to the private sector is clear from Figure 1.4. The scale does not show 
the 15 percentage point decline in credit from 1995 to 1998 and the subsequent slightly increase from 1998 











































   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
(1.1)
 
where yi,c,j,t is the outcome of firm i, in country c, in sector j at time t. For the outcome 
variables, we use sales and investment scaled by total assets to control for firm size. 
Foreign can be used as a continuous variable and also as a dummy that takes the 
value of one if the company is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. SDDebt measures 
lagged short-term dollar denominated liabilities, which are liabilities with residual 
maturity of twelve months. We focus on short-term debt since as mentioned in the 
introduction, the literature argues that this is the most relevant variable determining 
balance sheet mismatch vulnerability (see Setser et al., 2005).18 Post is the depreciation 
dummy and equals to one in the year of crisis and one year after. We include tj ,φ  that 
controls for sector-year fixed effects, tc,ϕ  that captures country-year fixed effects, iα  are 
firm-specific effects, and tjci ,,,ξ  is the error term.19 By using firm fixed effects we will be 
identifying solely from firm changes over time. Country-year effects will absorb the 
effects of any other macroeconomic shock. 
The triple interaction turns out to be crucial in correctly identifying the groups of 
firms that will benefit or will be hurt by the crisis. To see why, we compare the 
interpretation of the coefficients in equation (1.1) to those that would result from 
estimating the following equation: 
 
                                                 
18 We have also experimented with the ratio of short-term dollar debt in total debt obtaining similar results. 
The correlation between the two is 0.87. 
19 Notice that the Post dummy is captured in the country-year fixed effects. Time dummies are also 































   
   
   
   
     
(1.2)
 
In equation (1.1), β4 is the effect of holding dollar debt after the crisis only for the 
sample of domestic exporting firms. This is not the case for β4 in equation (1.2) since 
now this coefficient will reflect a combined effect of foreign-owned and domestic 
exporting firms. Similarly, β3 in equation (1) captures the investment behavior of foreign-
owned exporting companies with no dollar debt relative to those foreign-owned exporting 
companies with dollar debt at the time of the crisis, β1. Compared to equation (1.2) the 
advantage is that the coefficient β3 in equation (1.1) does not confound the effect of 
foreign-owned exporting companies holding and not holding dollar debt as it would be 
the case of the coefficient β3 in equation (1.2). 
If exporting firms match their dollar holdings with export revenue, we expect β4 
in equation (1.1) to be insignificant since the investment rate of domestic exporting firms 
who hold dollar debt should not be significantly different than that of foreign-owned 
exporting firms with dollar debt. We expect them both to have strong balance-sheets as a 
result of matching their dollar debt to their export revenue. Hence, β1 compared to β4 is 
the incremental effect of being a foreign-owned company among exporting firms holding 
dollar debt. If β1 > β4 (i.e., foreign-owned exporting firms holding dollar debt outperform 
domestic exporters holding dollar debt) we interpret this as the “access to finance” effect 
or evidence for the liquidity channel. Both foreign-owned and domestic exporting firms 
experience a similar change in their net worth but foreign-owned exporting firms manage 
to increase investment relative to domestic exporting firms. This means that there is 
something different about foreign-owned exporting firms with dollar debt at the time of 
the crisis. Our interpretation of this difference is access to external funds. The potential 
finding β1 < β3 (i.e., foreign-owned exporting firms with dollar debt under-investing 
relative to foreign-owned exporters without dollar debt holdings) would highlight the 
importance of insolvency since comparing firms that have the best access to liquidity 
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(i.e., foreign-owned companies), those with a deterioration in their balance sheet would 
under-invest. 
Therefore, to summarize, if both foreign-owned and domestic exporters with 
dollar debt holdings can avoid a mismatch on their balance-sheet and hence insolvency, 
then the differential response between the two captures access to liquidity. This result 
should only hold when domestic companies suffer from a liquidity problem. Hence, we 
should see foreign-owned exporters with dollar debt investing more relative to domestic 
exporters with dollar debt holdings only under twin crises. This can only be done by 
means of a triple interaction rather than a double interaction that would mask the groups 
of interest. In addition, one of the key advantages of this specification is that it allows 
quantifying the total effect of dollar debt holdings and identifying those firms that are 
benefited/hurt by the crisis. Finally, the identification strategy relies on the fact that there 
are no prior differential trends in outcomes of foreign versus domestic exporters with 
dollar debt, especially during a twin crisis. Our robustness section will show this is 
indeed the case. Next, we turn to the regression analysis. 
 
5.   Results 
Table 1.5 shows the results from estimating equation (1.1) for the sample of 
exporting firms.20 Following Aguiar (2005), an exporter is defined as a firm whose export 
revenue to sales ratio is more than 10 percent. The 10 percent cut off level corresponds to 
the 75 percentile of the distribution of exports to sales ratio. The main reasoning behind 
choosing this sample is to consider firms with enough export revenue to compensate any 
potential mismatch derived from dollar debt holdings. According to our estimation 
strategy, columns (1) to (4) of Table 1.5 concentrate on the twin crises episodes, (i.e., 
Argentina (2002) and Mexico (1995) where both countries had a banking crises in the 
year prior to the currency crisis). Columns (5) to (8) refer to the currency crises episodes 
                                                 
20 In order to properly implement country-year and sector-year fixed effects in the presence of triple 
interactions and continuous variables, through out the analysis we demean all continuous variables by 
removing country-year and sector-year averages from firm-level values. 
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(i.e., Brazil (1999, 2002) which involved a depreciation of the currency of more than 25 
percent but there was not a decline in the supply of credit (see Figure 1.4)).21 
Column (1) in Table 1.5 shows our main result: foreign-owned exporters holding 
dollar debt increase investment (0.211) relative to domestic exporters holding dollar debt 
(-0.150) and foreign-owned exporters with no dollar debt (0.127) during twin crises. On 
the contrary, column (5) shows that foreign-owned exporters holding dollar debt (-0.068) 
do not behave significantly differently than domestic exporters with dollar debt (0.053) or 
foreign-owned exporters without dollar debt (-0.033) during currency crises. Notice that 
according to the F-test in column (5) the total effect from dollar debt or foreign 
ownership is not significant during the currency crises years. In fact none of the total 
effects are significant under currency crisis episodes. 
Columns (2) and (6) show similar results when the exporting sample is defined 
according to whether the firm reported export revenue that accounted for more than 10 
percent of sales during the three years prior to the crises. The recent literature on firm 
heterogeneity and trade shows that it is most productive firms that enter the export market 
and among those, only the ones with the highest productivity will engage in FDI activities 
(Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Therefore, the depreciation episode would make 
firms near the threshold productivity cut-off level enter the export market. These firms 
would be more productive than the non exporting ones but less productive than the ones 
that were already exporting. Changes in export status from nonexporter to exporter at the 
time of the crisis were relatively limited in our sample and accounted for 5 percent of the 
exporting observations at the time of the crisis. These findings are similar to those in 
Gopinath and Neiman (2011) that show how during the 2002 Argentinean financial crisis 
there was not a significant change in the number of exported varieties.22 Nevertheless, to 
avoid concerns about selection into the export market at the time of the crises columns (2) 
to (4) and (6) to (8) use a predetermined export dummy to define the exporter sample. 
                                                 
21 Notice the post dummy always refers to the year of depreciation and year after. Given that the treatment 
is based on a time dummy, standard errors are clustered at the year level throughout the analysis. However, 
similar results where obtained for most specifications when clustering at the country level. 
22 Gopinath and Neiman (2011) also show that the extensive margin of imports played a small role during 
the 2002 Argentinean crisis and it was mainly driven by small importers. However, the churning of inputs 
within firms played a sizeable role in aggregate adjustment. For our purposes the important finding is that 
they show how these differences are not driven by differences between domestic and MNCs. 
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Table 1.5. The Differential Response of Foreigners Holding Dollar Debt During Crises. 
Dependent Variable: Investment. Subsample Of Exporters 
Crisis Twin Crises Currency Crises 
Exporter Definition Benchmark               Predetermined Benchmark              Predetermined 
Foreign Definition B-mark B-mark Predeter. Predeter. B-mark B-mark Predeter. Predeter.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ShortDollarDebt × 
Foreign × Post 0.211** 0.280** 0.183* 0.191** -0.068 -0.013 -0.060 -0.063 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
ShortDollarDebt × 
Foreign 0.017 0.045* 0.007 0.017 0.034 0.056** 0.020 0.025 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Foreign × Post 0.127* 0.143* 0.113* 0.043 -0.033 0.003 -0.019 -0.011 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
ShortDollarDebt × 
Post -0.150** -0.190** -0.182** -0.182** 0.053 0.060 0.063 0.063 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Foreign 0.012 0.018 ..  0.016 0.020 . . 
 (0.02) (0.02) ..  (0.02) (0.02) . . 
ShortDollarDebt -0.013 0.009 0.015 0.016 -0.025 -0.003 0.003 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ShortBankDebt -0.023 -0.037** -0.037** -0.041** -0.021 -0.036** -0.036** -0.042**
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
BondAbroad 0.029* 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.033** 0.035 0.035 0.031 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
InternationalLoan 0.000 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Equity 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 1394 1445 1445 1445 1394 1445 1445 1445 
Firms 305 233 233 233 305 233 233 233 
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Foreign*year no no no yes no no no yes 
F-test         
ShortDollarDebt 0.039 0.007 0.034 0.008 0.703 0.079 0.855 0.751 
Foreign 0.006 0.009 0.230 0.016 0.731 0.219 0.883 0.692 
ShortDollarDebt × 
Post 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.004 0.630 0.651 0.647 0.662 
Foreign × Post 0.007 0.028 0.139 0.008 0.524 0.908 0.784 0.566 
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. 
Investment is normalized by total assets. In columns (1) to (4) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one in the year of the twin crisis and one year after; the starting year is 2002 for Argentina and 1995 for 
Mexico. Columns (5) to (7) refer to currency crises; the starting year is 1999 and 2002 in Brazil. Starting 
years are the depreciation years in both cases. In columns (1) and (5) the subsample of exporters refers to 
those firms with export to sales ratios greater than 10 percent lagged one period. In columns (2), (3), (4), 
(6), (7), and (8) the subsample of exporters is based on whether the firm reported export revenue greater 
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than 10% of sales at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis. Foreign is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company and zero otherwise 
and it is lagged one period except in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) where foreign is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company at any time in the three 
years prior to the first crisis. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to 
total short-term liabilities. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. 
BondAbroad is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues a corporate bond abroad. 
InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues syndicated loans abroad. 
Equity is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues equity abroad. All variables are 
lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint significance of the 
coefficients associated with each variable of interest. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
We include in all columns firm-specific control variables to account for the 
following concerns. First, dollar debt holdings might not be an issue if the firm is not 
leveraged, i.e., the short-term debt might not be a big fraction of total debt, then it would 
not be a concern even if most of the short-term debt is denominated in dollars. This type 
of firm may not face an insolvency problem. Second, we assume that firms in countries 
that experienced a twin crisis cannot finance investment and/or working capital at the 
time of the crisis through banks. Several studies have highlighted the dependence of firms 
on the local banking system in Latin America, such as Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2001). Therefore, we control for the ratio of short-term bank debt to total liabilities to 
proxy for bank dependence and leverage, which enters as negative and significant. Third, 
we also assume that firms are not able to borrow in international markets at the time of 
the crisis. This is a typical characteristic of emerging market crises where foreign 
investors are dissuaded by the bad economic conditions of any lending to these firms in 
the eve of or during the crisis. To check this, using data from Dealogic Bondware and 
Loanware, we include measures of access to international markets like “bond abroad” 
dummy that takes the value of one in the year the firm issues a corporate bond abroad, 
“international loan” dummy that takes the value of one in the year the firm issues a 
syndicated loan abroad, and “equity abroad” dummy that takes the value of one in the 
year the firm issues stock abroad (either as ADR or GDR, whether in the US or other 
stock market). Although these measures are good proxies for external sources of 
financing during tranquil times we believe these measures will be relatively weak during 
financial turbulent times as argued by the sudden stop literature since markets shy away 
from emerging markets during such times (see for example Calvo and Mendoza, 2001, 
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and Reinhart and Reinhart, 2010). Indeed these measures turn out to be insignificant in all 
specifications. We rely on foreign ownership as a main arms’ length source of financing 
for foreign affiliates located in emerging markets, especially during financial crises. 
A potential threat to a proper identification arises from the possibility that 
productive firms are bought out by foreigners during the crisis although the evidence so 
far seems to be showing the opposite. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) show that foreign 
investors buy inferior firms at fire-sale prices. Nevertheless, we define foreign status as a 
dummy based on the ownership status of the firm three years prior to the crisis in 
columns (3) and (7). Clearly, the results are not sensitive to the way foreign and export 
status are defined. This is expected since although, there are 17 cases in which a domestic 
firms changed ownership status to majority foreign-owned at the time of the devaluation 
in the total sample, in the exporter subsample there are only 7 of such cases. Finally, 
columns (4) and (8) explore whether the results could be driven by foreign-owned firms 
being on a different trend than domestic firms. To shed some light on this possibility 
columns (4) and (8) add foreign-year fixed effects. The results stay the same. 
If insolvency through a worsening of the balance sheet was the dominant channel 
hindering investment we should observe no difference between foreign-owned and 
domestic exporters that hold dollar debt under any type of crisis. Clearly, foreign-owned 
firms do not suffer an illiquidity problem during a twin crisis and do better relative to 
domestic exporters, regardless of their solvency issues. The results imply sizeable impact. 
Results in column (1) indicate that comparing a domestic exporter in the 90th percentile 
of the distribution of short-term dollar debt to a domestic exporter in the 10th percentile, 
implies a decrease of investment of 11 percentage points for the former. At the same 
time, a foreign exporter experiencing a similar increase in the short-term dollar debt ratio 
would have increased investment by 15 percentage points relative to a domestic exporter. 
These effects are economically significant especially given the variation absorbed by the 
battery of fixed effects. 
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6.   Robustness and Threats to Identification 
6.1 Robustness 
We conduct a series of robustness checks for our main results obtained in column 
(4) of Table 1.5 and present the results in Table 1.6. 
 
Table 1.6. Robustness. Dependent Variable: Investment 
Subsample of Exporters 
Exporter Definition Predetermined 
Foreign Definition Predetermined 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ShortDollarDebt × Foreign × 0.236** 0.178** 0.121** 0.191** 
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
ShortDollarDebt × Foreign 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.031 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ShortDollarDebt 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.016 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
ShortDollarDebt × Post -0.238** -0.152** -0.209** -0.182** 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Foreign . . . . 
 . . . . 
Foreign × Post 0.083 0.037 0.030 0.053 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
DollarAssets -0.019    
 (0.04)    
DollarAssets × Post -0.362    
 (0.30)    
Cash  0.216***   
  (0.04)   
Cash × Post  -0.521   
  (0.32)   
Leverage   -0.086***  
   (0.02)  
Leverage × Post   0.245*  
   (0.14)  
LongBankDebt    -0.056** 
    (0.02) 
ShortBankDebt -0.048** -0.039** -0.036** -0.054** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
BondAbroad -0.002 0.009 0.031 0.022 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
InternationalLoan 0.021 0.007 0.011 0.016 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Equity 0.004 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 1188 1409 1445 1392 
Firms 200 230 233 231 
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes 
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Sector*year yes yes yes yes 
Country*year yes yes yes yes 
Foreign*year yes yes yes yes 
F-test     
ShortDollarDebt 0.199 0.034 0.016 0.006 
ShortDollarDebt × Post 0.080 0.020 0.007 0.005 
Foreign × Post 0.102 0.025 0.136 0.028 
NewControl × Post 0.443 0.000 0.002  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. 
Investment is normalized by total assets. In columns (1) to (4) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one in the year of the twin crisis and one year after in Argentina (2002) and Mexico (1995). The 
subsample of exporters is based on predetermined values and it refers to those firms with export to sales 
ratios greater than 10 percent at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis. Foreign is similarly 
defined in terms of predetermined values and takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 
percent of the company at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis and zero otherwise. All 
specifications control for foreign*year trends. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar 
denominated liabilities to total short-term liabilities. DollarAssets is the ratio of dollar assets to total assets. 
Foreign is a dummy that takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company 
at any time in the three years prior to the first crisis. Cash is the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. 
Leverage is the log of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. LongBankDebt is the ratio of long term 
debt from banks to total liabilities. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total 
liabilities. BondAbroad is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues a corporate bond 
abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues syndicated loans 
abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues equity abroad. All variables 
are lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint significance of 
the coefficients associated with each variable of interest. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
First, although we have emphasized the role of hard currency denominated 
income as the main channel to avoid balance sheet mismatches, there are other factors 
that can contribute to improve firms’ solvency. The potential negative effect of foreign 
denominated short-term liabilities on firms’ balance-sheets during crises could be 
mitigated by significant holdings of foreign currency denominated assets. Column (1) 
shows that results are robust to controlling for dollar assets as a share of total assets 
during crises. Notice ideally we would like to control for the share of short term dollar 
assets denominated in foreign currency however, this will severely limit the sample. 
Thus, we control for cash holdings in column (2) instead since the increase in debt 
service via the inflated dollar denominated debt would not translate into a balance sheet 
worsening if firms hold enough cash. Our main results are not affected. 
Columns (3) and (4) look at other measures of leverage. All the results in Table 
1.5 controlled for the ratio of short term bank debt to total liabilities. Similarly, column 
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(3) adds the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and column (4) the ratio of long term 
bank debt to total liabilities, with no significant effect on our main results. 
First, although we have emphasized the role of hard currency denominated 
income as the main channel to avoid balance sheet mismatches, there are other factors 
that can contribute to improve firms’ solvency. The potential negative effect of foreign 
denominated short-term liabilities on firms’ balance-sheets during crises could be 
mitigated by significant holdings of foreign currency denominated assets. Column (1) 
shows that results are robust to controlling for dollar assets as a share of total assets 
during crises. Notice ideally we would like to control for the share of short term dollar 
assets denominated in foreign currency however, this will severely limit the sample. 
Thus, we control for cash holdings in column (2) instead since the increase in debt 
service via the inflated dollar denominated debt would not translate into a balance sheet 
worsening if firms hold enough cash. Our main results are not affected. 
Columns (3) and (4) look at other measures of leverage. All the results in Table 
1.5 controlled for the ratio of short term bank debt to total liabilities. Similarly, column 
(3) adds the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and column (4) the ratio of long term 
bank debt to total liabilities, with no significant effect on our main results. 
Another possible explanation for the higher investment of foreign-owned 
exporters with dollar debt relative to domestic exporters holding dollar debt is that 
foreign-owned exporters had better access to export markets. As already mentioned we 
do not find many companies starting to export as a result of the devaluation (only 5 
percent of the exporting observations at the time of the crises). However, it might be that 
foreign-owned exporters have better connections or information about international 
markets and are better able to increase their sales abroad. This effect would be absorbed 
by the foreign-year effects. We also worry that due to contagion effects, exporters in the 
crisis country do not face a relative improvement in their investment prospects if 
exporters in neighboring countries undergo a parallel depreciation (relevant for Argentina 
and Brazil (2002)) or if the instability in the area reduces the demand for imports from 
the crisis country. However, there is no reason to believe that foreign and domestic 
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exporters serve different markets (unfortunately we do not have firm-level data on the 
destination of exports).23 
Finally, it is also possible that both foreign-owned and domestic firms reduce 
their dollar liabilities in anticipation to the crisis. This can explain the no-difference result 
between foreign-owned and domestic exporting firms in the case of currency crises. 
Thus, we show in Figure 1.5, that there was no systematic decrease in dollarization for 
foreign-owned firms relative to domestic firms in the eve of crisis. Nevertheless, we 
repeat our basic results using a predetermined dummy for dollar debt holdings. A firm is 
defined as having high dollar debt if her share of short term dollar debt in total short term 
debt is greater than 35 percent at any time during the three years prior to the crises.24 
Results (available upon request) confirm that our main results are not driven by 
foreigners decreasing dollar debt holdings faster at the time of the crisis. 
 


































                                                 
23 An alternative explanation for the better investment of foreign-owned exporters is related to the role of 
imported materials. Although the depreciation makes exported goods relatively cheaper, firms importing 
materials from abroad would now witness an increase in the relative price of imports. Unfortunately, we 
could not obtain data on imports. Nevertheless, to test for this possibility, we defined tradable sectors with 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm operates in a SIC sector classified as tradable (see Forbes, 
2002), and obtained similar results. The lack of data prevents us from exploring the possibility that foreign-
owned exporters have access to cheaper imported goods through the parent company. 
24 Recall 35 percent corresponds to the mean holdings in the exporter sample. 
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6.2 Threats to Identification 
Given our differences-in-differences strategy we might have several threats to 
identification. Foreign owned exporters that choose to hold dollar denominated debt 
could be different from domestic exporters that chose to do so, irrespective of the 
depreciation, and these differences might be correlated with investment rates. In practice, 
most of the firm unobservable characteristics are time invariant and therefore, this 
concern should be lessened by the firm fixed effect estimation. As shown before our 
results are also robust to controlling for foreign-year fixed effects to account for different 
trends between foreign-owned and domestic companies. In addition, the triple interaction 
regression controls for the term ShortDollarDebt × Post which accounts for the different 
trends in investment between exporters holding dollar debt and those not holding dollar 
debt, at the time of the crisis. Nevertheless, Figure 1.6 shows the average investment rates 
for two types of firms: foreign-owned exporters holding above median dollar debt and 
domestic exporters holding above median dollar debt in Mexico. Graphical inspection 
reveals that there are no major differences in trends between foreign and domestic firms 
holding high levels short-term dollar debt prior to the depreciation episode in Mexico. 
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Similarly, results are based on the assumption that firms across countries freely 
choose the percentage of their short-term debt that is denominated in foreign currency. 
We do not want our results to be driven by differences across countries in dollar debt 
practices. As we explained in detail in the data section most of Brazilian companies 
foreign currency borrowing is obtained abroad (whether bond issuances or bank loans). 
Exporters can borrow from the BNDES in foreign currency though. In fact, Table 1.4 
shows that although lower than the Argentinean and Mexican levels, short-term dollar 
debt in Brazil represents on average 20 percent of short-term debt. Most importantly, 
most of the variation in short-term dollar debt takes place within the sample of exporters 
(i.e. non-exporting companies do not hold significant amounts of dollar debt) which is 
our sample of interest given that they are the ones faced with the investment opportunity. 
Although the median domestic exporter in Brazil holds lower levels of dollar debt than 
the foreign-owned counterpart, so do Argentinean domestic exporters and it does not 
seem to be something specific to Brazil. 
A related issue is whether we can directly compare twin and currency crises. 
According to Kaminsky (2006) crises are the result of different factors that might question 
the suitability of comparing crises that were not originated from the same economic failure. 
Kaminsky (2006) identifies 6 different types of currency crises according to the way in 
which they were generated. Four of the categories are associated with domestic economic 
fragility, with vulnerabilities related to current account deterioration, fiscal imbalances, 
financial excesses, or foreign debt unsustainability. But crises can also be provoked by just 
adverse world market conditions, such as the reversal of international capital flows. The so-
called sudden-stop phenomenon identifies the fifth variety of crises. As emphasized by the 
second generation models, crises also happen in economies with immaculate fundamentals. 
Thus, the last variety of crises is labeled self-fulfilling crises. She classifies both Brazil 
1999 and Mexico 1995 as being the result of the same cause: financial excesses. 
Table 1.7 repeats the main specification in Table 1.5 by country and episode. 
Column (1) shows that foreign-owned exporters holding dollar debt in Mexico are the 
ones increasing investment relative to domestic exporters with dollar debt (although the 
total effects are not significant in this case notice that we are dealing with a small sample 
size). Column (2) examines the case of Brazil 1999 and as expected there are no 
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significant differences between domestic and foreign exporters holding dollar debt. 
Therefore, comparing columns (1) and (2) we can say that results are robust to focusing 
on currency crises that share the same origin and are not driven by the different nature of 
the depreciation but rather by the existence of a banking crisis in the preceding year. For 
completeness column (3) shows the case of Brazil 2002 where as expected there are no 
differences across foreign-owned and domestic exporters with dollar debt. 
 
Table 1.7. The Differential Response of Foreigners Holding Dollar Debt During Crises: By 
Country. Dependent Variable: Investment 
Subsample of Exporters 
Exporter Definition Predetermined 
Foreign Definition Predetermined 
Mexico1995 Brazil 1999 Brazil 2002  
(1) (2) (3) 
ShortDollarDebt × Foreign × Post 0.242** 0.540 -0.025 
 (0.09) (0.34) (0.13) 
ShortDollarDebt × Foreign -0.189 0.191** 0.160 
 (0.15) (0.07) (0.09) 
ShortDollarDebt 0.016 -0.058 -0.031 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ShortDollarDebt × Post -0.158 0.142 0.006 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 
Foreign - - - 
 - - - 
Foreign × Post 0.187 0.153 0.092 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) 
ShortBankDebt -0.027 -0.068 -0.045 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
BondAbroad 0.043* -0.033 -0.056 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
LoanAbroad -0.029 0.062 0.066 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
EquityAbroad 0.014 0.034 0.038 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 393 212 212 
Firms 71 49 49 
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes 
Sector*year yes yes yes 
year yes yes yes 
Foreign*year yes yes yes 
F-test    
ShortDollarDebt 0.032 0.000 0.000 
ShortDollarDebt × Post 0.010 0.067 0.980 
Foreign × Post 0.031 0.289 0.260  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Investment 
is normalized by total assets. In column (1) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of 
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the twin crisis in Mexico (1995) and one year after. In column (2) Post is a dummy that takes a value of one in 
the year of the 1999 currency crisis and one year after in Brazil. In column (3) Post is a dummy that takes a 
value of one in 2002 and one year after corresponding to the currency crisis in Brazil. The subsample of 
exporters is based on predetermined values and it refers to those firms with export to sales ratios greater than 
10 percent at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis. Foreign is similarly defined in terms of 
predetermined values and takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company 
at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis and zero otherwise. All specifications control for 
foreign*year trends. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to total short-
term liabilities. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is a 
dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues a corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a 
dummy that takes a value of one in the year the firm issues syndicated loans abroad. Equity is a dummy that 
takes a value of one in the year the firm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test 
reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint significance of the coefficients associated with each 
variable of interest. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
6.3 Alternative Estimation Strategy 
The results in Table 1.5 are consistent with the interpretation that the real problem 
is illiquidity. To further substantiate this point we propose an alternative specification 
instead of a triple interaction. This strategy involves defining a sample of solvent firms 
(i.e., firms with high leverage and holdings of short-term foreign currency denominated 
debt that are not matched by a dollar denominated stream of income like export revenue). 
Table 1.8 shows how foreign-owned firms invest relative to domestic firms when we 
focus in a sample of firms with no currency mismatch. To avoid any selection issues at 
the time of the crisis, we define matched balance sheets based on whether the firm had 
revenue in excess to short-term dollar liabilities at any time during the three years prior to 
the crises.25 Columns (1) to (3) show the results under twin crises while columns (4) to 
(6) refer to currency crises. Column (1) shows how foreign-owned firms invest 5 
percentage points more relative to domestic firms during twin crises. It is reassuring that 
results are robust to the use of a predetermined variable that classifies firms into foreign-
owned and domestic according to their ownership status three years before the crises (see 
columns (2) and (3)). Finally, column (3) examines the sample of exporters. Within 
solvent firms we expect exporting firms to be the ones taking the investment opportunity 
generated by the depreciation of the currency. To avoid concerns about selection into the 
                                                 
25 We define firms with no mismatch is defined based on whether Assets
rLiabShortDollaExports −  > 0. Notice we 
control for leverage in all the columns in Table 1.8. Appendix Table 1.A2 shows similar regression in total 
sample of firms. 
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export market at the time of the crises column (3) uses a predetermined export dummy to 
define the exporter sample. Within this sample of solvent exporters, foreign-owned 
exporters increase investment by 8 percentage points relative to domestic exporters.26 In 
addition, these columns show that results are robust to controlling for measure of access 
to international markets. It seems to be the case in which parent companies inject 
liquidity into foreign-owned firms during crises.27 
 
Table 1.8. Performance of Foreign Companies: Sample of Solvent Firms  
Dependent Variable: Investment 
 Twin Crises   Currency Crises 
Sample of Firms All All Exporter All All Exporter 
Foreign Definition Benchmark Predeterm. Predeterm. Benchmark Predeterm. Predeterm. 
Exporter Definition   Predeterm.   Predeterm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign × Post 0.045* 0.054* 0.083** 0.002 -0.000 -0.009 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Foreign 0.007   0.009   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   
ShortBankDebt -0.031** -0.032** -0.046** -0.030** -0.030** -0.042** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
BondAbroad 0.063* 0.063* 0.047 0.063* 0.063* 0.049 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
InternationalLoan -0.012 -0.012 0.002 -0.012 -0.013 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Equity -0.015 -0.016 -0.006 -0.016 -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 2956 2956 1849 2956 2956 1849 
Firms 454 454 278 454 454 278 
F-test       
Foreign 0.049 ..  0.602 . . 
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. 
Investment is normalized by total assets. In columns (1) to (3) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value 
                                                 
26 The earlier estimate of 15 percentage points raise in investment of foreign-owned exporters was 
calculated based on the 10th to 90th percentile change in short term dollar debt. 
27 The Argentina Renault is a case in point. In 2001, the parent firm contributed $300 million to assure the 
survival of its affiliate. In January 2003 it received an additional $160 million from parent Renault to 
accommodate its bank creditors. The company lost $71 million in 2003 and ended the year with debt of 
about $276 million. However, during the first half of 2004, the company made a small profit. 
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of one in the year of the twin crisis and one year after in Argentina (2002) and Mexico (1995). In columns 
(4) to (6) Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of currency crises and one year 
after in Brazil (1999) and (2002). The “solvent” firm sample refers to the sample of firms with no 
mismatch and is defined as firms with 
Assets
rLiabShortDollaExports −  > 0. In columns (3) and (6) the subsample of 
exporters is based on predetermined values and it refers to those firms with positive export to sales ratios at 
any time during the three years prior to the first crisis. Foreign is a dummy that takes a value of one if 
foreign investors own more than 49 percent of the company. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) Foreign is 
defined in terms of predetermined values and takes a value of one if foreign investors own more than 49 
percent of the company at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis and zero otherwise. 
ShortBankDebt is the ratio of short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is a dummy that 
takes a value of one in the year the firm issues a corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that 
takes a value of one in the year the firm issues syndicated loans abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes a 
value of one in the year the firm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test 
reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint significance of the coefficients associated with 
each variable of interest. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
6.4 The Role of Exporters: Reconciling with the Literature 
Finally, we would like to explore previous seemingly conflicting results in the 
literature and argue that proper measurement of access to international liquidity via 
foreign ownership can account for those findings. 
First, we would like to establish whether or not exporters are financially 
constrained in the aftermath of a crisis. We do this by estimating the following equation: 
tjciitctjtjcitctjcitjci eExportSharPosteExportShary ,,,,,1,,,2,1,,,1,,, )( ξαϕφββ +++++×= −−   
(1.3) 
ExportShare refers to the lagged ratio of export revenue to sales. Instead of lagged 
ratio we use a predetermined export dummy in the regressions below, where exporter is 
defined according to whether the firm reported export revenue at any time during the 
three years prior to the crises, obtaining similar results. The rest of the notation is same as 
in equation (1.1). 
The traditional textbook theory on the effect of exchange rate depreciations on 
output, concludes that the depreciation episode should increase sales and investment of 
exporting firms due to a competitiveness effect. The literature generally finds that this is 
not the case, as shown in column (1) of Table 1.9. There might be various explanations 
why exporters do not increase investment in the aftermath of currency crises such as 
adjustment costs and the role of inventories. The literature has suggested financial 
constraints as a major reason for exporters not undertaking new investment during 
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financial crises. Column (2) includes short-term dollar debt as a control for financial 
constraints but the result do not change. Notice that we would have expected a positive 
coefficient on the export propensity variable once dollar debt holdings were taken into 
account if the associated mismatch on the balance sheet was the reason hindering 
investment on the part of exporters. However, this is not the case, suggesting that 
controlling for dollar debt holdings is not enough to explain the investment behavior of 
exporters during crises. The result in column (2) is consistent with Aguiar (2005). 
 
Table 1.9. Performance of Exporters during Crises  
Exporter Definition: Predetermined Dummy 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exporter × Post 0.077** 0.000 0.059** 0.007 -0.007 0.024**
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ShortDollarDebt × Post   0.154** -0.056** -0.078** -0.013 
   (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
ShortDollarDebt   -0.013 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 
   (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 
Firms 864 864 864 864 864 864 
F-test       
ShortDollarDebt   0.054 0.040 0.001 0.395 
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the year level and are reported in parenthesis. Sales 
regressions control for size by including the log of total assets lagged one period. Investment is normalized 
by total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of the depreciation and one 
year after. Columns (1) and (2) refer to all crises so that the starting depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina 
and Brazil, 1999 for Brazil, and 1995 for Mexico. Column (3) refers to twin crises so that the starting 
depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina and 1995 for Mexico. Finally column (4) refers to currency crises 
and the starting depreciation year is 1999 and 2002 in Brazil. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm reports export revenue at any time during the three years prior to the first crisis and 0 
otherwise. Only in column (5) Exporter is defined as one if the firm exported more than ten percent of 
sales. ShortDollarDebt is the ratio of short-term dollar denominated liabilities to total short-term liabilities 
and it is lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-values associated to the joint 
significance of the coefficients associated with each variable of interest. *, **, and *** indicate 




Columns (3) and (4) investigate the role of different crises: under currency crises, 
where there are no liquidity constraints, exporters do increase investment however, under 
twin crises exporters do not do better than non exporters (conditional on dollar debt). 
Why do exporters behave differently during twin and currency crises and second, why 
firms holding higher levels of short term dollar denominated debt decrease investment in 
the aftermath of twin crises, but not in the aftermath of currency crises? This is because 
under currency crisis there is no illiquidity problem and solvency problem should not be 
an issue for exporters who can hedge using their dollar income. Column (5) shows that 
this is indeed the case since now the triple interaction specification show that exporters 
with short term dollar debt do better than non-exporters with short term dollar debt, 
which is consistent with Bleakley and Cowan (2008).28 Our results show that Aguiar 
(2005) results are driven by domestic exporters who do not have access to liquidity under 
a twin crisis and Bleakley and Cowan (2008) results are driven by ability of exporters to 
avoid insolvency as they highlight and take advantage of investment opportunity during 
depreciations. 
 
7.   Conclusion 
This paper provides systematic evidence on the key channel behind the 
contractionary nature of financial crises. The main reason why firms are constrained and 
hence investment and growth are hindered in the aftermath of a financial crisis is 
international and domestic illiquidity. By using a unique hand-collected data set for 1,300 
listed firms from six Latin American countries between 1990–2005, we disentangle the 
illiquidity channel from the insolvency channel. Our measure of liquidity is foreign 
                                                 



















   
   
  
(1.4) 
Notice that in order to be able to compare to Bleakley and Cowan (2008) and show that exporters with high 
export revenue can match their balance sheets we follow Aguiar (2005) and define a high exporter as one 
that exports more than ten percent of the sales. 
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ownership. We proxy insolvency by balance-sheet mismatch caused by short-term 
foreign currency debt conditional on leverage. 
Our main result is that foreign-owned exporters with dollar debt invest relatively 
more than domestic exporters with dollar debt only during twin crises, where domestic 
firms access to finance is limited given the troubled banking sector. There is no 
difference in investment between these firms during currency crises. This implies foreign 
currency denominated debt is not a problem for exporters per-se since they match their 
short-term dollar debt with export revenue to avoid insolvency. During twin crises, 
however, domestic exporters suffer from the problem of illiquidity and hence contract 
investment and production as oppose to foreign-owned exporters. 
Our results have important policy implications. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is first in quantifying the significant real effects of shocks to 
banking sector using firm-level investment data. Second, short-term foreign currency 
borrowing may not be detrimental to firms’ balance sheets as long as their access to 
finance is not limited during periods of instability. Hence it is important to provide 
liquidity to the banking sector during financial crises especially if the domestic banking 







1. Cleaning Procedure 
We drop all firm/year observations in which the accounting data are not self-consistent. In 
particular, we drop observations if dollar liabilities (assets) exceed total liabilities (assets) or if the 
ratio of exports to sales is greater than one. We drop firm-year observations with zero or missing sales. 
Finally, we drop firm-year observations in the top (low) 1 percent of the distribution of the ratio of 
sales to total assets and total liabilities to total assets. These adjustments led to dropping 16 percent of 
the remaining firm-year observations. To ensure that results are not driven by outliers, we then 
dropped all firm/year observations for explanatory variables that exceeded the sample mean by more 
than five standard deviations. We compute the change in total assets, sales and physical capital stock 
and construct a Z-score using the sample mean and standard deviation for each country/year. We drop 
firm/year observations that have absolute value of Z > 5. We drop firm/year observations for which 
the ratio of investment over assets is greater than one or less than minus one. This controls for outliers 
(either because of inadequate accounting, typing errors or extreme values). These adjustments led to 
dropping 19 percent of the remaining firm-year observations. These exclusions leave us with complete 
information for an unbalanced panel of 6,175 firm-year observations, which consist of 931 firms with 
an average of around 7 years each. Notice throughout the analysis we use lagged values of the main 
variables and therefore, we lose one year. Finally, data on additional controls included later on in the 
estimation leaves us with a sample of 5,063 observations or 864 firms. 
 
2. Foreign Ownership Variable 
We gathered information on all cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in Latin 
America between 1981 and 2005 using the SDC Platinum database from Thompson (for the period 
1981 to 2001) and Zephyr from Bureau Van Dijk (from 1997 to 2005). Given that there was no 
common firm-identifier across databases, we used a search algorithm based on firms’ names and 
economic sectors to match M&A transactions to firms in our sample. We took into account possible 
changes in firms’ names drawing on a list of company name changes from the Economatica database. 
In addition, we doubled checked with various internet resources, including the information provided 
by the company on its own web page and that of the Funding Universe website 
(www.fundinguniverse.com/companyhistories/) that provides information on companies’ history. 
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We construct a continuous, time-varying measure of foreign ownership based on the 
percentage fraction of shares held by foreign and domestic investors in each year. For example, the 
M&A databases would identify an M&A transaction where a foreign company that already owned 50 
percent of a company in a target country, buys 10 percent more of that company. Our foreign 
ownership variable would be 50 until the time of the transaction and 60 thereafter. In the case where 
we had more than one foreign investor in the same year we faced the problem of not knowing if the 
foreign companies were buying from each other, from other domestic investors, or rather directly from 
the target company. In those cases we checked the company history profile, the Funding Universe 
website and other specialized newspaper information. In the rare case that information was not 
available, we decided on a conservative measure of foreign ownership and assumed that the foreign 
companies bought from each other. We then merged this information with annual balance sheet data. 
In the few cases of target firms being renamed after the acquisition, we kept the old id number rather 
than creating a new company after the M&A. 
Of course there might be ways other than M&As for foreign investors to invest in firms. First, 
foreign ownership acquisitions can arise by means of IPOs, venture capital activity, or private equity 
deals, which are not covered in M&As hence in our procedure. Second, several foreign-owned firms 
could have been established before 1980, and not involved in a M&A since then. To remedy this, we 
used the Corporations Affiliations database to identify Latin American firms in our sample that are 
affiliates, subsidiaries and/or divisions of global multinational firms. This database contains 
international public and private business profiles and corporate linkage (“who owns whom”) for 
approximately 184,000 public and private companies worldwide. Notice, in addition to the “formal” 
sources of foreign ownership data we checked firm by firm company’s history. After this extensive 
search of all these alternative sources, if we find no evidence of foreign ownership we assume the 
company is domestic. 
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Table 1.A2. Performance of Foreigners during Crises  
Dependent Variable: Investment 
 
Crisis All Crises Twin Crises Currency Crises 
Sample All All Exporter Exporter All Exporter Exporter 
Foreign Definition B-mark B-mark B-mark Predeterm. B-mark B-mark Predeterm.
Exporter Definition   Predeterm. Predeterm.  Predeterm. Predeterm.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Foreign × Post 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.051** 0.058** 0.031** 0.021 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Foreign -0.005 -0.000 0.003  -0.003 0.004  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  
ShortBankDebt -0.021** -0.020** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.021** -0.037*** -0.036***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
BondAbroad    0.049*   0.049* 
    (0.03)   (0.03) 
InternationalLoan    0.002   0.002 
    (0.01)   (0.01) 
Equity    -0.003   -0.004 
    (0.01)   (0.01) 
Observations 5063 5063 2967 2967 5063 2967 2967 
Firms 864 864 470 470 864 470 470 
F-test        
Foreign 0.002 0.002 0.004 . 0.127 0.364 . 
Year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country*year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the year level are reported in parenthesis. Notice 
Investment is normalized by total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the year of 
the depreciation and one year after. Column (1) refers to all crises so that the starting depreciation year is 
2002 for Argentina and Brazil, 1999 for Brazil and 1995 for Mexico. Columns (2) to (4) refer to twin crises 
so that the starting depreciation year is 2002 for Argentina and 1995 for Mexico. Finally, columns (5) to (7) 
refer to currency crises and the starting depreciation year is 1999 and 2002 in Brazil. Columns (3), (4), (6), 
and (7) report results for the sample of exporters where Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm reports export revenue at any time during the three years prior to the crisis and 0 otherwise. 
In columns (4) and (7) Foreign is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is more than 50% 
owned at any time during the three years prior to the crisis and 0 otherwise. ShortBankDebt is the ratio of 
short term debt from banks to total liabilities. BondAbroad is a dummy that takes the value of one in the 
year the firm issues a corporate bond abroad. InternationalLoan is a dummy that takes the value of one in 
the year the firm issues syndicated loans abroad. Equity is a dummy that takes the value of one in the year 
the firm issues equity abroad. All variables are lagged one period. The F-test reports the corresponding p-
values associated to the joint significance of the coefficients associated with each variable of interest. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Does Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention Work for Inflation 
Targeters?  
 
1.   Introduction 
Assessing the effectiveness of central bank intervention in foreign exchange 
markets, and the conditions under which it can be an effective policy tool, have become 
key issues for emerging markets (EM). In a remarkable shift from the 90s—when many 
EM were battling currency crises—many central banks have tried to resist domestic 
currency appreciation by intervening actively in currency markets, accumulating large 
amounts of international reserves. While there is a huge literature on the impact of 
foreign exchange market intervention in advanced economies, very few studies have 
looked at central banks of emerging market countries, which nowadays account for the 
bulk of intervention activity. 
A key issue for these economies is the tension that can arise between 
interventions in currency markets and monetary policy strategy. Many of these EM 
countries have officially adopted inflation-targeting regimes to anchor inflation 
expectations, most often rising short-term interest rates to curb inflation. Rising interest 
rate may have the consequence of luring in more foreign capital, thereby exacerbating 
appreciation pressures. At the same time, resisting currency appreciation blunts the pass-
through channel to changes in import prices, making it more difficult to attain the 
inflation target. This policy dilemma that could arise when exchange rate and monetary 
policies work at cross-purposes has been discussed at length (see e.g. Ho and McCauley, 
2003) but seldom investigated empirically.  
In this chapter, I take advantage of a unique data set on daily official intervention 
by the Central Bank of Colombia between 2004 and 2007 to assess the effects of foreign 
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exchange interventions in the context of an inflation targeting framework. Colombia is an 
interesting case study for at least two reasons. First, Colombia faced strong exchange rate 
appreciation pressures during this period. Between December 2006 and May 2007, for 
example, Colombia ranked as the country with the highest nominal domestic currency 
appreciation in the world—both vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and in nominal effective terms. 
Second, the period under study is punctuated by frequent, and at times large, discretionary 
purchases of foreign exchange to resist domestic currency appreciation. Figure 2.1 shows 
the two distinct episodes of discretionary intervention in the foreign exchange rate market 
analyzed in this study: the first period, spanning from September 2004 to March 2006, 
and a more recent period from January 2007 to April 2007.29 During these periods, the 
Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República, henceforth BdR) intervened on 
almost 70 percent of business days and the scale of official intervention was significant 
relative to the daily turnover in the market, reaching 50 percent on some days.  
To correctly identify the impact of interventions on exchange rates in the case of 
Colombia, is crucial to take into account the fact that the two periods of discretionary 
intervention were associated with significant differences in the monetary policy stance 
and in the degree of credibility of the inflation targeting regime. The first period was 
characterized by a loosening of monetary policy and highly credible inflation targets. In 
particular, I show that during this period, foreign currency purchases by the BdR were not 
fully sterilized, and thus intervention influenced the central bank’s provision of liquidity 
in the financial system. Thus, to disentangle the influence of foreign exchange 
intervention as an independent policy tool from the effects of the expansionary monetary 
policy during this period, is essential to control for the extent to which interventions were 
sterilized (and whether the market expected interventions to be sterilized).30 
                                                 
29 As shown in Figure 2.1, the BdR stopped discretionary purchases of foreign currency from March 2006 
until mid-January 2007. During this period, the central bank only intervened through rules-based, non-
discretionary foreign currency options to smooth exchange rate volatility. A more detailed description is 
provided in Section 3. 
30 The focus of the analysis should be on sterilized interventions only, as the effect of unsterilized 
operations is arguably more straightforward: the expansion of the money supply (beyond monetary growth 
consistent with inflation targets given changes in money demand) would typically lead to a loss of value of 
the domestic currency. In other words, unsterilized interventions can be thought of as two distinct policies 
applied at the same time: a loosening of the monetary stance together with (or by means of) FX 
intervention. 
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During the second episode in 2007, however, large-scale intervention occurred 
against a backdrop of strong monetary tightening (to reduce inflationary pressures) and 
very low credibility of the inflation target. During this period, exchange rate and 
monetary policies goals came into conflict: the BdR sought simultaneously to maintain 
price stability by raising interest rates, and preserve competitiveness by resisting currency 
appreciation through foreign currency purchases. As inflation rose well above the target, 
markets perceived that BdR’s dollar purchases would undermine its ability to meet the 
inflation target by year-end, and the credibility of BdR’s inflation target fell to close to 
nil.31 Thus, to identify the causal effect of intervention operations during this period is 
important to control for high-frequency proxies on the level (and changes in the level) of 
credibility of the inflation target.  
 
Figure 2.1. Central Bank of Colombia's Intervention Operations and Movements  

































































































































































Source: Banco de la República. 
 
                                                 
31 In quantity terms, this is often thought of simply as insulating the normal path of the monetary base from 
changes in the central bank’s net FX position. 
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In this study, I estimate the impact of central bank intervention on exchange rates 
using a two-stage instrumental variable model based on estimates of the central bank’s 
intervention reaction function. I find that during the first period, there is a statistically 
significant and positive correlation between intervention operations and the exchange 
rate. The coefficient for the effect of contemporaneous intervention implies that a US$30 
million purchase (the average daily amount of intervention within this period) was 
associated with a depreciation of the value of the domestic currency of approximately 
0.23 percent. This result, however, does not provide evidence of a causal link from 
intervention to exchange rates (i.e., that intervention as an independent policy tool was 
effective). Rather, it suggests that the combination of large-scale foreign currency 
purchases and a credible expansionary monetary policy seem to have led to a reduction in 
appreciation pressures. In the absence of detailed data on the degree of sterilization of 
intervention operations (and market’s expectation of sterilization), the current 
identification strategy cannot tease out the influence of peso-weakening interventions 
from the effects of a loosening monetary policy.  
The results for the second period, on the other hand, suggest that sterilized 
intervention operations had no statistically significant contemporaneous effect on 
exchange rate returns. I show that during this period, sterilized intervention operations 
aimed at depreciating the currency were dwarfed by offsetting increases in domestic 
interest rates and the market’s reaction to higher-than-expected inflation 
announcements—both of which tended to appreciate the domestic currency. 
My study contributes to the literature on the effects of central bank intervention in 
two descriptive ways. First, I use a new data set that includes official statistics on daily 
foreign exchange intervention by the BdR, thus opening a rare window into the workings 
of central bank intervention operations for an inflation targeting country. Research on 
intervention in EM has remained a challenge, hampered by the dearth of high frequency 
data on central bank intervention operations (because of valuation changes, the 
magnitude of intervention operations cannot be inferred simply from changes in 
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reserves).32 A key advantage of the intervention data used in this study is that it accurately 
reflects discretionary purchases of dollars made with the explicit intention to depreciate 
the value of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.33 This allows for a cleaner 
identification of the impact of central bank intervention on the exchange rate. 
The second contribution of the chapter is to analyze in detail the tensions that can 
arise between interventions in currency markets to stem currency appreciation and 
monetary policy goals, when the cyclical position of the economy calls for interest rate 
tightening. 34 I show that during the second period markets expected monetary policy to 
remain firmly geared towards the goal of reducing inflation—even if that meant 
increasing interest rates and, thereby, defeating intervention efforts. Thus, the lack of 
effectiveness of sterilized intervention during the second period was rooted in its 
inconsistency with current and expected monetary policy actions. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
existing studies on the effectiveness of intervention in emerging and developing 
countries. Section 3 describes the exchange rate and monetary policies in Colombia 
during the sample period and describes the intervention data used here. Section 4 lays out 
the estimation strategy and Section 5 provides the main empirical results on the 
effectiveness of daily exchange rate intervention by the BdR. Section 6 distills policy 
lessons from the Colombia experience for other emerging markets and Section 7 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
32 Moreover, it is often not possible to know, a priori, whether the authorities accumulate international 
reserves with the intent of affecting the exchange rate or for other reasons, such as self-insuring against 
external financial shocks. Because central banks rarely publish targets on precautionary reserve 
accumulation, disentangling both motives for intervention without official data is almost impossible. 
Jeanne and Rancière (2006) and Aizenman and Lee (2007) analyze competing interpretations for the large 
increases in the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries.  
33 Data on official intervention was kindly provided by the Banco de la República, and is not disclosed to 
the public at a daily frequency. For this reason, the use of the daily data in this chapter is subject to 
confidentiality agreements.  
34 To my knowledge, Gersl and Holub (2004) is the only paper in the empirical literature on foreign 
exchange intervention in emerging markets that has looked at the interdependencies between discretionary 
intervention operations and the conduct of monetary policy under an inflation targeting regime for the case 
of the Czech Republic. 
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2.   Literature Review  
A large body of economic literature explores the efficacy of sterilized intervention 
in developed economies.35 The evidence suggests that sterilized intervention by 
industrialized countries has, at times, effectively influenced the value of currencies.36 
However, these effects are typically small in economic terms. Collectively, the recent 
literature for advanced economies has shown that intervention systematically moves the 
spot exchange rate only if the intervention is announced publicly, coordinated across 
countries, and is consistent with the underlying stance of fiscal and monetary policy 
(Sarno and Taylor, 2001).37 Additionally, a number of papers have examined the 
influence of intervention operations on daily exchange rate volatility and generally find 
evidence that intervention increases volatility.38 
Compared with the sizeable literature for advanced economies, studies on the 
effectiveness of intervention in emerging market economies are still sparse, in large part 
because governments are reluctant to provide official data on their operations.39 The few 
papers that analyze central bank intervention at daily frequencies using official data find 
mixed results on its effectiveness.40 Domac and Mendoza (2002) conclude, in the context 
of Mexico and Turkey in the period 2001–02, that central bank foreign exchange sales 
                                                 
35 Edison (1993) surveys the literature on central bank intervention from the 1980s through early 1990s; 
Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Humpage (2003) provide more recent surveys of theory and empirical 
evidence. 
36 Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Dominguez (2003) provide empirical evidence in this regard. For 
Japan, Ito (2002) found that large and infrequent intervention had quantitatively small but statistically 
significant effects on the dollar-yen nominal exchange rate. 
37 Using recent advances in market microstructure theory, a number of papers have examined the influence 
of intervention operations using intra-daily data on exchange rate returns. These studies typically find that 
central banks’ intervention has significant impact on the first two moments of the exchange rate (e.g. Evans 
and Lyons, 2001; Dominguez, 2003; Payne and Vitale, 2003).  
38 Dominguez (2006) and Cashin, Edison, and Liang (2006) found that intervention increases exchange rate 
volatility, in contrast with claims by central banks that intervention does not increase (or is not associated 
with an increase in) volatility (Neely, 2007). 
39 Canales-Kriljenko (2003) discusses some of the reasons why foreign exchange intervention may be more 
effective in developing and transition economies than in industrialized countries. Given the lower degree of 
international substitutability of emerging market assets, and the large size of interventions relative to 
currency market turnover in these countries, foreign exchange intervention could—in principle—have a 
sizeable effect on exchange rates.  
40 Disyatat and Galati (2007) provide a thorough review of the existing literature on the effectiveness of 
intervention in emerging market countries. BIS (2005) contains descriptive case studies for a large number 
of emerging economies.  
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(but not purchases) had a statistically significant influence on the exchange rate in both 
countries. In contrast, Guimarães and Karacadag (2004) find that in Mexico foreign 
exchange sales had a small impact on the exchange rate level, but official intervention 
does not appear to systematically affect exchange rate levels in Turkey.41 For Chile, Tapia 
and Tokman (2004) found that actual intervention appeared to have a generally 
insignificant effect on contemporaneous exchange rate movements.42  
Empirical evidence for Mexico, Turkey, and Chile, however, cannot be easily 
generalized to other emerging markets. First, given policy objectives, the finding that 
intervention has no impact on the spot exchange rate must be interpreted with caution. 
For example, the bulk of intervention undertaken in Mexico after the 1994 crisis was 
aimed at accumulating reserves, rather than influencing the level of the exchange rate. 
Moreover, the mechanisms used in Mexico and Turkey for intervention (auctioning put 
and call foreign exchange options and pre-announced foreign exchange sale auctions, 
respectively), are very different from the ways developing countries today intervene 
(usually through outright purchases or sales in the spot market on a discretionary basis). 
Finally, in Chile, the intervention strategy mostly relied on public announcements of 
potential (i.e., verbal), as opposed to actual, interventions.43  
The papers closest to this study are Gersl and Holub (2006) and Disyatat and 
Galati (2007), which analyze the role of direct foreign exchange interventions in the 
Czech Republic. Disyatat and Galati (2007) find a very small (cumulative) impact of 
intervention on the spot exchange rate for the period 2001–02. Gersl and Holub (2006) 
also find some evidence that the intervention had a statistically significant impact on the 
                                                 
41 Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) use a different sample period for Mexico (1996 to 2003) and Turkey 
(2001 to 2003). For the case of Turkey, see also Ozge, Olcay, Ozlale, and Sahinbeyoglu (2005). 
42 Other studies using monthly changes in gross reserves as a proxy for intervention operations typically 
find that intervention has either no effect, or is of little economic importance. Pattanaik and Sahoo (2003) 
concluded that intervention operations of the Reserve Bank of India had very little influence on exchange 
rate levels. More recent cross-country empirical evidence suggests intervention is unlikely to be effective in 
dealing with capital flows. Using a sample of emerging markets and small advanced countries, Lall, 
Jaumotte, Papageorgiou, and Topalova (2007) find that resisting nominal exchange rate appreciation 
through sterilized intervention is likely to be ineffective when capital flows are persistent. Looking at the 
experience of five managed-float countries (India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) over the 
period 2000–2007, Edison, Guimarães, Kramer, and Miniane (2007) find limited evidence of systematic 
links between exchange rates and intervention. 
43 Tapia and Tokman found that public announcements of potential interventions—as opposed to actual 
interventions—had significant effects on the level and trend of the exchange rate. 
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koruna's exchange rate, but that it was short-lived and economically-unimportant. Gersl 
and Holub also discuss the consistency of the interventions with inflation objectives of 
the central bank. 44 
 
3.   Discretionary Intervention and Monetary Policies: A Tale of Two 
Episodes 
3.1 Intervention Operations  
On September 17, 2004, facing an escalating appreciation of the peso, the BdR 
announced its decision to introduce direct and discretionary foreign exchange 
intervention operations in the spot market.45 The announcement indicated that the BdR 
would buy up to US$1,000 million in international reserves by year end.46 By December 
22, 2004, the BdR upended its discretionary intervention strategy, announcing that direct 
foreign currency purchases would continue indefinitely, with no fixed amount or 
duration.  
Table 2.1 provides descriptive information on BdR’s discretionary intervention 
operations.47 Between September 20, 2004, and March 2, 2006—the first period of 
                                                 
44 Ho and McCauley (2003) provide an earlier analysis of the use of intervention in the context of money or 
inflation targets, while Mohanty and Turner (2006) discuss the possible distortions in the domestic financial 
system caused by sustained sterilization efforts of central bank intervention. Edwards (2006) and Chang 
(2007) provide a discussion on whether the exchange rate should play a role in determining the monetary 
policy stance under inflation targeting in emerging markets, and analyze the rationale for reserve 
accumulation and foreign exchange intervention in these countries. More recently, Lavigne (2008) 
discusses the recent trends in sterilized intervention among emerging market economies, the fiscal costs 
associated to them, and the recent increase in alternative sterilization methods, such as the rise in reserve 
requirement ratios. 
45 The peso had appreciated 13.3 percent in real terms between April 2003 and September 2004. A policy 
response to the appreciation was also deemed necessary because further appreciation was expected to 
reduce inflation significantly below the 2004 inflation target of 5.5 percent. 
46 Up to that moment, the BdR had been following a rules-based intervention mechanism based on 
auctioning foreign currency options. The rules, timing, and magnitude of these interventions were largely 
predetermined and known by market participants. A detailed description of the operational aspects can be 
found in Uribe and Toro (2004). Mandeng (2003) and Ramirez (2004) analyze the experience of options-
based foreign exchange intervention in Colombia before 2004.  
47 As constructed, this data set excludes changes in reserves for reasons other than—and not related to—
influencing the level of the exchange rate. These include valuation effects, capitalization of interest gains, 
portfolio adjustment operations, or other foreign exchange transactions not aimed at influencing the 
exchange (such as the trading of foreign exchange to meet the needs of the central government). Historical 
data on official intervention is not available to the public at a daily frequency, and the BdR only publishes 
the aggregate monthly amount of its net purchases of dollars, ten days after the end of each month.  
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discretionary intervention—Colombian authorities intervened in the peso-dollar exchange 
rate market on 251 days, or approximately 70 percent of the total trading days. The 
average size of daily foreign currency purchases was almost US$30 million, 
approximately 5 percent of total market turnover. The amounts purchased varied 
considerably, however, with the largest intervention exceeding 40 percent of daily 
volume traded in the market. During this period, the BdR carried out intervention on 
several successive business days, with the longest intervention spell reaching 36 days.  
 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics on Daily Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign 
Exchange Market 
  
Regimes of Un-Announced 
Discretionary Intervention 






Frequency   
Number of trading days 357 73 
Number of intervention days  251 44 
Frequency of central bank intervention (in percent) 1/ 70.3 60.3 
Intensity   
Average value of intervention (in US$ millions) 2/ 29 103 
Maximum daily intervention (in US$ millions) 542 733 
Average relative value of intervention (in % of mkt. turnover) 2/ 5.1 10.7 
Maximum relative value of intervention (in percent) 40.9 48.6 
Duration   
Longest intervention spell (in business days) 3/ 36 9 
Sources: Author's calculations based on data provided by the Banco de la República. 
Note: Purchases are in millions of U.S. dollars. The first period goes from September 20, 2004, to 
March 1, 2006. The second period starts on January 15, 2007, and ends on April 30, 2007.  
1/ Number of days in which central bank intervened, as a fraction of total trading days. 
2/ Average magnitudes calculated over days on which intervention occurred.  
3/ The longest continuous stretch of central bank intervention within each sub-period. 
 
The BdR stopped its discretionary interventions at the beginning of March 2006, 
when uncertainty about the U.S. Federal Reserve policy led to a reversal of capital 
inflows and a sudden moderation of appreciation pressures. Starting in March 2006, the 
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Colombian government only intervened in the foreign exchange market by buying and 
selling foreign exchange options to smooth exchange rate volatility.48  
Beginning in July 2006, however, the exchange rate resumed its path of sustained 
appreciation, accumulating an appreciation of 15 percent by the end of 2006. On 
January 15, 2007, after a pause of nine months, the BdR re-initiated discretionary 
interventions to counteract the mounting appreciation pressures.49 During the second 
intervention episode (from January 15, 2007, to April 30, 2007), the frequency of BdR 
activity in the market was lower (60 percent of business days), but the amount of 
intervention was on average larger—especially when compared to the total activity in the 
foreign exchange rate market (see Table 2.1 above). During the first four months of 2007, 
the BdR accumulated US$4.5 billion by actively intervening in the market.50  
  
During the period under study, official discretionary intervention operations were 
conducted exclusively in the spot market, and the BdR did not intervene in the foreign 
exchange forward market nor did it conduct off-market foreign exchange operations.51 
Daily intervention operations were secret, and the BdR did not make explicit the rules for 
discretionary intervention or pre-announced a target level for the exchange rate.52  
                                                 
48 Under this mechanism, the Central Bank auctions call (put) options to sell (buy) foreign exchange for up 
to 180 million when the peso depreciates (appreciates) by more than 2 percent from its 20-day moving 
average. They expire one month after the auction date and can only be exercised when the official 
exchange rate is above (US$ call) or below (US$ put) its 20-day moving average. During this period, the 
volatility rule was triggered 11 times and led to a net reduction of reserves of US$360 million. 
49 Almost two weeks later, in its official Communiqué dated January 26, the BdR made public its 
determination to carry out ‘massive’ foreign exchange rate intervention, aimed at preventing what the 
central bank perceived as temporary appreciation pressures derived from the conversion of large 
privatization revenues to the domestic currency.  
50 Over the whole sample period, the BdR accumulated approximately US$17 billion through discretionary 
intervention operations, almost doubling the amount outstanding in September 2004. As a share of short-
term debt, reserves rose from 92 percent in September 2004 to 172 percent in April 2007.  
51 Central banks in several developing countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Mexico, and South Africa, 
among others) have at times engaged in “passive intervention,” i.e., outright transactions conducted off-
market aimed at insulating the foreign exchange market from large external receipts (such as oil revenue 
sales by state-owned enterprises, proceeds from privatization revenues, foreign aid, or surrender 
requirements). Moreno (2005) notes that in Mexico, for example, the Mexican oil company Pemex can 
only acquire pesos by depositing its dollars at the central bank. 
52 For carrying out discretionary interventions, the central bank participates in the foreign exchange market 
as any other trader, secretly announcing its bids for buying or selling foreign exchange. 
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3.2 Monetary Policy Stance and Sterilization Policies  
The two periods of discretionary intervention described above were associated 
with two starkly different monetary policy stances. 53 The first period was characterized 
by relatively low interest rates and a loosening of monetary policy. Over most of the 
period between September 2004 and March 2006, output was below potential and the 
central bank twice decreased the policy interest rate. 
 
Figure 2.2. Central Bank of Colombia's Intervention and Movements  





































































































































































Source: Banco de la República. 
 
During the second intervention episode in 2007, however, BdR’s dollar purchases 
occurred against a backdrop of tightening monetary policy. Since April 2006 the BdR had 
started to raise interest rates progressively in a bid curb inflationary pressures in an 
overheating economy (Figure 2.3). By January 2007 it had accumulated increases 
                                                 
53 The BdR adopted an inflation-targeting scheme with a floating exchange rate in October 1999, using the 
overnight repo (and reverse repo) interest rate as the main instrument of monetary policy. This reform 
replaced a system of pre-announced exchange rate bands that had been in place since 1994 and was subject 
to speculative attacks during 1998–99. See Vargas (2005) for a detailed account of monetary policy since 
1999. 
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amounting to 175 basis points, and continued to raise interest rates throughout the period 
of discretionary intervention. These rate increases led to a considerable upward shift in 
interest rate differentials with the U.S., which widened from 125 bps at the end of April 
2006 to 325 bps at the end of April 2007. 
 
Figure 2.3. Output Gap in Colombia 















Sources: Banco de la República; and author’s calculations. 
 
The different stance of monetary policy across the two intervention episodes is 
reflected in the different sterilization strategies pursued by the BdR across these two 
periods. Figure 2.4 shows the different mechanisms that the BdR could use to offset the 
impact of reserve accumulation, and their net contribution to changes in the domestic 
monetary base in each period. During the first period of discretionary intervention, the 
BdR mainly relied in non-market instruments to mop-up liquidity, by selling foreign 
exchange reserves to the government (which represented slightly more than 60 percent of 
total foreign currency intervention) and by transferring government deposits from the 
commercial banking system to the BdR. Over the whole period, the net sterilizing effect 
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of open-market operations (net sales of Treasury debt instruments) was close to zero.54 
Repo liquidity operations, on the other hand, were not used to offset, but rather had a net 
expansionary effect on the monetary base.55 Overall, FX intervention was only partially 
sterilized and intervention influenced the central bank’s provision of liquidity in the 
financial system. In other words, during this period in which the BdR was accumulating 
reserves, it also sought to deliberately expand the monetary base to support its choice of a 
more accommodative policy stance.56 
 
During the second episode of discretionary intervention, on the other hand, the 
increase in net foreign asset holdings of the Central Bank was fully sterilized, and all 
available mechanisms were deployed to offset the expansion of money supply associated to 
foreign currency purchases (see Figure 2.4).57 The transfer of deposits of the government to 
the Central Bank was the key instrument of sterilization, and repo operations—traditionally 
expansive— were also used heavily to neutralize the effect on reserve money. Overall, the 
monetary base contracted slightly during this period even though the economy (and money 
demand) was growing fast—consistent with Central Bank’s more restrictive short-term 
interest rate target.  
 
                                                 
54 Since 1999 the Central Bank is not allowed, by law, to issue its own securities. 
55 The Central Bank controls the amount of short-term liquidity supplied to the domestic banking system 
through the use of expansionary and contractionary REPO auctions (mostly overnight and at one-day 
maturities).  
56 For example, in December 2004, when the BdR announced that direct foreign currency purchases would 
continue indefinitely, it almost simultaneously notified the public of the closing of the contraction window 
and reduced the minimum interest rate on the monetary expansion auctions by 25 basic points. 
57 The only exception was the mechanism of selling foreign currency to the government, which was not 
used during this period. 
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Figure 2.4a. Sources of Changes in Monetary Base across the Two Intervention Episodes 
(Billions of pesos) 




































Figure 2.4b. Sources of Changes in Monetary Base across the Two Intervention Episodes 
(Billions of pesos) 




































Source: Author’s calculations based don data provided by Banco de la República. 
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3.3 Credibility of the Inflation Target: Differences Across Periods and Changes 
within Periods 
Not only did the monetary policy goals differ markedly across the two 
intervention episodes, but there was also a significant change in the credibility of the 
inflation targeting regime. During the first period, the inflation target announced by the 
Central Bank was highly credible: every quarter, between 80 and 90 percent of survey 
respondents (on average across the three years) thought that the inflation goal would be 
met.58 During the second intervention wave (January to April 2007), however, credibility 
was much lower and fell dramatically over time. The fraction of respondents that thought 
the inflation target would be attained was 24 percent during the first quarter, and fell to 
only 6 percent in the second quarter of 2007 (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). 
 

















































































































































Sources: Banco de la República; and author's calculations. 
 
 
                                                 
58 This numbers are based on quarterly survey data collected by the Central Bank on the percentage of 
respondents who believed that the inflation target would be attained at year-end.  
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What explains this change in the market’s trust that the Central Bank would 
achieve the target? During the first episode, purchases of international reserves were 
made in the context of a negative output gap and decreasing inflation rates. For this 
reason, the BdR was able to achieve the inflation targets with remarkable precision 
(Figure 2.5). Moreover, inflation expectations were unhinged by the intervention in the 
foreign exchange because markets perceived that exchange rate and monetary policies 
were fully coherent. That is, the stated goal of weakening the peso (through partially 
sterilized intervention operations) was consistent with the loosening of monetary policy. 
In other words, because macroeconomic objectives were well aligned, foreign currency 
purchases unambiguously and credibly signaled an easing of monetary policy—even if 
intervention operations were not publicly announced.59 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Credibility of the Inflation Target 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by Banco de la República. 
 
 
During the second period, however, there was a tension between monetary and 
exchange rate policy goals. By the time the Central Bank launched its discretionary 
                                                 
59 Toro and Julio (2006) provide additional support for this conclusion.  
   
 68
interventions in January 2007, inflation was already above the target and rising (Figure 
2.5). Thus, the BdR sought simultaneously to maintain price stability by raising interest 
rates, and preserve competitiveness by resisting currency appreciation through sterilized 
interventions. In this context, markets perceived that BdR’s dollar purchases would 
undermine its ability to meet the inflation target by year-end, as resisting currency 
appreciation blunted the pass-through channel that would have helped offset higher 
import prices. 60  
As a consequence of the large-scale intervention, the Central Bank found it 
increasingly difficult to offset its massive foreign currency purchases and increase the 
short term interest rate at its desired level. By end-March 2007, the Central Bank 
switched from being a net creditor to a net debtor position vis a vis the financial system 
(Figure 2.7). This stifled the primary transmission channel of monetary policy, as the 
inter-bank interest rate drifted (albeit, temporarily) below and away from the BdR’s 
lending rate which was being increased. 61 This further complicated attaining the inflation 
objective, and explains why credibility of the inflation target fell dramatically by the end 
of the second period.62 
 
                                                 
60 See Holub (2004) for a very similar finding based on the experience of the Czech Republic with central 
bank intervention.  
61 In practice, a central bank is better positioned to move short-term interest rates to its desired level if the 
monetary authority is a net lender of liquidity to the financial sector. This was evident in the behavior of 
policy and inter-bank interest rates depicted in Figure 7. While the average inter-bank rate tracked very 
closely the reference rate until the end of March 2007, the relationship weakened after that. The possibility 
that large scale foreign currency purchases could eventually turn the BdR from a net provider of short-term 
liquidity to being a net borrower vis-à-vis the financial sector was correctly anticipated in Vargas (2005). 
62 At the time, the outstanding stock of government paper at the BdR was not enough to mitigate the 
monetary consequences of large-scale foreign currency purchases. To preserve the control of monetary 
conditions, the BdR opened its own deposit facility on April 2, 2007, to mop up the excess liquidity from 
the financial system. Finding it increasingly difficult, however, to offset their aggressive intervention, the 
authorities decided to stop intervening on April 30, 2007. On the 6th of May, the authorities imposed 
restrictions on debt and portfolio inflows and derivative positions, in an attempt to isolate spot and forward 
exchange rate movements from interest rate policy.  
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Figure 2.7. Net Creditor Position of the Colombian Central Bank vis-à-vis the Financial 
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Source: Author’s calculations based don data provided by Banco de la República. 
 
4.   Empirical Strategy 
There are two main challenges in assessing the impact of intervention on 
exchange rates in the case of Colombia. First, the decision (and extent) of intervention 
may have been endogenous to past exchange rate movements. That is, the central bank 
could have been more likely to buy foreign currency when the domestic currency was 
strengthening. Failing to account for the two-way causality between exchange rate 
changes and intervention is likely to bias the analysis toward finding that the latter has no 
impact on exchange rates.63 Second, the descriptive evidence presented in Section 3 
indicates that part of the intervention operations conducted during the first period were 
                                                 
63 In other words, simultaneous observation of foreign exchange purchases and domestic currency 
appreciation cannot be interpreted as evidence that intervention was ineffective. For instance, in the 
absence of intervention, the exchange rate might have followed a more appreciated path. The lack of a 
counterfactual is typical of policy evaluation, as described in the literature of treatment effects (see Imbens, 
2004, for a recent survey). However, in the case of the exchange rate intervention literature, the problem is 
compounded by the lack of a consensus model on exchange rate determination to estimate the 
counterfactual. 
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not sterilized, i.e., the monetary authority did not fully offset the increase in the domestic 
money base from its increase in net foreign assets holdings. By itself, an unsterilized 
intervention is simply another way of conducting expansionary monetary policy and 
would be normally expected to depreciate the exchange rate. Thus, to assess the 
effectiveness of intervention as an independent policy tool, it is necessary to take into 
account the degree of sterilization and market expectations on the extent to which 
interventions would be sterilized. 
The empirical strategy aims to overcome the econometric identification problem 
by using a two-stage instrumental variable model based on estimates of the BdR’s 
reaction function.64 For each period of discretionary intervention, I estimate a foreign 
exchange intervention function for the amount of intervention. I then use the predicted 
values from the first stage as an instrument for actual interventions in a reduced-form 
model of exchange rate returns.65 However, in the absence of detailed daily data on the 
degree of sterilization of intervention operations, however, the current identification 
strategy would not be able to tease out the influence of peso-weakening interventions 
from the effects of monetary policy. This caveat should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results for the first period presented below. 
In the first-stage, foreign exchange intervention policy is described as a dynamic 
censored regression (Tobit) model of the following form:66 
 
( ) ( )( )0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4 1max 0 , ln ln ln    Tt t t t t t tINT INT s s s NewsInf uγ γ γ γ γ− − − − −= + + Δ + − + +  (2.1) 
 
                                                 
64 The same methodology is used in Guimarães and Karacadag (2004) and Disyatat and Galati (2007). For 
recent reviews of the empirical literature on the impact of foreign exchange interventions on the level and 
variance of exchange rates, see Hutchinson (2003) and Neely (2005). 
65 The model allows for GARCH effects in the conditional variance. 
66 Almekinders (1995) and, more recently, Gnabo, Mello, and Moccero (2008) survey empirical work on 
the determinants of intervention. The conventional strategy is to estimate a Probit or Tobit model on spot-
market intervention as a function of exchange rate deviations from fundamentals and volatility, as well as 
other controls. In cases where intervention is sporadic and tends to be clustered around specific days, other 
authors have estimated friction models (see Neely, 2006).  
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where INT denotes the actual amount of dollar purchases, ts  is the nominal exchange rate 
(expressed in terms of local currency per U.S. dollar), and Ts is a backward-looking,  












= ∑  (2.2) 
The specification in (1)-(2) allows interventions to be motivated by two exchange 
rate factors: a very short-term one (the daily percentage change in the exchange 
rate, 1ln ts −Δ ), and by the percentage deviation of the exchange rate from 'target.'67 This 
enables to test if the BdR systematically “leaned against the wind” and/or attempted to 
counter short-term exchange rate trends. In addition, the model controls for the possibility 
that official announcements of inflation data can influence the decision to 
intervene. NewsInf is the “news” contained in the announcement—the difference 
between the actual announced level of monthly inflation and the market’s expectation of 
that announcement.68 Finally, because interventions usually come in clusters, we include 
the lagged dependent variable as a regressor to account for persistence effects. 
In the second stage, we estimate a GARCH (1,1) model of the peso-dollar 
exchange rate return with the following general specification:69 
 
                                                 
67 The order of the moving average representation has varied across studies. In the case of Colombia, I set it 
to a 20-day moving average, which is the trigger used in operations with options under the rules-based 
intervention scheme.  
68 Market expectation is measured as the median forecast of the monthly inflation value culled from opinion 
surveys conducted by Bloomberg News Service. The surveys are taken very close to the time of the 
announcement, and ask about expectations of the change in domestic CPI over the previous month. 
69 The nominal exchange rate data is provided by the BdR and corresponds to the value-weighted average 
of all foreign exchange rate transactions in the spot market throughout the day (officially known as TRM, 
or Tasa Representativa de Mercado). The daily returns for the peso/dollar exchange is calculated as the 
difference in the logarithm of the exchange rate of two consecutive business days. Table A1 in the 
Appendix reports various descriptive statistics on the unconditional distribution of exchange rate returns. 
All the series appear to have non-normal distributions, with significant linear and non-linear serial 
correlations, especially during the first period. Thus, I follow Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) and Dominguez 
(1998) and use a univariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model 
for the analysis.  
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where: ( )slnΔ  is the daily percentage change in the nominal exchange rate (such that a 
positive change is a depreciation of the Colombian peso); TNI  is the instrumented level 
of BdR intervention in the foreign exchange market, as explained above; ( )*ri −  is the 
interest rate differential between the domestic interbank rate and the U.S. Fed’s fund rate, 
in percent per year; spreadEMBI  is the yield spread on a sovereign foreign currency 
bond over a comparable U.S. treasury bond in percent per year;70 AutomINT  is a dummy 
variable denoting the days in which the automatic intervention rule through options was 
triggered;71 itD  are day-of-the-week dummy variables (for example, 11 =tD  for Mondays, 
where Friday is the omitted category); tPostH  is a holiday dummy variable that is equal 
to one on the day following the market being closed for any reason other than a weekend; 
 denotes the absolute number operator and tε  is the unexpected return which is used to 
model the conditional volatility of the exchange rate in the volatility equation (5). 
Finally, 2tσ  is the conditional variance and allows for the possibility of time-varying and 
clustering conditional volatility. The conditional distribution of the disturbance term is 
normal with variance 2σ . 
Several features of the specification are worth noting. Equation (3) of the 
empirical model (the “mean” equation) analyzes changes in the exchange rate return 
                                                 
70 This is measured in first differences to achieve stationarity. 
71 During the discretionary intervention episodes, the intervention rule was triggered twice: on 
December 20, 2004, and on March 30, 2007. The empirical model above accounts for the impact of these 
automatic interventions in assessing the effects of discretionary intervention. 
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(depreciation or appreciation against the dollar) as a function of intervention, controlling 
for other factors affecting exchange rates at a daily frequency.72 The main focus is on the 
estimate of 1β , the contemporaneous impact of intervention on the level of the exchange 
rate. If central bank intervention is effective, then purchases of foreign currency 
( )0>INT  will depreciate the domestic currency ( )( )0ln >Δ s  and so 1β , the parameter of 
interest, will be positive and statistically significant.  
The estimation controls for financial developments affecting short term exchange 
rate movements. The interest differential aims to capture the possible impact of monetary 
policy actions and local money market conditions on the exchange rate. This is especially 
important during the first period, when the Central Bank was easing monetary policy.73 
Yield spreads on sovereign external debt are included as a measure of country risk and 
foreign investor sentiment, which are potential key determinants of foreigners’ demand 
for local currency. I also account for the possible influence of surprises in inflation 
announcements, that may arrive on the same day on which intervention is carried out.  
 
5.   Summary of Results 
5.1 Central Bank Reaction Function 
Table 2.2 reports the results on the determinants of foreign exchange intervention 
activity. Results for the first period of intervention are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the BdR attempted to “lean against the wind,” i.e., to smooth the speed of adjustment of 
the exchange rate and thus avoid large appreciations on a given day. The coefficient for 
the reaction on the short-term change in the spot exchange rate has the right sign and is 
statistically significant, suggesting that between 2004 and 2006, the BdR reacted 
systematically to previous-day exchange rate changes in deciding the amount to 
intervene. The estimate of 2γ implies that, on average, a 1 percent appreciation of the 
                                                 
72 Given the reduced-form nature of the estimation, the framework can only identify the average response 
of exchange rate returns to intervention operations. It does not, however, identify a structural relationship 
or the channels through which intervention may affect exchange rates.  
73 The distinction between unsterilized and sterilized intervention is important: changes in the monetary 
supply would naturally affect the exchange rate, so it would not be surprising to find that unsterilized 
intervention is effective in depreciating the currency.  
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exchange rate was met by a central bank purchase of US$14 million the following day 
(see Table 2.2). At the same time, results shown in the first column of Table 2.2 suggest 
that another motivation for BdR’s intervention was to slow or reverse the trend of 
appreciation during this period. The point estimates imply that an appreciation of the peso 
of 1 percent relative to target, triggered purchases of US$13 million on average by the 
BdR during the first period.74 
 
Table 2.2. Determinants of Colombia Central Bank's Daily Discretionary Intervention 
in FX Spot Market 






γ1 (Lagged Dependent Variable) 0.16 0.40** 
 (0.13) (0.19) 
Exchange Rate Acceleration   
γ2 (Exchange Rate change, in percentage) (t-1) -14.10** -67.80 
 (5.5) (55.85) 
Deviation of Exchange Rate Level    
γ3 (Percentage Deviation from Target) (t-1) -13.40*** -54.78** 
 (4.13) (26.3) 
Unexpected Component of Inflation Announcement     
γ4 (Actual minus Expected Value of Inflation) (t-1) -90.340** 52.15 
 (40.1) (55.16) 
Diagnostics  
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.10 0.19 
Prob > LR 0.00 0.00 
Included observations 356 73 
Censored Observations (in percent) 29.7 39.6 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: This table reports estimation of a Tobit model for equation (1) in the text. The dependent 
variable is the amount of dollars purchased by the Central Bank (in millions) in the domestic 
foreign exchange market to influence the value of the home currency. Estimated coefficients are the 
marginal effects of a unit change in the explanatory variables, evaluated at sample means. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The model includes a constant, not shown. Asterisks 
denote significance of coefficients, with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.  
                                                 
74 Since the motivation for BdR intervention was not announced, the policy criteria of ‘leaning against the 
wind’ and ‘reverse the trend of appreciation’ are only indicative of actual policy intentions. However, the 
negative estimated coefficients on 2γ and 3γ  conforms to our priors and those of market participants, as 
well as unofficial BdR statements. 
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The results for the second period of intervention, however, suggest that 
Colombian authorities did not appear to intervene in response to an acceleration of peso 
appreciation, that is, to smooth out exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, the value for 2γ  in 
the second column of Table 2.2 has the expected sign but is estimated very imprecisely. 
Rather, results indicate that a key motivation for discretionary interventions during the 
second period was a desire to correct the deviation of the exchange rate from its (moving) 
target value. The point estimate for 3γ  implies that in response to a 1 percent negative 
deviation of the exchange rate with respect to target, the BdR would purchase on average 
US$54 million during 2007 to slow appreciation. These intervention efforts to guide the 
exchange rate toward a target value were more pronounced than during the first period of 
intervention.75  
During the second period, foreign exchange interventions became more highly 
correlated over time. In particular, the results suggest that once intervention was carried 
out one day, another intervention of a similar magnitude (and in the same direction) was 
likely to take place the following day.76 This observation provides important insights into 
the muted impact of the BdR’s activity in the foreign exchange: as intervention became 
more predictable, its ability to surprise the market diminished. In effect, market 
participants may have been better able to anticipate the BdR’s operations, especially 
considering the high frequency of intervention and that all interventions were carried out 
in the same direction.77 
 
                                                 
75 These results are robust to the inclusion of volatility of the exchange rate as a possible determinant of 
discretionary intervention in equation (1). The estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant in both 
periods, suggesting that the BdR did not intervene in response to a rise in market uncertainty. This pattern 
is consistent with the idea that the authorities engaged in discretionary intervention only to affect the level 
of the exchange rate, and resorted to rules-based, non-discretionary intervention to dampen the volatility of 
the exchange rate (as discussed in Section 3).  
76 Dynamic considerations did not play an important role in determining the intervention strategy used by 
the BdR in the first period. 
77 The model seems to capture only a small fraction of the variance of the intervention variable as suggested 
by the R-square statistic, in particular during the first period. This may suggest that other variables not 
captured in the model—such as political factors—were also important. See Vargas (2005) for a discussion 
of political economy issues related to intervention. 
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5.2 Effects on exchange rates 
The estimates in Table 2.3 suggest that unsterilized intervention during the first 
discretionary period had a moderately sizable effect on the exchange rate, and in the 
direction intended by the authorities.78, 79 The coefficient for the effect of 
contemporaneous intervention (0.78) is statistically significant, and implies that a US$30 
million purchase (the average daily amount of intervention within this period) was 
associated to a depreciation of the value of the domestic currency by approximately 0.23 
percent.80 That is, the intervention required to contemporaneously move the nominal 
exchange rate by 1 percent on a given day represented approximately 2 percent of the 
country’s reserve money.  
The results in the second column of Table 2.3 also suggest that intervention 
operations had no statistically significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rate 
returns during the second episode of discretionary intervention.81 Instead, the results of 
the model points to the theoretically sensible finding that high and increasing interest rate 
differentials, positive domestic inflation surprises and improvements in sovereign 
creditworthiness (as represented by decreases in the EMBI spread) were key factors 
driving the appreciation of the peso during this period.82  
Importantly, during this second period, the exchange rate became much more 
responsive to the interest rate differential. The coefficient on the interest rate differential 
is almost 15 times larger than in the 04–06 period, and is equally significant in statistical 
terms. The greater impact of positive interest rate differentials on exchange rate 
                                                 
78 These results are consistent with Toro and Julio (2006), who use ultra-high frequency data to analyze the 
impact of intervention on exchange rate dynamics in Colombia between 2004 and 2006. 
79 Maximum likelihood estimation was carried out using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausmann algorithm using 
Eviews 5.1 package. In all cases, the skewness and kurtosis of the standardized regression residuals indicate 
that the assumption of conditional normality in equation (2) does not hold. Therefore, robust standard errors 
using the method described in Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) were reported. 
80 The appreciation of the Colombian peso in 2005 was fairly moderate and less acute than the 
corresponding appreciation that took place in other countries in the region such as Brazil and Chile.  
81 It is telling that—in spite of massive foreign currency purchases by the BdR that reached US$4.53 billion 
(39 percent of monetary base) in the first four months of 2007—the exchange rate continued its steep 
appreciation path, the second-highest among emerging markets during this period. 
82 The fit of the exchange rate model (R-square of 0.42) is significantly higher than in previous studies, 
indicating a high explanatory power for exchange rate changes during this period.  
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appreciation provides indirect evidence of the importance of carry trade operations during 
this period, as discussed in the next section.83  
Exchange rates also appear to have been responsive to announcements on 
economic news during both periods. Two results stand out. First, news on inflation 
announcements had a significant impact on exchange rate dynamics, suggesting that 
fundamentals also drive the exchange rate at higher frequencies.84 Second, the effect of 
these announcements was exactly the opposite across periods (Table 2.3). During the first 
period of intervention, higher-than-expected inflation was on average associated with a 
depreciation of the peso. During 2007, however, the sign on the unexpected inflation 
variable was negative and statistically significant, indicating that higher-than-expected 
inflation resulted in a strong currency appreciation (a reduction in the nominal exchange 
rate) the subsequent day. The point estimate is economically important: for example, if 
announced inflation was 1 percentage point above expectations during the second period, 
the estimated effect was an appreciation of the peso of almost half a percent the next day. 
The results thus indicate that during the second period, “bad news” about inflation—
inflation higher than expected—was “good news” for the nominal exchange rate (that is, 
the exchange rate appreciated following this news).85  
 
                                                 
83 Offshore players shorted the dollar in the forward market to gain exposure to the Colombian peso, and 
indirectly to the prevailing interest rate differential. Kamil and Reveiz (2008) analyze in detail the role of 
derivatives markets as a conduit for this carry trade, and discuss its policy implications. 
84 The systematic relationship between the surprise component of macroeconomic releases and one-day 
exchange rate changes is noteworthy, given that the literature has pointed out that this connection is weak 
and hard to detect (Edison, 1997). 
85 Results for the second period of intervention are consistent with the recent findings by Clarida and 
Waldman (2007), who look at the reaction of nominal exchange rates to inflation surprises using intra-daily 
data across 10 countries. The authors show that if a central bank has an inflation target that it implements 
via a Taylor rule, an unexpectedly high inflation announcement leads to a stronger domestic currency.  
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Table 2.3. Impact of Central Bank Intervention on Exchange Rate Level  
(GARCH Model: Mean Returns Equation) 






β0 (Lagged Dependent Variable) (t-1) 0.228*** 0.148* 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Intervention Indicator   
β1 (Instrumented Amount of Dollar Purchases by Central 
Bank) (t) 0.782*** 0.055 
 (0.29) (0.09) 
β2 (Overnight Interest Rate Differential) (t) -0.024** -0.371** 
 (0.01) (0.16) 
β3 (Daily Change in EMBI Sovereign Spread) (t) 1.287*** 2.023** 
 (0.22) (0.92) 
Unexpected Component of Inflation Announcement     
β4 (Actual minus Expected Value of Inflation) (t-1) 0.286*** -0.464*** 
 (0.10) (0.08) 
Dummy for Days with Automatic FX Intervention Yes Yes 
Diagnostics  
Log L -66.160 -7.460 
R-Squared 0.150 0.430 
Included observations 356 73 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: This table reports estimation of the Mean Equation of the GARCH(1,1) model in equation (3)–
(5) in the text. The dependent variable is the daily rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, in 
percent. The coefficient on the intervention variables measures the percentage change in the 
exchange rate for a US$100 million in foreign currency purchases. Asterisks denote significance of 
coefficients, with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
The fact that the peso consistently and significantly appreciated in response to 
unexpectedly high inflation during the second period suggests that markets apparently 
believed that the BdR would react to such news by increasing interest rates.86 Consistent 
                                                 
86 During the first discretionary intervention episode, 75 percent of the monthly announcements of inflation 
were higher than what the market was expecting. The average value of these positive inflation surprises 
was 0.25 percent. During the second intervention episode, however, all four inflation announcements 
between January 15 and April 30, 2007, were above market expectations and the average value of the 
inflation surprises was five times higher than during the first period (1.3 percent).  
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with the notion that exchange rates are forward looking asset prices that react to changes 
in the market’s expectation of future fundamentals, the prospect of an increase in 
domestic interest rates made Colombian assets more attractive, inducing an immediate 
dollar depreciation (peso appreciation) to equilibrate the asset market. This market 
reaction provides insight into the reasons why sterilized intervention was ultimately not 
effective in 2007: markets expected that monetary policy would remain committed to the 
goal of reducing inflation, even if that meant increasing interest rates and—by 
encouraging more capital inflows—undoing intervention efforts.  
Also of interest is how central bank intervention affects exchange rate volatility. 
Volatility often reflects, among other things, uncertainty in economic policies and other 
fundamental determinants of exchange rates, which the market may be struggling to price 
accurately. As indicated by Dominguez (1998), central bank intervention is expected to 
reduce volatility as long as intervention is both credible and unambiguous. The results 
shown in Table 2.4 are consistent with this hypothesis. During the first period, BdR 
intervention had a stabilizing effect on the exchange rate. Controlling for other factors 
affecting short-term exchange rate volatility, the results indicate that BdR’s discretionary 
intervention had the un-intended consequence of dampening the volatility of exchange 
rate returns.87 This empirical finding is noteworthy, given that the smoothing effect of 
intervention on exchange rate volatility is at odds with most of the intervention literature 
for developed countries and developing economies.88 In contrast, during the second 
period, official discretionary intervention had no discernible impact on exchange rate 
volatility.89 
 
                                                 
87 In unreported results, I find that the stabilizing effect on the exchange during the first intervention period 
was stronger after December 20, 2004, when the BdR reduced interest rates and simultaneously announced 
that interventions would continue indefinitely, with no predetermined amount or duration.  
88 Guimarães and Karacadag (2004), for example, find that intervention led to increased exchange rate 
volatility in Mexico and Turkey. 
89 During the first period, monthly inflation announcements led to an economically significant drop in 
conditional volatility of exchange rates in the subsequent day. Interestingly, during the second period 
foreign exchange market uncertainty did not decrease in the day following the official announcement of 
inflation. As noted in Footnote 45, during the second period, the actual inflation rates announced were 
systematically underestimated by the market, possibly leading to major revision in expectations following 
these official announcements. 
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Table 2.4. Effect of Central Bank Intervention on Volatility of Exchange Rate 
(GARCH Model: Conditional Variance Equation) 






a0 (GARCH Term) 0.560*** 0.544***
 (0.13) (0.23) 
a1 (Squared Innovation) 0.210*** 0.098 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Intervention Indicator   
β1 (Actual Amount of Dollar Purchases) (t) -0.019*** -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
β2 (Overnight Interest Rate Differential) -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.03) 
β3 (Daily Change in EMBI Sovereign Spread) 0.095 -0.153 
 (0.14) (0.16) 
Unexpected Component of Inflation Announcement     
β4 (Actual minus Expected Value of Inflation, in absolute 
terms) (t-1) -0.223*** -0.028 
 (0.04) (0.02) 
Fixed Effects for Days-of-the Week and Post-Holiday 
Trading Days Yes Yes 
Dummy for Days with Automatic FX Intervention Yes Yes 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: This table reports estimation of the Mean Equation of the GARCH(1,1) model in equation (3)–
(5) in the text. The dependent variable is the daily rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, in 
percent. The coefficient on the intervention variable measures the percentage change in the exchange 
rate for a US$100 million in foreign currency purchases. Asterisks denote significance of 
coefficients, with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
In Appendix II, I report on a number of sensitivity tests that probe the central 
results regarding the treatment for endogeneity and the possibility that the “surprise” 
element of BdR’s interventions (rather than its predicted component) had a significant 
effect on exchange rates during the second period. The results of such tests are virtually 
identical to those reported above. 
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6.   The Role of Derivatives Markets in Blunting Central Bank Intervention  
During 2007, markets perceived the BdR as pursuing two mutually inconsistent—
and ultimately unsustainable—goals. Foreign investors, trusting that the Central Bank 
would eventually focus on taming inflation (and eventually let the exchange rate 
appreciate), speculated heavily on exchange rate appreciation by building-up large long-
positions in pesos through the onshore forward market.90 The turnover value in peso 
forwards bought by off-shores to local banks increased more than three times between 
end-2006 to its peak in March 2007 (Figure 2.8).91 The unprecedented size and sheer 
speed of execution of these leveraged positions resembled a speculative attack against the 
dollar, reducing the ability of the central bank to influence exchange rate market 
conditions by buying international reserves to prop up the exchange rate.92 In summary, 
the Colombian experience shows that large, persistent, and one-sided central bank foreign 
exchange purchases that go against the perception of the majority of market has little 
possibility of success. In such circumstances, intervention can actually lead to greater 
financial instability, as investors engage in one-way bets against the central bank in the 
expectation of a high return once the official resistance to the exchange rate adjustment is 
overpowered. 
                                                 
90 Speculative demand for the peso was also buttressed by the prospect that the underlying forces putting 
upward pressure on the real exchange rate (such as the improvement in the security situation, better terms 
of trade and strong inflows of foreign direct investment) were expected to persist over time. 
91 Investors knew that if the BdR became a net debtor of the banking system, this would greatly weaken its 
ability to conduct monetary policy, other things remaining equal. Under this net debtor scenario, the 
authorities would be forced to discontinue intervening and the exchange rate would appreciate on impact. 
As opposed to the information on intervention operations, the net creditor position of the BdR is updated 
daily in the BdR’s official website. Thus, as the BdR soon approached a position in which it would become 
a net debtor, financial markets may have perceived that the scope for additional intervention would be 
coming to an end. 
92 As far as I am aware of, the only other instance of a speculative attack against a foreign currency in an 
emerging market occurred in Hungary in 2002 (see Barabas, 2003). Lall (1997) describes a theoretical 
model that resembles the experience of Colombia but in reverse, where forward markets are the main 
channel used by speculators to mount a speculative attack against the domestic currency in a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Kumhof, Li, and Yang (2007) analyze a small open economy model under inflation 
targeting, and show that an inflation-targeting regime can be also vulnerable to speculative attacks. In their 
model, however, the central bank intervenes to avert a currency depreciation and the attack depletes central 
bank’s reserves. 
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Figure 2.8. Traded Value in On-Shore Currency Derivatives Market Between Local 












































































































































Source: Banco de la República. 
 
 
7.   Conclusions 
This chapter examines Colombia’s experience with central bank foreign exchange 
intervention between 2004 and 2007 under an inflation targeting regime. During most of 
this period, the BdR engaged in large-scale, discretionary purchases of foreign exchange 
to resist appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Results suggest that during the first period of discretionary intervention 
(September 2004–March 2006), the combination of peso-weakening intervention and a 
credible expansionary monetary policy seem to have led to a reduction in appreciation 
pressures. During the second period (January–April 2007), however, there was no 
statistically significant correlation between foreign currency purchases and exchange 
rates. A possible explanation for this result is that large-scale intervention during the 
second period worked against a backdrop of intense monetary tightening and low 
credibility in the inflation target. 
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The identification strategy used in this study does not allow disentangling the 
causal effect of intervention on exchange rates. Doing so would require properly 
accounting for the degree of sterilization of interventions (and whether the market 
expected interventions to be sterilized) and changes in the credibility of the inflation 
target. This will be the subject of my future research. 
 
 






Table 2.A1. Summary Statistics on the Unconditional Distribution of Daily Exchange 
Rate Returns 
  Regimes of Un-Announced Discretionary Intervention 
 First Period Second Period 
  September 2004–March 2006 January 2007–April 2007 
Daily exchange rate statistics   
Mean (percent) -0.03  0.01 
Variance (percent)  0.17  0.07 
Skewness 1/  0.82  0.04 
Kurtosis  9.11 -0.02 
QDs(20) 2/ 76.60  23.86 
QDs2(20) 349.20  16.34 
Sources: Author's calculations based on data provided by the Banco de la República. 
1/ The kurtosis statistic is normalized so that a value of zero corresponds to the normal distribution. 
2/ QDs(20) and QDs2(20) are Ljung-Box tests for high-order serial correlation for the returns and 
square returns up to the 20th lag, respectively. 
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Appendix 2: Robustness Tests  
 
Endogeneity 
A fundamental assumption of our analysis so far is that the amount of dollars 
bought by the BdR on a given day depends on past exchange rate returns, but is 
independent of movements in the exchange rate within that day. Admittedly, this is a 
strong identifying assumption, as it rules out the possibility that the BdR could have acted 
strategically by also taking into account the intraday evolution of the exchange rate in 
deciding how much to intervene. If this were the case, aggregate daily interventions and 
exchange rate changes would simultaneously determine each other, and thus estimates of 
the effect of central bank intervention would be biased downwards.93 
Unfortunately, the exact timing and magnitudes of BdR’s intervention in foreign 
exchange markets are not available at an intra-daily frequency. Data are available, 
however, on the opening exchange rates quotes each day from the Colombian foreign-
exchange electronic transactions system, known as SET-FX. Given that exchange rates 
are quoted at the beginning of the trading day while intervention data is reported at the 
close of the day, exchange rate returns at time t (the percentage change in opening prices 
between t and t-1) are predetermined with respect to the amount of intervention at t. I 
exploit this differential timing to attenuate simultaneity problems and check the 
robustness of the baseline results.94 
Table 2.A2 re-estimates the impact of BdR’s intervention on exchange rate 
returns for both periods, using opening exchange rates quotes to measure daily exchange 
rate returns.95 Results are virtually identical to the benchmark estimates presented in 
Table 2.3 in the text, except that the positive impact of central bank intervention on 
                                                 
93 Using a novel identification strategy, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) exploit exogenous structural breaks in 
the Japanese and Australian authorities’ intervention strategies to estimate the effects of central bank 
intervention. Their identification method, however, hinges crucially on the assumption that the parameters 
of the authorities’ intervention reaction function are stable across periods—something that is very difficult 
to justify in the Colombian case in light of the evidence presented in Section V.  
94 The same empirical strategy is used in Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000). 
95 As in the previous section, I also use a two-stage instrumental variable model based on estimates of the 
BdR’s reaction function. Results from the first-stage are available upon request. 
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exchange rate returns during the first discretionary period is somewhat lower. For the 
second period, I again fail to detect a significant effect of intervention on exchange rate 
levels, confirming the baseline result that intervention was not a useful short-term policy 
instrument for exchange rate management during 2007. 
 
Table 2.A2. Effects of Central Bank Intervention: Robustness Test for Endogeneity 
Concerns 
(Mean Returns Equation) 






β0 (Lagged Dependent Variable) (t-1) -0.095 -0.130 
 (0.07) (0.10) 
Intervention Indicator   
β1 (Instrumented Amount of Dollar Purchases by Central 
Bank) (t-1) 0.488* 0.067 
 (0.29) (0.07) 
β2 (Overnight Interest Rate Differential) (t-1) -0.027* -0.413***
 (0.01) (0.14) 
β3 (Daily Change in EMBI Sovereign Spread) (t-1) 1.609*** 3.868***
 (0.29) (0.17) 
Unexpected Component of Inflation Announcement   
β4 (Actual minus Expected Value of Inflation) (t-1) 0.272 -0.333***
 (0.31) (0.12) 
Dummy for Days with Automatic FX Intervention Yes Yes 
Diagnostics  
Log L -28.001 -7.581068 
R-Squared 0.088 0.585 
Included observations 356 73 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: This table reports estimation of the Mean Equation of the GARCH(1,1) model in equation (3)–
(5), modified to account for the timing in exchange rate quotes as discussed in Section VI in the text. 
Explanatory variables are lagged one period because exchange rates are quoted at the beginning of 
the trading day, while intervention is as of the end of the business day, and interest rate and 
differential and EMBI spread are calculated as averages within the day. The coefficient on the 
intervention variable measures the percentage change in the exchange rate for a US$100 million in 
foreign currency purchases. Asterisks denote significance of coefficients, with ***, **, and * 
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Unexpected Intervention  
By using the fitted values from the reaction function as instruments, the analysis 
up to this point has tested whether the systematic (i.e., expected) component of foreign 
exchange intervention could affect exchange rates. However, it is possible that the 
“surprise” element of intervention (rather than its expected component) has a significant 
effect on exchange rates.  
To test this hypothesis, I try two alternative specifications. First, I decompose the 
actual amount of intervention into an expected component and unexpected one, the latter 
given by the residual term in the Tobit model used in the first stage. I then include both 
measures of intervention in the exchange rate equation (3) described in Section IV. The 
results in Table 2.A3 show that, in line with the benchmark results, the effects of the 
predictable component of discretionary intervention is significant during the first period, 
but has no significant measurable impact during the second period. The unexpected 
amount of intervention, on the other hand, seems to have a consistently perverse effect in 
both periods: higher unexpected intervention actually led to a contemporaneous 
appreciation of the currency. 
An alternative way to measure the effect of unexpected intervention is to test 
whether central bank intervention was more effective on days when monetary authorities 
were perceived as least likely to have intervened. To implement this second specification, 
I first estimate a Probit model for the decision to intervene using a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 in days when the central bank intervened, and 0 otherwise. As 
explanatory variables, I use the same determinants as in the benchmark model. Using the 
fitted values of the discrete choice models as a measure of the ex-ante likelihood of 
central bank’s presence in the market, I define days with a predicted probability below 
0.5 as days with a low likelihood of intervention.96 I then include in the baseline model a 
multiplicative term capturing the interaction between the instrumented level of 
intervention and a dummy indicating days in which the BdR was less likely to have 
                                                 
96 The median daily value of the predicted probability of intervention using the Probit model is 0.84 and 
0.74 during the first and second period, respectively. 
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intervened. Results in Table 2.A4 indicate that the effects of BdR intervention were not 
significantly different in days with low perceived likelihood of central bank intervention. 
 
Table 2.A3. The Impact of the Unexpected Component of Central Bank Intervention 
(Mean Returns Equation) 






β0 (Lagged Dependent Variable) (t-1) 0.251*** 0.102 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Intervention Indicators   
β11 (Predicted Amount of Dollar Purchases by Central 
Bank) (t) 0.860** 0.024 
 (0.42) (0.09) 
β12 (Unexpected Amount of Dollar Purchases by Central 
Bank) (t) -0.039*** -0.124*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) 
β2 (Overnight Interest Rate Differential) (t) -0.031*** -0.587*** 
 (0.01) (0.17) 
β3 (Daily Change in EMBI Sovereign Spread) (t) 1.472*** 1.835** 
 (0.21) (0.84) 
Unexpected Component of Inflation Announcement   
β4 (Actual minus Expected Value of Inflation) (t-1) 0.432** -0.461*** 
 (0.21) (0.10) 
Dummy for Days with Automatic FX Intervention Yes Yes 
Diagnostics  
Log L -28.001 -3.251016 
R-Squared 0.157 0.512 
Included observations 356 73 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: This table reports estimation of the Mean Equation of the GARCH(1,1) model in equation (3)–
(5), augmented to account for the unexpected component of central bank intervention. The unexpected 
amount of intervention corresponds to the estimated residual values of the foreign exchange 
intervention policy reaction model fitted in the first stage. The coefficient on the intervention variable 
measures the percentage change in the exchange rate for a US$100 million in foreign currency 
purchases. Asterisks denote significance of coefficients, with ***, **, and * indicating significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.A4. The Impact of Intervention in Days when the Central Bank was Less Likely to 
Have Intervened 
(Mean Returns Equation) 






β0 (Lagged Dependent Variable) (t-1) 0.261*** 0.132 
 (0.08) (0.22) 
Intervention Indicators:   
β11 (Predicted Amount CB Intervention) (t) 0.864** 0.085 
 (0.39) (0.23) 
β12 (Dummy for Days in Which CB was Less Likely to 
Have Intervened) (t) -0.116 0.083 
 (0.16) (0.25) 
β13 (Predicted Amount CB Intervention) X (Dummy for 
Less Likely CB Intervention) (t) 0.845 -0.187 
 (0.66) (0.42) 
β2 (Overnight Interest Rate Differential) (t) -0.018 -0.377 
 (0.01) (0.25) 
β3 (Daily Change in EMBI Sovereign Spread) (t) 1.479*** 2.114** 
 (0.25) (0.91) 
Unexpected Component of Inflation Announcement   
β4 (Actual minus Expected Value of Inflation) (t-1) 0.469** -0.454*** 
 (0.19) (0.12) 
Dummy for Days with Automatic FX Intervention Yes Yes 
Diagnostics  
Log L -108.442 -5.81293 
R-Squared 0.157 0.436 
Included observations 356 73 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: This table reports estimation of the Mean Equation of the GARCH(1,1) model in equation (3)–(5), 
augmented to account for the interaction between the predicted amount of intervention and the ex-ante 
probability of central bank's presence in the foreign exchange market. The dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 in those days when the predicted probability of intervention was less than 0.5. The coefficient 
on the intervention variable measures the percentage change in the exchange rate for a US$100 million in 
foreign currency purchases. Asterisks denote significance of coefficients, with ***, **, and * indicating 
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Cross-Border Trading as a Mechanism for Implicit Capital Flight: 
ADRs and the Argentine Crisis97 
1.   Introduction 
The role and consequences of capital controls continues to be a subject of 
controversy for many developing countries. Governments that under normal 
circumstances advocate financial integration with global markets are often tempted to 
resort to capital controls in the face of economic crisis. Argentina and Venezuela are two 
recent cases in point. In December 2001, after a decade of open capital markets, the 
Argentine government imposed a series of financial market controls in an ultimately 
unsuccessful bid to forestall economic crisis. In early 2003, Venezuela established capital 
controls in the wake of a 20 percent devaluation. These experiences with capital controls 
afford an opportunity to examine the reactions of investors within and outside of the 
country to a drastic change in financial market conditions. 
The same economic conditions that encourage governments to impose capital 
controls also give residents and investors in these countries incentives to remove their 
wealth. Capital flight can be accomplished through various channels. In this chapter we 
examine one potential channel for capital flight that is made possible by the existence of 
cross-listed shares. By converting locally-purchased shares into their corresponding 
shares listed abroad, investors can effectively move their wealth out of the country, 
thereby confounding government efforts to control capital outflows. 
                                                 
97 This chapter was co-authored with Sebastian Auguste, Kathryn Dominguez and Linda Tesar. 
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There is an extensive literature on cross-listed shares and their role in the global 
integration of financial markets (see, for example, the survey by Karolyi (1998). Cross-
listing of shares on the U.S. stock market allows firms to enjoy the advantages of greater 
liquidity, transparency, and access to the U.S. capital market.98 From the perspective of 
U.S. investors, cross-listed shares are a convenient way of obtaining global 
diversification.99 This chapter describes a new, and largely unstudied, role for cross-listed 
shares as a mechanism for capital flight.100  
In the absence of capital controls, the law of one price should hold for cross-listed 
shares in the home and foreign market after controlling for the exchange rate and various 
transaction costs. When capital controls are in place, however, the factors that determine 
demand for cross-listed shares in the home market may diverge from those in the foreign 
market resulting in a wedge between the two prices. In Section 2 below, we show how 
controls on capital inflows into the firm’s home market will result in a premium on the 
firm’s cross-listed shares in the foreign market relative to the corresponding shares in the 
local market, while controls on capital outflow will lead to a premium on shares in the 
local market relative to their corresponding cross-listed shares in the foreign market. We 
test this relationship in a cross-section of countries and find limited evidence of a 
systematic link between capital controls and the difference between the local price of 
shares and their corresponding (exchange rate adjusted) price in the foreign market. Lack 
of information about the specifics of the capital controls and their impact on the relative 
prices of cross-listed shares in the home and foreign markets, however, makes it difficult 
to draw strong conclusions about the relationship between violations of the law of one 
price for cross-listed shares and capital controls in general. Therefore, we turn to two 
specific cases of countries with capital controls and cross-listed shares, Argentina and 
                                                 
98 See, for example, Alexander, Eun, and Jankiramanan (1987), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), 
Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004), Melvin and Valero-Tonone (2003), and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2001). 
99 See, for example, Officer and Hoffmeister (1987), Wahab and Khandala (1993), and Jiang (1998). 
Domovitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1997), Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (1999), and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) 
examine the broader influences of cross-listed shares on the development and integration of markets. 
100 Melvin (2003) and Kadiyala and Kadiyala (2004) also examine the role of cross-listed shares during the 
recent Argentine capital control regime. 
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Venezuela, in which we can precisely track changes in government policy and the 
consequent impact of these policies on share prices.  
The financial regulations put in place during the crises in Argentina and 
Venezuela allow us to study how cross-listed shares can provide investors with a means 
of circumventing capital controls. In Section 3 we discuss the particular controls faced by 
investors in Argentina and calculate American Depositary Receipt (ADR)101 discounts102 
based on the transactions costs that U.S. and Argentine investors faced during the 
December 2001 to May 2002 period. We find evidence that local investors were willing 
to pay a substantial price to move their deposits out of the domestic market through the 
conversion of local shares to ADR shares in the U.S. At their peak, some ADRs in 
Argentina and Venezuela were trading at a discount (relative to their corresponding local 
price converted to dollars) of more than 50 cents on the dollar.  
In the presence of capital controls, ADR discounts include the value of 
circumventing capital controls as well as the value of converting one’s assets into dollars. 
We use ADR discounts in Argentina to estimate the market’s expectation of the peso 
devaluation in January 2002 and to price capital control circumvention. We find that 
ADR discounts just before the actual devaluation indicate an expected 40–45 percent fall 
in the value of the peso relative to the dollar, similar to reports in a number of financial 
newspapers during this period. Our estimates of capital control circumvention value using 
the most liquid ADR, Perez Companc, average 3 percent over the full period, and rise to 
just under 6 percent before the devaluation.  
In Section 4 we test whether the imposition of capital controls leads to changes in 
the underlying pricing structure of cross-listed stocks in Buenos Aires and New York. We 
find evidence that local market factors became more important for pricing cross-listed 
                                                 
101 Although Depositary Receipts (DRs) can be issued in a number of markets, all of the cross-listed firms 
from Argentina and Venezuela issued DRs in the United States; consequently, we will refer to Argentine 
and Venezuelan cross-listed shares as ADRs. ADRs are classified by the U.S. SEC as: Rule 144a, OTC, 
Level II or Level III. Level II and III ADRs require basic to full compliance with U.S. GAAP and SEC 
disclosure rules. Level III ADRs are capital raising. 
102 ADR discounts are measured as the difference between the local price in U.S. dollars and the ADR 
price, as a fraction of the local price in dollars (where the local price is adjusted for the ADR conversion 
ratio). See equation 6. 
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shares in Argentina, and less important for pricing the same cross-listed shares in New 
York during the period when capital controls were in place. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Cross-listed Returns and Capital Controls  
In order to understand how capital controls influence the relative price of cross-
listed securities in the local and foreign markets, it is useful to define the pay-offs of 
holding these stocks in the two markets. Consider a security i that is traded on the local 
market but is also cross-listed in the United States. We will use the following definitions: 
L
itp  = price of share for firm i on the local market, in local currency 
ADR
itp  = price of the associated ADRs for firm i in the United States, in dollars 
tS  = spot exchange rate, U.S. dollars per local currency 
iξ  = conversion ratio between local share i and its corresponding ADR103 
Each period t, the local share i pays out a dividend in local currency, denoted Litd . 
The ex dividend market valuation of the share, in local currency, is equal to the expected 
stream of dividends, discounted by the period rate of time discount, β, and adjusted by the 















= ∑  (3.1) 
 
 Assuming the foreign investors have the same rate of time discount β, the market 















= ∑  (3.2) 
                                                 
103 Local shares are often bundled into groups of shares per ADR. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that 
low-priced shares have higher transaction costs suggesting that bundling is likely done for cost reasons. 
Another reason for bundling is that the NYSE has minimum price requirements. Bundling can help 
companies avoid their stock being delisted (which occurs when share prices fall below the NYSE 
minimum). The conversion ratio is fixed at the time of the initial listing. 
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Note that ADRs represent claims against the same stream of risky cash flows in pesos as 
their corresponding local shares. Dividends on the ADRs, however, are paid in dollars, 
and the appropriate deflator is the U.S. consumer price index, USt jCPI + . If firms fail (or are 
expected to fail) to pay dividends to shareholders of ADRs (possibly because of 
government restrictions in the issuing country) this will drive a wedge between the local 
share price and the currency-adjusted ADR price. 
 
2.1 The Law of One Price for ADRs 
 In the absence of capital controls and foreign exchange controls (and abstracting 
for now from transactions costs and time delays in ADR conversion), the law of one price 
should prevail for ADRs and their corresponding local shares. Equation (3.3) shows the 
return in local currency from round-trip arbitrage between the local market and the 
United States via ADRs: 
 










Investors purchase a local share at price pitL. The share is then converted into (1/ iξ ) units 
of an ADR and the ADR is sold for dollars. Finally the dollars are converted back into 
local currency at the prevailing market exchange rate. 
 To see the impact of capital controls on the return from conversion of local shares 
into ADRs, consider the return, LitR , on round-trip arbitrage from the perspective of a 
















⎝ ⎠=  (3.4) 
 
We assume that investors can conduct this arbitrage instantaneously. Note that if the 
transaction were to take time, the expected change in the exchange rate over the 
transaction interval would also affect the investor’s return. 
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Now suppose the government of the country in which the investor resides imposes 
controls on capital outflows and/or restricts access to foreign exchange. We denote this 
tax on capital outflows as KOτ . Also suppose that investors in the local market can freely 
convert a local share of security i into its ADR and sell the ADR on the U.S. stock market 
for U.S. dollars (thereby avoiding KOτ ).104 All other cross-border investments must 
include the tax on capital outflows, KOτ . However, because investment in ADRs legally 
circumvents this tax, demand for local shares with corresponding ADRs will increase, 
driving up the local price. In equilibrium, local investors will pay a premium on local 
shares (or a discount on ADRs) for the right to convert local shares into foreign-currency 
denominated ADRs. The wedge between the ADR price and the price on the 
corresponding local share reveals the extent to which controls on capital outflows are 
binding. 
Conversely, consider the impact of controls on capital inflows. Equation (3.5) 
shows the return, USitR , to round-trip arbitrage from the perspective of a U.S. investor 










=  (3.5) 
 
A tax on capital inflows, KIτ , into the local market reduces the return U.S. investors 
receive on alternative investments in the local market. If the ADR channel remains open, 
arbitrage through ADRs will result in a premium on ADRs relative to local shares. In this 
case, U.S. investors are willing to pay a premium for the privilege of bringing capital into 
the local market (and avoiding KIτ ). 
 The discussion above implies a strict dichotomy between the impact of controls 
on capital inflows and outflows on the sign of ADR discounts. In practice, however, this 
dichotomy may not be so clear. Controls on capital outflows could cause U.S. investors 
                                                 
104 We will discuss in detail the controls on investors in Argentina in section 3. In both Venezuela and 
Argentina local investors faced prohibitive controls on capital outflows and on foreign exchange but were 
able to convert local shares to ADRs, thereby legally circumventing the capital control. 
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to worry about their ability to repatriate profits, and thereby effectively reduce capital 
inflows. In the empirical Section below, we will see that it is difficult to separately 
identify the effects of controls on capital inflows and capital outflows. 
Note also that in both cases arbitrage implies that the wedge between the local and 
exchange-rate adjusted U.S. price should reflect the cost of avoiding the capital control 
through an alternative mechanism. Therefore, the price gap reflects not only the de jure 
control, but also the ability of investors to circumvent that control. If the alternatives are 
relatively cheap, capital controls would not bind and we would expect the wedge between 
the local price and the corresponding ADR price to be small. In Section 3 below we 
provide a measure of the Capital Control Circumvention Value (CCCV) for Argentina 
during the period when capital controls were in place.  
 
2.2 Cross-Sectional Evidence on ADR Discounts and Capital Controls 
The previous discussion suggests that, in principle, the discount on ADRs should 
be positively related to controls on capital outflow, and negatively related to controls on 
capital inflow. To test this relationship we collected country-level data on capital control 
indices105 and firm-level data on ADRs and their underlying local shares. We select a 
representative cross-listed firm for each of 42 countries,106 and calculate the ADR 
discount, defined as:107 
                                                 
105 We first compute daily ADR discounts on days when there were transactions in both markets (to avoid 
non-synchronous trading biases) and take a weekly average. We then compute the average for the calendar 
year 1999 as the average of the weekly averages. Results based on daily data are qualitatively similar and 
are available upon request. 
106 We selected one representative level II or level III ADR from each country on the basis of liquidity. 
Unfortunately many countries that have capital controls do not have ADRs or their ADRs are only traded 
infrequently. The countries (firms) included in our analysis are: Argentina (Banco Francés), Australia 
(News Corp. Ltd.), Austria (EVN AG), Belgium (Solvay S.A.), Brazil (Embratel Participações S.A.), Chile 
(Enersis S.A.), China (Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd.), Colombia (Bancolombia), Czech 
Republic (Komercni Banka A.S.), Denmark (Novo-Nordisk A/S), Finland (Nokia), France (Total S.A.), 
Germany (Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG), Greece (Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A.), 
Hungary (Matáv Rt), India (Infosis), Indonesia (Indonesian Satellite Corp. Tbk PT), Ireland (ELN), Israel 
(Matav-Cable Systems Media Ltd.), Italy (Benetton Group S.A.), Japan (Sony), Korea (SK Telecom Co. 
Ltd.), Luxembourg (Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A.), Mexico (Grupo Televisa, S.A.), Netherlands 
(Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.), New Zealand (Fletcher Challenge Forests Ltd.), Norway (Norsk 
Hydro ASA), Peru (Cía. de Minas Buenaventura S.A.), Philippines (San Miguel Corp.), Portugal (Portugal 
Telecom Sgps S.A.), Russia (Vimpel-Communications), Singapore (Keppel Corp. Ltd.), South Africa 
(continued) 









= −  (3.6) 
 
We selected the year 1999 for our cross-sectional analysis because it was a year for 
which we had the largest overlap of information on ADR discounts and on capital 
controls, and because it was a year of relative calm for most financial markets in the 
wake of the Asian crisis.108 
We study the relationship between ADR discounts and four different indices of 
capital controls: (i) the IMF index;109 (ii) the capital account openness index (CAOI) 
index;110 (iii) the Chinn-Ito index;111 and (iv) the Edison and Warnock index.112 Each 
capital control series has some advantages and some disadvantages. Each series covers a 
different sample of countries. Although we have 42 countries with data on ADR 
discounts and some measure of capital controls, the largest sample we were able to use in 
a regression contained 37 country observations. The IMF index is probably the most 
widely used in studies of the impact of capital controls on financial market development 
and growth. The index is essentially a dummy variable indicating whether or not a 
country has capital controls in place in a given calendar year based on the information 
provided in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. The advantage of this measure is that it covers a large sample of countries. 
The drawback is that the index contains no information about whether the controls 
restrict capital inflow or outflow, the particular type of transaction that is restricted, or the 
                                                 
(Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd.), Sweden (Volvo AB), Switzerland (Logitech International SA), Taiwan 
(Macronix International), Thailand (Advance), Turkey (Turkcell Iletisim Hizmet A.S.), United Kingdom 
(Barclays Plc), Venezuela (Cía. Anónima Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela – CANTV). 
107 Note that this definition of the ADR discount is equivalent to equation (4) except that the terms in the 
numerator are reversed (making the discount positive when the price of local shares exceeds the price of the 
corresponding ADR). We use this definition of the ADR discount in all the empirical work to follow. 
108 There were no capital controls in place in Argentina in 1999 so this analysis will not capture the 
significant deviations between the prices of local shares and their corresponding ADRs that occurred in 
2001 and 2002. 
109 See Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferreti (1993). 
110 See Brune, Garrett, Guisinger, and Sorens (2001). 
111 See Chinn and Ito (2002). 
112 See Edison and Warnock (2003). 
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intensity of the control. The CAOI measure is similar to the IMF index in that a dummy 
variable is created for each category of capital flow. The dummies are then added up so 
that the more controls that are in place, the bigger the index number. This provides a 
rough gauge of capital control intensity, but does not give a clear indication of how 
tightly each type of capital flow is restricted. The Chinn-Ito measure is based on the same 
underlying information, but attempts to aggregate the information in a way so as to better 
capture the intensity of the restrictions. The Edison-Warnock index takes a completely 
different approach by computing the ratios of the market capitalization of “investable” 
stocks (i.e. those available to foreign investors) to the full set of stocks in a given market. 
In effect, the Edison-Warnock index provides a measure of the extent to which a market 
is closed to foreign investors. It does not, however, provide information about the 
intensity of controls on capital outflow from a given market. Edison and Warnock 
provide two measures of their index: the basic index (labeled “unsmooth” in Table 1) and 
an index that corrects for shifts due to changes in sectoral market capitalizations and not 
due to shifts in capital controls (the “smooth” index in Table 1).  
Table 1 shows the results of the regression of the ADR discount on the various 
capital control indices: 
 
 0 1i i iD ccβ β μ= + +  (3.7) 
 
where Di is the average ADR discount for a representative firm in country i in 1999, cci is 
the value of the capital control index for country i in 1999, and iμ  is the error term. Each 
index is adjusted so that the higher the index, the more intense the capital control. As 
shown in the top panel of Table 3.1, we find some evidence of a positive relationship 
between ADR discounts and the various measures of capital controls. The coefficients on 
the IMF, CAOI, and Chinn-Ito indices are statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 5 percent level, while the smooth Edison-Warnock index is significant at the 10 
percent level.113 Because the indices provide only de jure classifications and little 
                                                 
113 If we exclude China, as suggested in Edison and Warnock (2003a), and include developed countries 
with zero restrictions, as was done in Ahearne et al. (2004), the smooth Edison-Warnock index is 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
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information about whether the controls are on capital inflows or outflows, it is difficult to 
know how to interpret the results. It could be that most of the controls are on capital 
outflows, and the positive coefficient can be taken as evidence that controls on outflows 
result in an increase in the ADR discount. If this were the correct interpretation, however, 
we would have expected the coefficient on the Edison-Warnock indices, which reflect 
only restrictions on capital inflows, to be negative. Alternatively, it may be that, in 
practice, controls on inflows ultimately serve to control outflows. 
 
Table 3.1. Testing for the Relationship between ADR discounts and Capital Controls in a 
Cross-section of Countries, 1999 
 Alternative indices of capital controls: 
 IMF CAOI Chinn-Ito Edison-Warnock 
    smooth  unsmooth 
A. Dependent variable: ADR discount  
β   0.106   0.019   0.059   0.436   0.250 
Std error   0.048   0.008   0.018   0.214   0.179 
P-value   0.036   0.028   0.002   0.058   0.173 
Number of Obs 37 36 33 19 19 
R2   0.12   0.13   0.27   0.2   0.11 
 
B. Dependent variable: Absolute value of ADR discount 
β   0.100   0.018   0.060   0.436   0.260 
Std error   0.048   0.008   0.017   0.212   0.177 
P-value   0.045   0.032   0.003   0.056   0.159 
Number of Obs 37 36 33 19 19 
R2   0.11   0.13   0.25   0.15   0.06 
Sources:  Bloomberg; Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferreti (1993) for the IMF index; Brune, Garrett, 
Guisinger, and Sorens (2001) for the CAOI (Capital Account Openness Index); Chinn and Ito (2002); 
Edison and Warnock (2003).  
Note: The dependent variable is the average ADR discount (measured as the difference between the local 
price in U.S. dollars and the ADR price, as a fraction of the local price in dollars) for a representative 
cross-listed firm (based on liquidity) in selected countries in 1999. Local prices are adjusted for the ADR 
conversion ratio. Beta is the coefficient on the capital control index (where the higher the index, the more 
intense the capital control). 
 
Given the ambiguities in the capital controls series, we repeat the regression using 
the absolute value of the ADR discount as the dependent variable. The hypothesis tested 
here is whether capital controls, regardless of whether they affect inflows or outflows, 
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drive a wedge between local share prices and their corresponding ADRs. The results in 
the second panel provide some support for this hypothesis. The estimated coefficients are 
again all positive and four of the five are significant at the five percent level. Figure 3.1 
provides a plot of the ADR discounts (expressed in percent) and the Chinn-Ito measure of 
capital control intensity. The figure suggests that in most countries, the ADR discount is 
very close to zero and that the positive relationship between controls and discounts is 
driven by two countries, Colombia and India.114 When those two countries are dropped 
from the regression, none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero.  
 
Figure 3.1. Capital Control Intensity and ADR discounts 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Chinn-Ito (2002). 
Note: Scatter plot summarizes the relationship between capital control intensity (as measured by Chinn and 
Ito) and average ADR discount for a representative firm (based on liquidity) in selected countries in 1999. 
 
  
                                                 
114 Colombia’s capital controls involved a tax on short-term investment repatriation which provided 
incentives for investors to purchase ADRs (which are not subject to the tax) rather than local shares. In 
India (before 2002) there was only one-way fungibility for ADR conversions. ADRs could be converted 
back into local shares, but not vice versa. Over time the reduction in ADR liquidity (due to the fall in 
supply) resulted in high premiums on ADRs relative to the underlying stocks. Taiwan and South Korea are 
also special cases. The Taiwanese and South Korean governments restrict foreign ownership of companies 
making it very difficult to purchase stocks in the local market. Taiwan also restricts the size of the ADR 
program. The case of one Taiwanese firm, Taiwan Semi Conductor, has been widely cited in the press 
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 The cross-sectional analysis suggests that there is a tenuous relationship between 
available measures of capital controls and ADR discounts. As shown in Figure 3.1, there 
is a great deal of cross-country heterogeneity in the capital control indices, but in most 
countries those controls have no impact on ADR discounts. There are a number of factors 
that could account for this weak relationship in the cross-section. First, the dependent 
variable in the regression is the average ADR discount over the calendar year. Even a 
cursory glance at ADR discounts reveals that discounts can swing dramatically over time, 
particularly during periods of volatility in financial markets. These are precisely the 
periods when capital controls tend to be imposed, but such information is lost in taking 
annual averages (which we do in order to match these data with the annual capital control 
indices). Thus, the particular window chosen for the analysis can have a large impact on 
the results. Second, and more importantly, the capital control measures are only crude 
indicators of the particular restrictions that could affect transactions in ADRs. Controls 
on some types of capital flow may be largely irrelevant for stock market participants, 
whereas other types of legal restrictions—seemingly unrelated to capital flow—could 
have a large effect on ADR discounts. For example, restrictions on withdrawals from 
bank accounts in Argentina (which are neither controls on capital inflow or outflow) 
contributed to a run up in local stock prices and on ADR discounts. Third, the cross-
sectional analysis ignores transactions costs and other taxes (e.g. brokerage fees, local 
sales taxes, etc.) and short sales restrictions,115 which could distort ADR discounts. 
Finally, we have calculated ADR returns assuming instantaneous arbitrage. If investors 
know that there is a significant time delay in ADR conversions, the wedge between the 
prices of local shares and their corresponding ADRs will also reflect the risk premium 
associated with holding the asset over the conversion interval.  
For these reasons, we think that the cross-sectional analysis yields at best an 
imprecise measure of the relationship between restrictions on capital markets and the 
wedge between the prices of local shares and their corresponding ADRs. To probe this 
                                                 
115 Bris, Goetzmann, and Ning (2003) examine whether short-sales restrictions in different countries affect 
market efficiency. 
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relationship more deeply, we next turn to the role played by ADRs in the unfolding of 
two recent events, the financial crises in Argentina and Venezuela. 
 
3.   Case Study: Argentine Capital Controls and ADRs 
Although the exact timing and causes of Argentina’s economic fall from grace are 
contentious, there is little disagreement that by the last quarter of 2001 Argentina was on 
the brink of a full-scale collapse.116 Between July and November, 2001, Argentines 
withdrew over US$15 billion from banks—on November 30, 2001, alone, banks saw 
withdrawals of US$1.3 billion. On December 3, in a desperate effort to prevent further 
massive capital outflows, financial market controls were established (these are known as 
the “Corralito”), which among other restrictions, imposed a ceiling of US$1,000 a month 
on bank withdrawals.117 In January, the Argentine peso was officially devalued and all 
bank deposits and some (small denomination) debts were “pesofied.”118  
 
3.1 The Corralito 
Under the Corralito, depositors were limited to withdrawals of Arg$250 per week 
per account119 but could access their accounts to transfer funds within the banking system. 
Wire transfers required Central Bank approval, foreign currency futures transactions were 
prohibited, and in effect, all investors, foreign and domestic, were prohibited from 
                                                 
116 Mussa (2002) makes the case that the persistent inability of the Argentine government to run responsible 
fiscal policy was the primary cause of the economic collapse. Others point to the deleterious effects of an 
over-valued currency on exports (see, for example, Feldstein 2002) and the sudden stop in foreign capital 
inflows (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi 2003). Also, see Dominguez and Tesar (2005) for a detailed 
description of the factors that let to Argentina’s collapse. 
117 A literal translation of “Corralito” is little corral. It is also the word for “playpen.”  
118 On February 3, 2002, an asymmetric pesofication (based on type of borrower) of debts was announced. 
See Appendix 1 for more details. 
119 Perhaps unsurprisingly there was a sudden increase in the number of new bank accounts in early 
December. The government promptly changed the regulations so that the deposit limits applied per person 
rather than per account. According to the press, some 500,000 accounts were opened in the two days 
following the imposition of bank restrictions. 
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transferring funds abroad. The restrictions were announced as temporary measures that 
would remain in place until the danger of the speculative attack had passed.120 
The Corralito did not, however, restrict investors from trading Argentine 
securities including those that were cross-listed on another market. Indeed, to do so 
would have seriously destabilized the local market as it would have prevented investors 
from trading in some of the largest and most liquid stocks on the market. The Argentine 
ADR “loophole” worked as follows: Argentine residents were allowed to use bank 
deposits to purchase Argentine stocks. If a stock happened to be cross-listed in the U.S., 
those shares could be legally converted from Argentine shares into ADRs. The ADRs 
could then be sold in the United States and the dollar proceeds deposited in a U.S. 
account. Under normal circumstances the dollar proceeds would appear in the Argentine 
Balance of Payments as a capital inflow, as foreign residents have acquired claims on 
Argentine firms. Under the Corralito, however, the capital inflows did not occur, and the 
dollars and/or shares remained outside of Argentina. In effect, the ADR “loophole” 
allowed Argentines to transfer monies abroad, but the transactions did not result directly 
in a fall in Argentina’s international reserves (or a fall in Argentine bank deposits). ADR 
conversions, however, did reduce the number of (underlying) shares available on the 
local stock exchange in Buenos Aires, La Bolsa. 
 
3.2 Decomposition of the Argentine ADR Discount under the Corralito 
To see the impact of the Corralito on the ADR discounts, we modify equation 
(3.3) to take into account the restrictions on bank deposits: 
 





⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (3.3’) 
 
                                                 
120 Some of the original withdrawal limits were eventually modified, though the main restrictions on capital 
outflow remained in place until December 2, 2002 (exactly one year after they were first introduced). See 
Appendix 1 for a detailed timeline of the changes in financial market regulations in Argentina beginning in 
October 2001. 
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where Dtp is the price of local-currency denominated bank deposits in terms of local stock 
(or cash). During the Corralito, Dtp was less than one because investors were willing to 
pay for the opportunity to cash out their bank deposits (which had limited convertibility). 
In the absence of controls on bank deposits, we would expect Dtp  to be equal to one. 
Arbitrage now involves cashing out one’s bank deposits at a discount, purchasing local 
shares, converting those shares into ADRs and then selling the ADRs for dollars in the 
U.S. Consider the return from ADR conversion on the day the capital controls are 
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The first effect, 1 1(ln ln ) (ln ln )L L D Dit it t tp p p p+ +− − − , we term the liquidity value of 
shares. This reflects the impact of the banking restrictions on the relative price of local 
shares to bank deposits. This effect will only exist if controls restrict access to bank 
deposits but at the same time allow investors to transform frozen bank deposits — which 
could potentially be expropriated by the government or lost in a full-scale bank run — 
into stocks. In the absence of controls liquidity value is zero. Note that the prices of all 
local market stocks will reflect this liquidity value, not just those that are cross listed. The 
premium associated with asset transformation should remain until all depositors in the 
local market have re-optimized their portfolios or the deposit restrictions are removed.  
The second effect is the capital control circumvention value (CCCV) of cross-
listed shares. ADRs provide a legal means of acquiring foreign assets in capital outflow 
control regimes. Note that in equation (8) the rate of conversion of local stock i into its 
ADR equivalent, iξ , is a constant. Therefore, holding changes in ADR prices and the 
exchange rate constant, the increase in the local price of cross-listed shares relative to the 
(fixed) rate of conversion, iξ , reflects the value of being able to circumvent the capital 
controls. In the absence of capital controls this effect is clearly zero. During a capital 
control regime, ADRs carry an additional premium over other non-cross listed shares and 
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the premium should last until all local investors are indifferent between holding their 
assets at home or abroad. This could be achieved either when all of the available funds 
have left the country, the cost of moving funds becomes prohibitively high, the 
emergence of alternative mechanisms to channel funds abroad reduces the demand for 
local shares with a corresponding ADR, or the capital controls are removed. 
The third effect is the currency value of ADRs. This effect has two parts. The 
first part, reflected in the change in ADRitp , is due to the fact that holders of ADRs own 
claims to dollar-denominated dividends, paid out at the official exchange rate (recall 
equation (2)). Depending on the impact of the capital controls on the expected path of the 
official exchange rate, this would alter the market valuation of the ADR relative to its 
local share equivalent. The second part of the currency effect is the change in the 
exchange rate itself. Because investors receive dollars, rather than local currency, for the 
sale of the asset, this will affect the expected profit from ADR conversion.  
 
3.3 Trading Volume in Argentine ADRs 
Table 3.2 provides a list of the eleven ADRs listed in Argentina as of December 
1, 2001, and traded on either the NYSE or Nasdaq.121 In November 2001 trade in these 
eleven ADRs accounted for 36 percent of the Merval Index and 27 percent of total 
market volume. Table 2 also provides pre-Corralito information on each ADR’s market 
capitalization and trading volume as a percent of the market, as well as the mean and 
standard deviation of returns (over the period January 2001 to November 2001).  
 
                                                 
121 Our list of Argentine ADRs is drawn from JP Morgan’s ADR Universe Directory. Our focus is on 
eleven of the thirteen exchange-listed shares, referred to as Level II and Level III (capital-raising) 
programs. The two shares we do not include, Nortel and APSA, had very few transactions over the period 
of study. APSA ADRs only traded on one day during the Corralito while Nortel (a preferred stock) had 
very few transactions over this period. There are also eleven (Rule 144a and OTC) ADR shares that we do 
not include in our analysis because there was virtually no trading of these stocks over the period we study. 
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Table 3.2.  Pre-Corralito ADR Information (January 2001-November 2001) 
       
Name Ratio 
ADR:local 
Industry    Market 












   Nov. 2001 Nov. 2001 (daily)  (daily)  
BBVA Banco 
Francés 1:3 Banking 0.26   1.92 -0.40 4.76 
Cresud 
S.A.C.I.F. Y A. 1:10 Food-Agribus-Tobacco 0.04   0.39 -0.06 1.64 
Financiero 
Galicia  1:10 Fin Serv-Investment 0.22   7.09 -0.54 4.24 
Irsa Inversiones 1:10 Real Estate 0.06   0.60 -0.44 2.79 
Metrogas S.A. 1:10 Oil & Gas-Service 0.15   0.06 -0.13 2.39 
Pérez Companc 
(PC) 1:10 Util-Gas, Elec&Water 1.03   9.82 -0.18 3.17 
Siderca S.A.I.C 1:10 Steel 0.61   2.75 -0.16 2.62 
Telecom Arg 
Stet-France 1:5 Telecom-DatNtwk 0.61   3.43 -0.35 3.82 
Telefónica  1:10 Telecom-DatNtwk 1.42   0.03 -0.31 3.41 
TGS 1:5 Oil & Gas-Service 0.39   0.84 -0.11 2.88 
YPF S.A. 1:1 Oil & Gas-Service 3.11   0.09 -0.21 1.74 
All ADRs   7.91 27.03 -0.26 1.83 
Source: JP Morgan. 
Note: The “All ADRs” row corresponds to an equal-weighted ADR portfolio. The “Ratio ADR:local” is the 
number of local shares bundled into one ADR share. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows price indices for value-weighted portfolios of ADRs122 and all 
other Argentine stocks from January 1, 2001, to May 31, 2002. Both portfolios reverse 
their downward trend in the pre-Corralito period, increasing immediately following the 
freezing of bank accounts and the imposition of capital controls. As our discussion above 
predicted, the ADR portfolio price index experiences a bigger increase than the non-ADR 
portfolio price index, reflecting the additional capital circumvention and currency values 
                                                 
122 The figure using price indices for equal-weighted portfolios of ADRs and non-ADRs is qualitatively 
similar. 
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of cross-listed stocks.123 We formally test for differences in ADR and non-ADR portfolio 
returns just after the imposition of the Corralito in Section 3.4 below. 
 
Figure 3.2. Price Indices of ADR and non-ADR Portfolios, Value Weighted 
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Note: The non-ADR portfolio includes all non-cross-listed local shares. 
 
We also observe a dramatic change in the trading volume in cross-listed shares in 
Argentina over this period. Although the aggregate trading volume on La Bolsa steadily 
declines, the fraction of ADRs in the total volume traded jumps dramatically at the time 
of the Corralito from roughly 40 percent of the total volume to over 80 percent. Pérez 
Companc alone accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total volume of trading in 
December 2001. In late February 2002, volume in the ADR market leveled off.124 
Although the Corralito continued to be in effect, several regulatory changes, starting in 
                                                 
123 Levy-Yeyati, Schmukler, and van Horen (2003) argue that it was the most liquid stocks (not ADRs) that 
had the largest increase in price after the Corralito. We find that while liquidity played a role, in 
regressions explaining Argentine stock returns, a dummy variable for ADR shares is significant and 
positive even after controlling for liquidity. 
124 ADR volume also declined in New York falling from its peak in December 2001. Volume in February 
2002 was 18 percent lower than the previous December, and by May 2002, volume was a mere 23 percent 
of what it had been in December 2001.  
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February 2002, may have diminished investor’s incentives to use the stock market as a 
means to gain access to frozen assets.125  
 
Figure 3.3. Volume Traded in Local Shares with ADRs and Pérez Companc (PC) as a 



























































3.4 Changes in prices of Argentine ADRs 
Table 3.3 presents the results of tests for whether the differences in the ADR and 
non-ADR portfolios seen visually in Figure 3.2, at the time of the Corralito, are 
statistically significant. The table presents changes in ADR and non-ADR portfolio prices 
in Argentina and New York following the imposition of the Corralito. (All prices are 
measured in U.S. dollars.) On the day following the imposition of the Corralito (see the 
first column of the table), the equal-weighted ADR portfolio price in Argentina jumped 
2.93 percent while the equal-weighted portfolio of non-ADRs increased by 0.7 percent. If 
we measure the change in ADR and non-ADR portfolio prices one week after the 
imposition of the Corralito the ADR portfolio price change is even more dramatic, 
                                                 
125 In February 2002, investors were allowed to withdraw (once and for all) US$7,000 from any of their 
bank accounts. In March 2002 investors were given the option to convert deposits into bonds (in pesos or 
dollars) and they were allowed to use their deposits to purchase properties and subsequently cars. 
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increasing by 13.92 percent, while the non-ADR portfolio rise is 9.43 percent. Similar 
results hold for the value-weighted portfolios. These changes are statistically significantly 
different from the price movements one would have anticipated based on the pre-
Corralito distribution and are consistent with the view that there was an increase in the 
liquidity value of all Argentine stocks. 
We also examine differences in the prices of the equally-weighted ADR and non-
ADR portfolios (after the imposition of the Corralito) and find that the wedge between 
the two portfolios is 2.23 percent one day after (and 4.5 percent one week after) the 
capital controls were put in place. The t-statistics indicate that one would not have been 
able to forecast the wedge between ADR and non-ADR portfolio returns that arose 
during the Corralito, based on the distributions of returns for the two portfolios in the 
pre-Corralito period.126 The impact of the Corralito on share prices is consistent with the 
predictions of equation (8). The liquidity of shares relative to bank deposits drives up the 
prices of all shares in Argentina. However, ADR prices increase by more due to the other 
benefits of ADR convertibility. The results in Table 3 are suggestive that there was an 
additional premium associated with ADRs relative to non-ADRs during the Corralito. 
In the lower panel of Table 3.3 we examine the same ADR and non-ADR 
portfolio price changes, now using the ADR portfolio price in New York. The ADR 
portfolio price in New York increases too, but by a fraction of the price changes of the 
same portfolio in Argentina. We also find that the difference between the (equally-
weighted) ADR portfolio price in New York and the non-ADR portfolio price (in Buenos 
Aires) one day after the Corralito is only 0.5 percent. The difference in the New York 
ADR portfolio price and non-ADR portfolio price the week after the imposition of the 
Corralito is actually negative (and statistically significant) suggesting that the New York 
price on the ADR portfolio fell below the non-ADR portfolio price during this period. 
Taken together, the data suggest that New York ADR prices changed little following the 
Corralito, while prices on the corresponding shares in Argentina rose dramatically. This 
                                                 
126 It is worth noting, however, that the distribution of ADR and non-ADR portfolio prices may well have 
changed after the imposition of the Corralito. If the distribution of prices changed, t-stats based on the pre-
Corralito period will not be appropriate. It is, however, unclear in this case what assumption one should 
make about the distribution of prices in the immediate aftermath of the Corralito. 
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is consistent with the argument made in Section 2 that controls on capital outflows would 
increase demand for local shares with corresponding ADRs relative to demand for non-
cross listed local shares. 
 
Table 3.3. Price Impact of Corralito on ADRs in Argentina and New York 
 
Day before 
to day after 
t-stat Day before 
to week after 
t-stat 
I. Percent change in Argentine prices (in US$)     
Equal weighted portfolios     
ADRs (ARG) 2.93 41.78  13.92  44.50 
NON-ADRs 0.70 22.32    9.43  42.75 
Difference in Wedge Between ADRs (ARG) and 
Non-ADRs (ARG) 
2.23 43.80    4.50  19.95 
Value weighted portfolios     
ADRs (ARG) 1.68 25.99  21.47  63.22 
NON-ADRs 0.29   8.13  16.22  54.14 
Difference in Wedge Between ADRs (ARG) and 
Non-ADRs (ARG) 
1.39 25.91    5.25  19.31 
II. Percent change in New York price (in US$)     
Equal weighted portfolios     
ADRs (NY) 1.21 19.57   -1.27   -0.82 
Difference in Wedge Between ADRs (NY) and 
Non-ADRs (ARG) 
0.51 10.56 -10.70 -38.41 
Value weighted portfolios     
ADRs (NY) 0.39   8.33    1.15    5.14 
Difference in Wedge Between ADRs (NY) and 
Non-ADRs (ARG) 
0.10   2.68 -14.59 -44.40 
Source: Economatica. 
Note: t-stats are tests that the return on ADR and non-ADR portfolios on the day after and the week 
after the imposition of the Corralito differ significantly from the mean daily and weekly ADR and 
non-ADR portfolio returns in the pre-Corralito period. “Day before to day after” is the return between 
12/3/2001 and 11/30/2001; “Day before to week after” is the return between 12/7/2001 and 
11/30/2001. Tests assume that the distribution of returns in the ADR and non-ADR portfolios did not 
change after the imposition of the Corralito. 
 
3.5 Argentine ADR discounts 
It is clear from Table 3.3 that Argentine share prices increased following the 
imposition of the Corralito, consistent with our prediction that share prices reflect the 
liquidity value of stocks relative to bank deposits. One of the difficulties in studying 
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share price movements, however, is that it is difficult if not impossible to control for 
changes in fundamentals that could have affected firms around the time of the Corralito. 
The advantage of studying ADRs is that one can use the price of ADRs in New York as a 
benchmark for gauging the impact of changes in policies that were specific to investors in 
Argentina. We therefore turn to the discounts on ADR shares in New York relative to 
their corresponding price in Buenos Aires.  
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show prices of local and ADR shares (both in dollars) and the 
ADR discounts for two (Pérez Companc and Siderca) of the eleven companies in our 
sample of ADRs over the January 1, 2001, to May 31, 2002, period.127 The figures also 
show the arbitrage bounds based on our estimates of transactions costs (described in 
Appendix 3.2 and detailed in Table 3.A1).128 Table 3.4 summarizes the maximum and 
average discounts during pre-Corralito, Corralito pre-devaluation and Corralito post-
devaluation periods for each company and the averages across the eleven companies. The 
top panel of the table calculates the discounts excluding transactions costs and the bottom 
panel includes transactions costs.129 
 
                                                 
127 Similar figures for the rest of the ADRs are available upon request. 
128 The transactions costs we use in the calculations include the Argentine brokerage fees in both Buenos 
Aires and New York (τ1=0.3025, τ3=0.3025), the Buenos Aires stock exchange fee (τ2=0.1025), the ADR 
conversion fee (τ4=0.15) and the fees to open a NY bank account and wire transfer ADR proceeds (τ5=1.0). 
These costs are explained in detail in Appendix Table A1. We ignore the time delay in our calculations of 
premia/discounts. The difference between the lower and upper arbitrage bound in our estimations is around 
500 basis points. Rabinovitch, Silva, and Susmel (2003), using data for 6 Argentinean stocks with ADRs 
for the period 1993–2000 estimate arbitrage bands of around 270 basis points, suggesting that transactions 
costs increased during the Corralito. 
129 We use the same transactions costs for the pre-Corralito and post-Corralito periods for consistency, 
even though it is likely that these costs increased substantially after the imposition of the Corralito (so that 
we are biasing our results against finding differences in the two periods). 
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Figure 3.4. Daily PC (Pérez Companc) prices in NY and Argentina and PC’s ADR Discount 
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Note: Arbitrage bounds are calculated based on the derivations described in Appendix 3.2. 
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Figure 3.5. Daily Siderca prices in NY and Argentina and Siderca’s ADR Discount  
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Source: Bloomberg. 
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Table 3.4. Average ADR Discounts Before and During the Corralito 
 Pre-Corralito  Corralito pre-deval  Corralito post-deval 
 
Jan. 1, 2000–  
Nov. 30, 2001  
Dec. 3, 2001–  
Jan. 10, 2002  
Jan. 11, 2002–  
May 31, 2002 
A. Excluding transactions costs mean  max mean t-stat  max mean t-stat 
BBVA Banco Francés -0.02  52.09 20.43   7.96  21.89    7.00   9.73 
Cresud S.A.C.I.F. Y A.  0.01  32.35 21.47   2.91  22.61    3.27   2.28 
Financiero Galicia   0.35  43.89 20.04   6.90  18.42    3.66   3.69 
Irsa Inversiones  0.08  38.27 15.74 11.56  14.11    2.01   1.47 
Metrogas S.A. -0.81  27.03 10.94   1.65  19.63   -1.05  -0.12 
Pérez Companc (PC)  0.08  53.14 19.56   7.00  23.36    6.36   9.53 
Siderca S.A.I.C  0.13  40.12 20.35   5.63  24.85    6.77   9.52 
Telecom Arg Stet-France  0.13  39.71 19.23   8.00  23.56    5.64   7.05 
Telefónica  -0.59  23.52 13.95   8.09  17.39 -14.25  -3.68 
TGS  0.22  45.45 20.14   8.68  19.94    4.36   4.13 
YPF S.A. -0.08  31.79 15.96   4.87  24.72    8.14   7.30 
Portfolios          
Equal-weighted  0.02  38.85 17.93   8.63  19.88    4.71   6.48 
Value-weighted -0.02  37.30 17.27   9.84  20.49    5.91 22.18 
B. Including transactions costs          
BBVA Banco Francés  2.48  54.35 23.50   8.48  27.55  14.13 18.51 
Cresud S.A.C.I.F. Y A.  3.43  35.26 24.70   3.00  26.38     7.20   2.75 
Financiero Galicia   3.37  47.83 24.70   7.71  30.09  15.86 17.73 
Irsa Inversiones  2.67  41.16 19.37 12.90  19.06    6.57   3.10 
Metrogas S.A.  2.92  30.28 14.57   1.66  24.50    5.69   1.49 
Pérez Companc (PC)  2.79  54.71 21.97   7.14  26.45    9.78 11.38 
Siderca S.A.I.C  2.78  41.73 22.49   5.66  27.48    9.17   9.44 
Telecom Arg Stet-France  2.75  42.19 22.58   8.73  27.44  12.88 14.86 
Telefónica   1.67  26.01 16.72   8.49  20.41 -10.48  -3.41 
TGS  4.01  48.32 24.13   9.27  26.17  13.62 12.89 
YPF S.A.  2.13  33.47 18.08   4.97  27.31  10.64   7.66 
Portfolios          
Equal-weighted  2.78  41.39 21.15   9.20  24.61  10.94 13.11 
Value-weighted  2.51  39.28 19.87 10.71  23.62    9.61 24.44 
Sources: Bloomberg and Economatica. 
Note: Mean ADR discounts (measured as the difference between the local price in U.S. dollars and the ADR price, as 
a fraction of the local price in dollars) are calculated only on days when the security was traded in both markets. Local 
prices are adjusted for the ADR conversion ratio. T-stats are tests that the mean ADR discount during the Corallito 
differs significantly from the mean ADR discount in the pre-Corralito period. The test corrects for differences in 
sample size and unequal variances across the sub-periods. Transaction costs are assumed to be the same in the pre- 
and post-Corralito periods. 
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The information in Table 3.4 and the plots indicate that the average pre-Corralito 
discount for all companies was close to zero, suggesting that arbitrage between Argentina 
and the U.S. kept prices of local shares and their corresponding ADRs in close alignment. 
During the Corralito, the average ADR discount (the local price less the ADR price) 
jumped to 17.93 percent (excluding transaction costs). And, even after the devaluation in 
January the average ADR discount remained at 4.71 percent (or 10.94 percent including 
transactions costs). Unfortunately many of the ADRs traded only sporadically in the 
December 2001 through January 2002 period, so that it is not possible to do a full-fledged 
event study analysis of the impact of the Corralito and the devaluation on the ADR 
discounts. To get a sense of whether the changes in discounts over this period are 
statistically significant we provide t-statistics that suggest that the discounts observed in 
the Corralito period are far outside the range that we would have expected based on the 
distribution of pre-Corralito discounts.130  
 Figures 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that the ADR discounts were relatively small at the 
beginning of the Corralito and peaked just prior to the devaluation. One interpretation of 
this evidence is that the value of converting to dollar-denominated assets increased as the 
devaluation became more likely in early January 2002. At their peak, the discount 
exceeded 50 cents on the dollar for Banco Francés and Pérez Companc.131  
 
3.6 ADR Discounts Prior to the Devaluation 
By late December 2001, it was clear that a devaluation of the Argentine peso was 
imminent.132 On December 21, the Argentine foreign exchange market was closed, 
                                                 
130 Non-parametric kernel density estimates (available upon request) suggest that along with differences in 
the first moment of the ADR discount, there were statistically significant changes in the shape, dispersion, 
and skewness of the distribution of ADR discounts during the Corralito relative to the pre-Corralito 
distribution. 
131 According to brokers and the financial press, the most demanded ADRs for capital outflow purposes in 
this period were (in order of importance): Pérez Companc (PC), Grupo Financiero Galicia, Siderca, and 
Telecom. In December 2001, the number of shares of PC traded on the NYSE increased 170 percent.  
132 Although President Dualde initially promised that he would not devalue the peso before March, 
financial press reports in this period suggest that the market expected a devaluation to come much sooner. 
On January 4treports in the press (apparently based on official leaks) indicated that the Government was 
likely to devalue before mid-January. The Argentine Congress voted to establish the Law of Economic 
Emergency and abolish the Convertibility Law on (Sunday) January 6. The decision to devalue the peso 
(continued) 
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although the official exchange rate remained at Arg$1 per dollar. Reports in the press 
suggest that there was an active parallel market for dollars on the streets of Buenos Aires 
during this period, and there were trades in the one-week ahead non-delivery forward 
(NDF) peso-dollar market in New York. It is in this context that the Argentine ADR 
market was also able to serve as a shadow foreign exchange market, allowing us to back 
out the market’s implicit forecast of the size of the devaluation. Recall from equation (8) 
that the ADR discount can be decomposed into 3 components: the liquidity premium (for 
which we have data),133 the capital control circumvention value (CCCV), and the 
currency value. We use two different identification schemes to disentangle the CCCV 
from the currency value. First, we use data from financial press reports as well as non-
delivery forward (NDF) prices134 to measure currency expectations. The CCCV in this 
approach is then the residual, after subtracting off the liquidity premium and the expected 
devaluation from the ADR discount. Alternatively, going back to equation (8), we make 
the assumption that the CCCV and the liquidity premium did not change in the interval of 
one-day-before to the day of the devaluation, allowing us to directly back out devaluation 
expectations from the one-day change in the ADR discount on the eve of the actual 
devaluation.  
1.      In the week before the announcement of the devaluation (and on the days 
between the announcement and the actual devaluation) the range of forecasts for the size 
of the devaluation varied widely. Uncertainty about the magnitude of the devaluation was 
further complicated by the fact that when the Government announced that a devaluation 
would take place (on January 7), they also announced that a new dual-exchange rate 
                                                 
and establish a dual exchange rate regime was officially announced on (Monday) January 7. The actual 
devaluation occurred on (Friday) January 11 when the peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate was officially 
changed from 1 to 1.4. The free float of the peso started on February 11. See Appendix 3 for more 
information regarding exchange rate developments over this period.  
133 The sources for this data are Nosis S.A. and Broda Consultores. The liquidity premium is calculated as 
the daily average market discount on checks relative to cash. These data are available for January through 
November 2002. In keeping with anecdotal evidence from Argentine brokers, we assume that the liquidity 
premium rises gradually (linearly) from 0 percent to 9 percent (the average premium in January) by 
December 20, the day that President De la  Rúa resigned and it became more likely that a devaluation 
would be necessary (and the Corralito would remain in place for the indefinite future).  
134 The NDF data are a composite index of one-week forward peso-dollar contracts available on 
Bloomberg. 
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system would be established, in effect indicating that there would be two simultaneous 
devaluations. Clarín, the leading newspaper in Argentina, reported on January 3 that a 
devaluation was imminent and that it was expected to be 30 percent. On January 4, 
Clarín revised its forecast of the devaluation to a range of between 35–40 percent. In 
contrast, the one-week ahead NDF market was predicting a devaluation of just 25 percent 
on January 9 and 10 (down from 30 percent in the previous week). Reuters, which 
collected data on the peso-U.S. dollar black market rate in this period, did not track the 
rate in the week prior to the devaluation apparently because of the wide dispersion of 
quotes in the broker market. In our decomposition calculations we use the (high-end) 40 
percent devaluation forecast reported in the financial press starting on January 4 through 
January 10. For the rest of the days in our sample we use the NDF market forecasts. 
 In Figure 3.6 we provide a visual picture of our first method of decomposing the 
ADR discount for Pérez Companc (PC) into its 3 components. We focus on PC because it 
was the stock with the highest trading volume in the United States and Argentina during 
the days surrounding the devaluation, and information from brokers suggests that PC was 
the stock primarily used to conduct ADR conversions. The liquidity premium (the price 
of deposits) ranged from zero to 9 percent, declining very gradually from mid-January 
through May 2002. The expected devaluation—based on the NDF series and media 
reports as described above—shows three sharp spikes on December 6, December 20, and 
January 4. The capital control circumvention value—which is the residual—averages 5 
percent in the week before the announcement of the devaluation. It then falls back down 
to around 3 percent in the post-devaluation period.  
In the upper panel of Table 3.5 we calculate the CCCV for each of the eleven 
ADRs over the week before the devaluation assuming a liquidity premium of 9 percent 
and an expected devaluation of 40 percent. The Argentine Merval was closed in the days 
surrounding the devaluation, so changes in the ADR discount reflect movements of the 
stock price in New York. It is interesting to note that only two of the ADRs, Banco 
Francés and Pérez Companc, have positive CCCVs in this period. If actual devaluation 
expectations were lower than 40 percent (as suggested by the NDF prices) a number of 
   
 124
the CCCV estimates would turn positive.135 It is also the case that in the period just prior 
to the devaluation liquidity in some of the ADRs was extremely low (as reflected in the 
trading volume numbers in the last two columns of the upper panel shown in Table 3.5). 
This is especially true for those ADRs with relatively low rates of discount (Irsa, 
Metrogas, and YPF).136 
One way to think about the CCCV in this context is as a measure of the degree to 
which the Argentine capital controls were binding. If there were other less costly means 
of circumventing the Corralito we should see the CCCV embedded in the ADR discount 
decline. Indeed, the Argentine government eased some of the more draconian restrictions 
on capital outflows in the months following the devaluation, which likely lowered the 
ADR CCCV. Also, a number of other cross-listed financial instruments, including 
CEDEARs (U.S. firms cross-listed on the Argentine stock market), became more liquid 
in early 2002 which provided additional vehicles for capital outflow,137 further lowering 
the CCCV for ADRs. Finally, it should be noted that a negative CCCV for a particular 
stock does not necessarily mean that there are costless profits available to investors 
through ADR conversions. The calculation of the CCCV assumes that the trade can occur 
instantaneously. If the stock is held for any period of time, and this period will be longer 
for more illiquid stocks—investors will also take into account any additional covariance 
risks that they would incur in holding the stock. These additional risk factors are not 
included in our calculations.  
Our second method of disentangling the capital control circumvention value 
(CCCV) from the currency value contained in the ADR discount is presented in the last 
two columns of Table 3.5. We make the assumption that the CCCV value (and the 
                                                 
135 If we calculate the CCCV on January 4, when both the Argentine and New York markets were open, 
and use the NDF estimate of expected devaluation of 30 percent and a liquidity of premium of 9.2 percent, 
the CCCVs for Financiero Galicia, Siderca, and TGS all become positive at 5.1, 1.4, and 0.4 percent, 
respectively. 
136 Amihud (2002) provides an alternative measure of liquidity (designed to capture the daily price impact 
of order flow) that takes the average ratio of the daily absolute return on share i to the daily value of trading 
volume for share i. Using this measure of liquidity, the five most liquid shares in Argentina during the 
Corralito are PC, Financiero Galicia, Siderca, Telecom, and Banco Francés. Further, using this measure of 
liquidity, PC is at least 4 times as liquid as any of the other cross-listed shares. 
137 See Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil, and Tesar (2002) for a further discussion of the role of CEDEARs. 
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liquidity premium) did not change on the eve of the devaluation. If we take the difference 
in ADR discounts just before and just after the devaluation on January 11 we find an 
average expected devaluation of between 40 and 45 percent, depending on whether we 
use the ADR discounts on January 10 (when only the New York market was open) or on 
January 4 (the last trading day on the Argentine Stock Market before the devaluation) in 
our calculations.138 These changes in discounts are significantly larger than the typical 
daily or weekly discount changes in the pre-Corralito period and they suggest that, on 
average, the ADR market did a good job predicting the magnitude of the official 
devaluation (which was 40 percent). However, it is interesting to note that the 
devaluation forecasts implicit in the ADR discounts were generally far from predicting 
the 70 percent devaluation that took place for the floating component of the dual-
exchange rate system that was also established on January 11.  
 









Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02
Pérez Companc ADR discount inclusive of transactions costs
Liquidity premium
Expected Devaluation (NDF premia and media reports)
CCCV (Premium associated with the circumvention of capital controls)
"Leak" in the 




Sources: Bloomberg, Nosis S.A., Broda Consultores, and Clarín. 
Note: Observations are based on weekly moving averages  
                                                 
138 Over this period there are days when only the U.S. market is open (although there exist local prices in 
Argentina based on the previous trading day) as well as days when particular ADRs did not trade in one or 
both markets. If we calculate changes in the ADR discounts on January 17 (when the Argentine stock 
market reopened), rather than January 11 , the average change in the ADR discount ranged between 32 and 
33 percent.  
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Table 3.5. Estimated CCCV and Expected Devaluation After January 4, 2002 
Individual ADRs 
Decomposition of ADR discount in week before 
the devaluation 
Difference in ADR 
discounts discounts around 
devaluation 














BBVA Banco Francés 54.4    5.4     886   1872 19.29 35.52 
Cresud S.A.C.I.F. Y A. 35.3 -13.7   8026       40 58.82 62.35 
Financiero Galicia  47.8   -1.2   5887   3678 33.29 36.89 
Irsa Inversiones 41.2   -7.8     807     619 28.64 43.21 
Metrogas S.A. 30.3 -18.7     372     200 23.72 45.34 
Pérez Companc (PC) 54.7    5.7 16757 16429 22.62 32.36 
Siderca S.A.I.C 41.7   -7.3   4470     817 45.52 44.12 
Telecom Arg Stet-France 42.2   -6.8   4251 25674 76.00 69.67 
Telefónica  na  na         0     878 na na 
TGS 48.3   -0.7     410     284 38.97 37.96 
YPF S.A. 33.5 -15.5     219     795 48.72 45.61 
Average 42.92   -6.08   3826   4662 39.56 45.30 
Sources: Bloomberg, Economatica, Nosis S.Z. and Broda Consultores, and Clarín. 
Note: ADR discounts are measured as the difference between the local price in US dollars and the ADR price, 
as a fraction of the local price in dollars. Local prices are adjusted for the ADR conversion ratio. The 
Argentine Stock Market was closed January 5–17 so that the reported ADR discounts are based on Argentine 
trading on January 4. The CCCV column is calculated as the “max ADR discount” minus a liquidity premia of 
9 percent, and an expected devaluation of 40 percent. Volume is in thousands of dollars. Telefónica is 
excluded as its shares did not trade in Argentina on January 4. Using Amihud’s (2002) measure of liquidity, 
PC is at least 4 times more liquid than all the other ADRs, and the five most liquid shares in Argentina during 
the Corralito are PC, Financiero Galicia, Siderca, Telecom, and Banco Francés. 
 
3.7 Venezuela’s CANTV ADR discount 
Just two months after Argentina’s Corralito was finally abolished, Venezuela 
found itself in the midst of an economic crisis that resulted in a 20 percent devaluation of 
the bolívar against the dollar and the establishment of capital controls on February 6, 
2003. The Venezuelan controls were less severe than those in Argentina in that they did 
not involve the freezing of bank deposits, but all conversions of Venezuelan bolívares 
into U.S. dollars (including the purchase of dollars to pay dividends to ADR holders) 
became subject to government approval. In the period immediately following the 
imposition of the capital controls ADR conversions were suspended, although trading in 
CANTV shares (the most liquid Venezuelan ADR) continued both in Venezuela and New 
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York.139 Starting in May 2003, the Bank of New York announced that it would resume 
CANTV ADR conversions and the CANTV discounts (the difference between the ADR 
price in New York and the corresponding local price in U.S. dollars) increased 
dramatically from below 10 percent to between 30 and 45 percent peaking at 50 percent 
in January 2004.140  
Figure 3.7 shows the CANTV ADR discount together with the “dollar-transfer” 
rate141 and the “dollar-CANTV” rate142 over the period May 2002 through February 2004 
(the capital controls are still in place at the time of this writing). During the period when 
CANTV ADR conversions were suspended (February 6 through May 20, 2003) and 
arbitrage was not possible, the “dollar-CANTV” is much lower than the “dollar-transfer” 
rate. Once ADR conversions resumed, and arbitrage could again take place, the “dollar-
CANTV” rate closely tracks the “dollar-transfer” rate. In June 2003, The Economist 
reported that “shares in CANTV, the telephone company, which is also quoted in New 
York, rose by 68 percent in May, as investors realized that they could swap them for a 
dollar-denominated ADR, and thus for dollars”.143 Unfortunately, there does not exist an 
alternative measure of currency value in Venezuela that will allow us to disentangle the 
CCCV from the expected devaluation. 144 If we assume that the CCCV was in the 3–5 
                                                 
139 The other Venezuelan firm that was cross-listed on the NYSE in 2003 was Corimon. It was de-listed in 
June 2003 after it failed to pay dividends to ADR holders and its ADR price in NY dropped so steeply that 
its market capitalization fell below the NYSE minimum value. The other eleven Venezuelan ADRs were 
OTC and extremely illiquid during 2003. 
140 As of February 2004, the Institutional Investor Relations Department of CANTV indicated that 92 
percent of all possible ordinary shares of CANTV which can be transformed into ADRs (class-D shares), 
have been converted and are outstanding in New York. 
141 The dollar transfer market (also described as “money tables” or “mesas de dinero”) provides the price in 
bolívares of buying dollars and transferring them to a foreign bank, so that this price will include the 
CCCV. These data are available from Venanacham (the Venezuelan-U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 
Caracas) and are for “large transactions” in an informal broker market. The transaction fee for these 
transfers is typically fixed at US$25 per operation. 
142 The dollar CANTV is the effective cost of buying dollars using CANTV ADR conversions inclusive of 
transactions costs. Our estimates of transactions costs for this market were provided by Activalores. 
143 The Economist, June 12, 2003. It is interesting to note that CANTV posted negative earnings in the same 
quarter that its share price rose by 68 percent. Venezuela’s Caracas General Index also rose 63 percent as a 
direct consequence of CANTV’s price boom, even as Venezuelan GDP was contracting 25 percent. 
144 The official Venezuelan exchange rate was fixed over this period at 1598 bolívares to the dollar. It is not 
possible to use bolívar NDF prices to decompose the ADR discount because the market was extremely 
(continued) 
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percent range that we found for Argentina, this would imply an ADR market expectation 
of a 55–62 percent devaluation of the bolívar relative to the dollar in early December 2003.  
 


































CANTV ADR Discount  
inclusive of transaction 
May 21: Bank of NY 
announces that it will 
resume ADR 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and Activalores. 
 
The Venezuelan ADR market, and particularly the CANTV ADR discount, 
continues to provide market participants with a timely indicator of the effective exchange 
rate in an organized, legal, and transparent asset market. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that in November 2003 Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) announced that it 
would use CANTV’s ADR discount to proxy for the bolívar-U.S. dollar exchange rate in 
their calculation of the MSCI Venezuela Index.145  
 
                                                 
illiquid over this period. The dollar transfer rate is also not useful because it includes both transaction costs 
and a CCCV component.  
145 On November 26, 2003, MSCI announced its decision to change its standard spot rate for the 
Venezuelan bolívar to a notional exchange rate based on the relationship between the price of CANTV in 
the local market in bolívares and the price of its ADR in U.S. dollars 
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4.   Market Factors and the Pricing of ADRs  
In Section 3 of this chapter we analyze the time series of Argentine ADR and 
local prices in isolation. We now turn to the pricing of ADR stocks in the context of 
overall market movements in Argentina and New York. 
In theory, in a fully liberalized and integrated financial environment, we would 
expect ADRs to be priced based on global market factors. Investors with access to global 
assets should expect returns to be based on covariances of individual stocks and the 
global market portfolio. That said, in practice, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2004) find that home bias tends to increase local influences on asset prices. 
They find that local market portfolios often better explain the cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns for local stocks, though they also find that equity flows and cross-country 
correlations increase global influences on asset prices.146 The pricing of Argentine ADRs 
provides an interesting natural experiment in the context of this literature. Prior to the 
imposition of the Corralito, Argentina’s financial markets were considered fully 
liberalized. The Corralito, although allowing ADR transactions to continue, was intended 
to control capital outflows and therefore presumably led to a less globally integrated 
Argentine capital market.147 In terms of the market model, we might therefore expect to 
find that the influence of local and global market factors in pricing Argentine cross-listed 
stocks changed during the period in which capital controls were in force. 
We test whether the imposition of the Corralito led to changes in the pricing of 
Argentine stocks with associated ADRs using a multi-factor market model; where itR  is 
the return on asset i at time t, GmtR  is the return on the global market portfolio at time t, 
L
mtR  is the return on the local market portfolio at time t, and ΔSt is the change in the 
exchange rate at time t: 
                                                 
146 Also see Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), and Alexander et al. (1987) who 
examine the pricing of ADR portfolios in the context of the market model and generally find evidence that 
global market factors dominate local factors in explaining ADR returns. In a large cross-country study, 
Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) find evidence of significant differences in the prices of local shares and their 
corresponding ADR shares, though they also find that these differences rarely persist for more than one day. 
147 Schmukler and Kaminsky (2000), however, find little evidence that capital controls (in six emerging 
market economies during the 1990s) effectively segmented domestic markets especially over longer horizons. 
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it mt mt t itR R R Sβ β β β ε= + + + Δ +  (3.9) 
 
Table 3.6 presents daily time series results148 from regressions of returns from the value-
weighted ADR portfolio (in Argentina and the U.S.) on the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) world index, an orthogonalized149 local Argentine value-weighted 
portfolio index (excluding the stocks with associated ADRs), and the change in the peso-
dollar exchange rate. Regression results are presented both for the period prior to the 
imposition of the Corralito (specifically January 2000 through November 2001) and for 
the Corralito period (December 2001 through May 2002). 
The results in Table 3.6 suggest that both local (Argentine) market factors and 
global market factors were important in pricing Argentine stocks with associated ADRs 
even before the imposition of the Corralito. Our estimates of the betas on the global 
market portfolio are close to one while the betas on the local market factor are 0.8 for the 
portfolio returns in Argentina and 0.7 for the corresponding ADR portfolio returns in the 
U.S. Focusing first on the results for the regression using the portfolio price in Argentina 
we find that in the Corralito period the local market portfolio beta rises (both in absolute 
magnitude and in relation to the beta on the global market portfolio) following the 
imposition of the Corralito. If we examine what proportion of the variance of portfolio 
returns in Argentina is explained by the local market portfolio (using the partial R2), we 
find that prior to the Corralito this was 42 percent, whereas during the Corralito this rises 
to 76 percent.150 The opposite is true of the global market factor, the proportion of the 
                                                 
148 Daily returns correspond to close-to-close prices including dividends and excluding weekends and 
holidays. 
149 We orthogonalized the non-ADR Argentine portfolio by regressing it on the MSCI (separately over the 
pre- and post-Corralito sub-periods) and use the residuals from these first stage regressions for LmtR  in the 
estimation of equation (8). 
150 This result is based on a market model which includes dummies to control for the many market closures 
that occurred during the Corralito. In order to determine whether non-frequent trading introduces bias in 
our regression results, we re-estimated equation (8) using the Scholes and Williams (1977) non-
synchronous trading correction. Specifically, we estimate equation (8) allowing for up to 10 lags and leads 


















where ρ is the autocorrelation 
coefficient. We find that the local market portfolio beta is robust to the choice of leads and lags, whereas 
(continued) 
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variance of portfolio returns in Argentina explained by the global market factor falls from 
16 percent prior to the Corralito to just 1 percent during the Corralito. These results 
suggest local market factors in Argentina became more important in pricing stocks with 
associated ADRs (and presumably all Argentine stocks), and global factors became less 
important, during the period in which capital controls were in force. 
 
Table 3.6. Explaining ADR portfolio returns in Argentina and the U.S. using a Global Market 
Portfolio and an Argentine (Non-ADR) Local Market Portfolio over the Pre-Corralito and 
Corralito Periods 
Independent Variable Pre-Corralito Corralito 
 Local Shares ADRs Local Shares ADRs 
Local Market Portfolio     0.834**     0.736**     1.011**     0.157** 
    (0.053)    (0.050)    (0.094)    (0.046) 
Global Market Portfolio     0.961**     0.992**     0.668*     0.651** 
    (0.057)    (0.053)    (0.256)    (0.174) 
Exchange Rate Change       0.069    -0.011 
      (0.097)    (0.029) 
Constant     0.000     0.000    -0.002    -0.004* 
    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Number of Obs 477 483 104 124 
R2     0.45     0.47     0.81     0.2 
F-statistic 190.7 208.9   58.2     5.5 
DW statistic     2.11     1.89     1.89     1.88 
Partial R2 (local MP)     0.42     0.43     0.76     0.16 
Partial R2 (global MP)     0.16     0.23     0.01     0.09 
Sources: Economatica and Bloomberg. 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The global market portfolio is the MSCI world index and the local 
market portfolio is an orthogonalized value-weighted portfolio (in dollars) of all the stocks traded in Buenos 
Aires except those with an associated ADR.  The dependent variable is the return in Argentina or the U.S. on 
a value-weighted portfolio of the 11 stocks with associated ADRs.  The pre-Corralito period is 1/1/2000 to 
11/30/2001 and the Corralito period is 12/3/2001 to 5/31/2002. ** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, 
and * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. The regressions over the Corralito period include dummy 
variables for days when the Argentinean market was closed. Partial R2 (market x) corresponds to the R2 when 
we exclude the other market index in the regression (in the Corralito sample the Exchange Rate Change 
variable is also excluded). 
 
                                                 
the global market portfolio beta is sensitive to the lag specification in the Corralito period, though the main 
qualitative results remain robust. These lead and lag estimates of the betas are available upon request. 
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The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter suggests that the pricing of 
cross-listed shares in Argentina and New York may have diverged during the Corralito 
period. And, in particular, we might expect that while local factors influenced prices in 
Argentina, they may not have been as important for prices of the same stocks sold in New 
York (given that investors in New York were not subject to the restrictions of the 
Corralito). Indeed, we find that estimates of equation (3.9) using ADR portfolio returns 
in New York indicate that the beta on the local market portfolio falls dramatically from 
0.73 in the pre-Corralito sub-period to 0.16 in the Corralito period. The beta on the 
global market portfolio in this regression also falls in the Corralito period (from 0.99 to 
0.65), as does the regression goodness of fit which falls from 0.47 in the pre-Corralito 
period to 0.2 during the Corralito.151 Further, the percentage of variation in the return of 
the ADR portfolio in New York explained by the local market portfolio (based on the 
partial R2) falls from 43 percent before the Corralito to 16 percent during the Corralito, 
while the explanatory power of the global market index falls from 23 to 9 percent. 
In order to more formally test the hypothesis that the influence of local and global 
market factors for pricing Argentine cross-listed shares changed after the imposition of 
the Corralito, we use a Chow breakpoint test for structural change. Table 3.7 presents the 
results of four such Chow tests for no structural change in the local and global market 
betas in the two markets (over the full sample period January 2000 through May 2002). 
The results indicate strong rejections of the hypothesis of no structural change in both the 
local and global market betas after the imposition of the Corralito for the ADR portfolios 
in both markets. These results together with the results presented in Table 6 indicate that 
Argentine ADRs in New York became less like other Argentine stocks (including those 
with associated ADRs) with the advent of capital controls.  
 
                                                 
151 We analyze beta stability in the post-Corralito period by running recursive least squares regressions. 
These estimates (available upon request) suggest that in the first two months following the imposition of 
the Corralito (and when the volume in the ADR market was at its peak) neither the global market index nor 
the Argentine market index explain ADR portfolio returns in New York (whereas in Argentina local market 
factors become more important in explaining the pricing of stocks with associated ADRs over this period). 
In the subsequent two-month rolling subsamples the global market index beta regains statistical 
significance and rises in magnitude for the ADR portfolio returns in New York. 
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Table 3.7. Chow Breakpoint Test for local and global market portfolio beta stability after the 
imposition of the Corralito 
Local Shares Local Market Portfolio β Global Market Portfolio β Both Market β 
F-statistic 12.931 3.440   3.796 
P-value   0.000 0.017   0.005 
ADRs    
F-statistic   6.719 3.230 30.050 
P-value   0.001 0.040   0.000 
Note:  The dependent variable is the return (in dollars) in Argentina (Local Shares) or in the U.S. (ADRs) on a 
value-weighted portfolio of the 11 stocks with associated ADRs. The global market portfolio is the MSCI world 
index and the local market portfolio is an orthogonalized value-weighted portfolio (in dollars) of all the stocks 
traded in Buenos Aires except those with an associated ADR. The full sample is 1/1/2000 to 5/30/2002 and the 
breakpoint is 11/30/2001. 
 
 
5.   Conclusions 
Argentina in late 2001 and early 2002 and Venezuela in 2003 provide an unusual 
opportunity to analyze the reactions of investors to capital controls. The Argentine 
Corralito, originally put in place to stave off a devaluation of the peso, effectively served 
to provide incentives for Argentines to invest in the Argentine stock market, and provided 
a new role for cross-listed shares as a (legal) mechanism for capital flight. Venezuelan 
investors also learned to use CANTV ADRs to evade similar capital controls. Investors in 
both countries were able to purchase cross-listed stocks for local currency, convert them 
into ADRs, re-sell them in New York for dollars and deposit the dollar proceeds in U.S. 
bank accounts.  
In this chapter, we show that Argentine and Venezuelan ADR discounts went as 
high as 55 percent, indicating that investors were willing to pay significant amounts in 
order to move their funds abroad and to hedge the dollar value of their assets. In effect, 
ADR discounts serve as a shadow exchange rate in the presence of capital controls. In 
Venezuela, the implicit value of the dollar in CANTV ADR discounts serves as timely 
indicator of the effective exchange rate in an organized, legal, and transparent asset 
market. On the eve of the Argentine devaluation, the ADR market anticipated a fall in the 
value of the peso relative to the dollar in the range of 40 to 45 percent. We also estimate 
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that the capital control circumvention value for Argentine ADRs averaged 3 percent 
during the Corralito. 
We find that the imposition of the Corralito led to changes in the underlying 
pricing structure of ADR stocks in Argentina and New York. The Corralito, although 
allowing ADR transactions to continue, was intended to control capital outflows and 
therefore should have led to a less globally integrated Argentine capital market. We find 
evidence of an increase in Argentine market segmentation after the imposition of the 
Corralito. Local market factors in Argentina became more important in pricing peso 
denominated stocks with associated ADRs, while the reverse was true (local factors 
became less important) for the same ADRs in New York. 
In the chapter we have focused on the recent Argentine experience with capital 
controls and the role that cross-listed securities can play in such an environment. But 
there are general lessons to be learned. Our analysis suggests that once having established 
ADRs and other kinds of contractual arrangements across markets, it is difficult if not 
impossible to reverse the process of capital market integration. Indeed Venezuela tried to 
halt ADR conversions by restricting firms from paying out dollar dividends, but the 
government ultimately succumbed to pressures and allowed ADR conversions to resume. 
ADRs also give insights into the extent to which capital controls are binding by providing 
a market measure of the effectiveness of those controls. 





Appendix 1: Argentina’s Financial Market Event Time Line 
 
October 28, 2001 
Minister Cavallo starts negotiations with the IMF and the U.S. 
Treasury to purchase collateral for new Argentine bonds to be 
issued in an exchange for the nearly US$100 billion of local 
and external debt. 
 
 
October 29, 2001 
Mr. Cavallo defines the debt exchange operation as voluntary. 
The old debt would exchange for bonds paying seven percent 
per year and be guaranteed by tax revenues. The IMF and U.S. 
Treasury require compliance with a zero deficit and an 
agreement with the provinces on tax revenue sharing before 
any kind of financial support is given. 
 
November 19, 2001 
The IMF announces it will not make any new disbursements 
without being satisfied that Argentina has secured the goals 
previously designated. 
 
November 30, 2001 
End of a debt swap with local banks and pension funds for 






December 2, 2001 
The government announces temporary capital control regime 
(termed Corralito) involving bank withdrawal limits and limits 
on dollar transfers abroad as a last-ditch effort to fend off a 
devaluation and prevent a major banking crisis. Withdrawals 
are limited to Arg$250 (in dollars) per week per account. 
Depositors, however, may still access funds for larger 
purchases through checks or debit cards and transfer their 
money among banks. Holders of deposits may also exchange 
them for federal bonds (BODENs) maturing in 2005, 2007, or 
2012 in a Canje exchange. No limits are placed on domestic 
payments made with checks, credits, debit cards and electronic 
MEP (Método Electrónico de Pagos) payments.  












December 3, 2001 
 
The capital control measures announced on Dec 2 come into 
full effect through Decree 1570-01 on Dec 3: 
a) Wire transfers suspended except with prior Central Bank 
approval. 
b) Cash withdrawals from the Banking System limited to 
US$1000 per month. 
c) Financial Argentine institutions prohibited from foreign 
currency futures transactions. 
d) Financial Argentine institutions prohibited from issuing new 
bank loans denominated in Argentine pesos. All new loans 
must be issued in U.S. dollars and existing peso loans must be 
converted to U.S. dollar loans at a one to one rate. 
e) Foreign investors trading in the Argentine Securities Market 
subject to repatriation restrictions. Funds related to securities 
transactions must remain in the country until government 
approval is obtained or the measure is officially revoked. 
December 19, 2001 Mr. Cavallo and all other ministers resign. 
 
December 20, 2001 
President De la Rúa resigns and Mr. Ramón Puerta becomes 
interim president. Country Risk reaches 4618 points. Global 
(sovereign) bond yields reach their historical maximum of 49 
percent annual return in dollars. 
December 21, 2001 The official Foreign Exchange Rate market is closed. 
 
December 23, 2001 
Mr. Rodríguez Saa becomes the new interim president for 60 
days. He declares the suspension of external debt payments for 
at least 60 days, totaling US$166 billion in federal and 
provincial debt. 
 
December 24, 2001 
The government announces that a new fiat currency (i.e., 
without foreign-currency backing) will be created (the 
argentino). 
 
December 30, 2001 
Interim president Mr. Rodríguez Saa resigns and the legislative 
assembly elects Mr. Eduardo Duhalde as new president. 
January 2, 2002 Mr. Duhalde assumes power. 
January 4, 2002 “Leak” reported in the financial press suggests that a 40 percent 
devaluation is imminent. 
January 5, 2002 The Argentine stock market is closed. 
January 6, 2002 The Argentine Congress votes to establish the Law of 
Economic Emergency and abolish the Convertibility Law. 
 
January 7, 2002 
 
The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Lenicov, announces the 
devaluation of the peso and the establishment of a new dual 
foreign exchange rate regime, to be implemented on January 9, 
2002.  








 January 11, 2002 
After several delays, the exchange rate market re-opens and the 
new dual exchange rate system is put in place: 
a) 1 Argentinean peso= 1 U.S. dollar parity (Convertibility 
Plan) is abolished.  
b) All debts (capital and interests) agreed in Argentinean 
currency with financial entities—converted into U.S. dollars 
according to the Decree 1570/2001—will be reconverted into 
the original currency agreed (pesos). 
c) The official, fixed conversion rate of US$1 U.S.=Arg$1.4 is 
relevant for foreign trade operations. The free or floating rate is 
relevant for all other transactions and freely determined by the 
market.  




January 21, 2002  
The government announces the easing of bank withdrawal 
restrictions: 
a) Up to Arg$7,000 can be withdrawn from term deposits in 
pesos (transferring that money to a checking account) 
b) Up to US$5,000 can be withdrawn from term deposits in 
dollars (transferring that money to a checking account at the 
official exchange rate, 1.40). 
c) Up to US$5,000 in a saving account can be pesofied at the 





February 3, 2002 
Mr. Lenicov announces an asymmetric pesofication and the end 
of the dual exchange rate regime: 
a) pesofication of all dollar deposits at Arg$1.4 per dollar.  
b) corporate and consumer debts are also pesofied, but at the 
exchange rate prevailing during the Convertibility period. Both 
deposits and credit will be indexed to inflation.  
c) the end of the dual exchange rate regime and a unified 
floating exchange rate determined by market forces. 
d) the right to withdraw wage and pension income from the 
corralito without any amount restrictions (before workers could 
only extract up to Arg$1,500). 
Corralón starts which freezes bank term deposits (holders of 
term deposits had the option to convert them into CEDROs or 
BODENs maturing in 2007 or 2012 in a Canje exchange). 
February 4, 2002 The official foreign exchange market is closed. 
 
 
February 11, 2002 
The BCRA establishes a new unified free foreign exchange 
market, which replaces the two markets—official and free—
implemented in January. The exchange rate market re-opens 
and the floating dollar exchange rate reaches Arg$2.1, well 
below the devaluation expectations built-into asset prices.  






March 26, 2002 
The Central Bank announces new measures related to foreign 
exchange transactions and ADR/CEDEAR conversions aimed 
at improving the functioning of the foreign currency market 
and regulating the buying and selling of foreign currency by 
order and for the account of the Central Bank. The press 
communication also mentions that there will be coordination 
between the Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV) and the 
Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA) in order to adopt 
new measures to regulate capital outflows via ADR and 






The Central Bank passes very restrictive regulation (circular 
#3723) that mandates that every stock be traded in its 
underlying currency. After intense opposition from the 
financial community, the central bank rescinds #3723 and 
instead passes a resolution (circular #3727) that forbids “contra 
cable” operations. These operations allowed brokers to sell 
stocks purchased in Buenos Aires instantaneously in New York 
(or any foreign market) using the Mercado de Valores as a 
clearinghouse. Under #3727 it was still possible for investors in 
Argentina to convert CEDEARs and sell them in New York, 
but this new restriction significantly increased the transactions 
costs to do so.  
December 2, 2002 2.      Corralito rescinded. 
 
Sources: Ámbito Financiero, La Nación, and Clarín (various issues) and Pictet. 
   
 139
Appendix 2: Transactions costs and computation of arbitrage bounds 
Appendix Table A1 shows transaction cost ranges that reflect amounts that were 
charged to both small and large Argentine investors during the Corralito. The standard 
length of time required for an ADR conversion was nine days.152 Large investors, 
institutional investors, and bankers faced substantially lower costs than smaller investors, 
and could also complete the ADR conversion in a shorter period of time.153 
[Appendix Table A1 here] 
Taking into account these various transactions costs and defining n0 as the 
minimum time required to sell an ADR in New York, the expected return (at period t) in 
U.S. dollars of converting local share i into its corresponding ADR is:154 
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where n≥n0, 1 2(1 )
L
i itpξ τ τ+ + is the local currency the investor needs to buy iξ  local 
shares to obtain one ADR corresponding to stock i, and 3 5[  (1- )(1- )]
ADR
t it nE p τ τ+ is the 
dollar amount that the local investor expects to obtain after selling the ADR in the U.S. at 
time t+n after taxes and expenses. Local investors typically face a broker’s fee, τ1, and a 
transactions fee, τ2. A second broker’s fee, τ3, is incurred when the asset is sold in the 
United States. We also include a fixed fee in dollars, τ4, that the investor must pay to 
transform the local shares into an ADR. Finally, the cost of opening a bank account in the 
United States is τ5. Note that the investor does not have to physically obtain dollars to 
                                                 
152 Information from brokers in Buenos Aires suggests that the time to conversion varied considerably 
across type of investor and across time. We use contemporaneous prices and exchange rates as a 
benchmark in computing arbitrage returns, which can be interpreted as the minimum cost investors would 
incur for ADR conversion.  
153 The costs reported in the table are based on phone interviews with portfolio managers and investors in 
Buenos Aires and on information published on the websites of various Argentine brokerages advertising 
the ADR-conversion process. 
154 Here we are assuming the conversion fee is paid in dollars in the U.S. once the operation is complete, 
and the amount is withdrawn from the investor’s banking account. 
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carry out this operation (the return is simply expressed in dollar units) so the investor 
does not pay a fee for obtaining foreign exchange. 
 If the local investor were instead to use the dollar amount 1 2[ (1 ) ]
L
i it tp Sξ τ τ+ + to 
buy local share i and sell it in the local market in period t+n for the expected (net of 
taxes) price, her expected return at time t will be: 
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where 1 2 (1 )
L
i it tp Sξ τ τ+ +  is the amount, expressed in dollars, the investor needs in order 
to buy enough shares of the local stock i to reach the equivalent of one ADR, and 
L
1 2 (1- - )t i it n t nE p Sξ τ τ+ +  is the amount of money she receives for selling the shares after n 
periods. The returns are calculated net of the broker’s fee and the local transactions fee.  
 For the investor to be willing to convert shares to ADRs, it must be the case that: 
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The trade-off facing a U.S. investor is different from that of an Argentine investor 
because of the asymmetries in fees, taxes and institutional regulations in the two markets. 
The expected return to holding ADR i for n periods is: 
 
 -   
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U.S. investors do not face a broker’s fee or a stock market transactions fee.155  
 The return to converting the ADR to local shares, and repatriating the earnings is 
given by: 
 
                                                 
155 It is not strictly true that U.S. investors face zero transactions costs. However, our empirical analysis 
focuses on the arbitrage conducted by Argentine investors during the Corralito, so we abstract from the 
relatively small U.S. transaction costs for simplicity.  
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When selling the shares in the local market, we assume that the U.S. investor incurs 
charges in using a local broker and must pay the stock market transactions fee. Since we 
assume that he would like to return the profits from the sale back to the U.S., he incurs an 
additional tax ( 6τ ) for transferring the funds.  
 A risk-neutral investor will cancel an ADR when: 
 
 L 1 2 6(1- - )(1 )  0
ADR
t i it n t n itE p S pξ τ τ τ+ +− − ≥  (A6) 
 
This suggests that if local prices (expressed in dollars) exceed the ADR price investors 
should buy ADRs, convert them back to local shares and sell them in the local market.  
 
Arbitrage bounds 
The trade-offs faced by local and U.S. investors yield arbitrage bounds for capital inflow 
into and outflow from the local market. Equation (A6) can be re-written to show the 
bound facing a local investor who is contemplating converting his local stocks i into their 
corresponding ADR:  
  
 1 2 4
3 5 3 5
(1 ) 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
ADR L
t it n t i it n t n
L L
t i it n t n t i it n t n
E p E p S
E p S E p S
τ τ τ ξ
τ τ τ τ ξ ξ
+ + +
+ + + +
− − −
+ − ≥
− − − −
 (A7) 
 
Capital outflows to the U.S. will not occur if the transaction costs on the left-hand-side of 
(A7) (which are a function of the local price and the exchange rate) exceed the returns to 
the conversion. The Argentine data show that local prices moved well outside of the 
arbitrage bands because of the value investors attached to being able to convert their 
frozen bank deposits into dollars in overseas accounts. 
 Equation (A8) shows the corresponding arbitrage bound for capital inflows into 
the local market. Transactions costs faced by a U.S. investor that exceed the returns of 
selling ADRs for local shares will choke off capital inflows into the local market.  
   
 142
 
 1 2 6(1 )(1 ) 1
L ADR
t i it n t n t it n
L
t i it n t n







− − − − ≥  (A8) 
 
If the ADR premium/discount lies between the bounds in (A7) and (A8) neither investor 
would engage in arbitrage between the markets. Premia outside of the bounds should, in 
the absence of capital controls, be arbitraged away.  
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Appendix 3: Argentine Exchange Rate Market Developments 
The Argentine foreign exchange rate market was closed (feriado cambiario) from 
the December 21 until January 10 (inclusive). During this period the shadow (or parallel) 
market exchange rate quoted at around 1.5–1.6 pesos per dollar, well above the official 
parity of Arg$1 per dollar prevailing before markets were closed.  
On January 4, the Minister of Finance announced the discontinuation of the 
currency board and on January 7, the Minister of Finance announced the devaluation of 
the peso and a new exchange rate regime. The new exchange rate regime was a dual one, 
featuring an official, fixed non-convertible rate of Arg$1.4 per dollar (relevant for 
exporters and financial institutions) and a free or floating dollar, for all other operations 
and determined by supply and demand. This new dual regime came into full effect on 
Friday, January 11, when the markets were re-opened. 
On January 11 there were two different values for the free exchange rate: dollars 
purchased with cash at 1.7–1.8 “free pesos” per dollar, and a higher exchange rate for 
dollars purchased with checks from funds in the Corralito (1.9–2 “trapped pesos” per 
dollar).  
Exchange rate market operations were again suspended from February 4 to 
February 8, inclusive. On Sunday, February 3, the new Minister of Finance announced 
the end of the dual exchange rate regime and a unified floating exchange rate was put in 
place on Monday, February 11. On February 11, the floating exchange rate opened at 
Arg$2.10 per dollar. 
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Figure A1. Foreign Exchange Rate Regimes in Argentina 
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Note: Thick black lines denote periods when the official foreign exchange market was closed. 
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